Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SHANGHAI160
2009-04-10 01:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

CHINA AND AFRICA: SHANGHAI VIEWS ON EXPANDING TRADE AND

Tags:  PREL ETRD EINV CH XA TW 
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04.10.2009 01:32
09SHANGHAI160
Consulate Shanghai
CONFIDENTIAL
06BEIJING23548|08SHANGHAI283|09SHANGHAI5|09SHANGHAI80
VZCZCXRO4847
RR RUEHCN RUEHDU RUEHGH RUEHJO
DE RUEHGH #0160/01 1000132
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 100132Z APR 09
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7813
INFO RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0004
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 0001
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 0001
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0001
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0001
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0001
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RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0001
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0005
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0065
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 8452
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2678
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1676
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2056
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 1880
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RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0345
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0001
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0004
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0001
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0001
TAGS: PREL ETRD EINV CH XA TW
SUBJECT: CHINA AND AFRICA: SHANGHAI VIEWS ON EXPANDING TRADE AND
REF: A) SHANGHAI 80; B) 06 BEIJING 23548; C) 08 SHANGHAI 283


C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 06 shanghai 000160

Sipdis

Dept for af/e, af/c, af/w, af/s, af/eps
usdoc for ita mac das kasoff, melcher, szymanski
nsc for loi

E.o. 12958: decl: 4/9/2024
Tags: prel, etrd, einv, ch, xa, tw
Subject: china and africa: shanghai views on expanding trade and
investment ties

Ref: a) shanghai 80; b) 06 beijing 23548; c) 08 shanghai 283

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Pol/Econ Section Chief, U.S.
Consulate, Shanghai, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d),(e)



04.10.2009 01:32 09SHANGHAI160 Consulate Shanghai CONFIDENTIAL 06BEIJING23548|08SHANGHAI283|09SHANGHAI5|09SHANGHAI80 VZCZCXRO4847 RR RUEHCN RUEHDU RUEHGH RUEHJO DE RUEHGH #0160/01 1000132 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 100132Z APR 09 FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7813 INFO RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0004 RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 0001 RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 0001 RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0001 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0001 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0001 RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 0011 RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0001 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0005 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0065 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 8452 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2678 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1676 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2056 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 1880 RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1889 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0345 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0001 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0004 RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0001 RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0001 TAGS: PREL ETRD EINV CH XA TW SUBJECT: CHINA AND AFRICA: SHANGHAI VIEWS ON EXPANDING TRADE AND REF: A) SHANGHAI 80; B) 06 BEIJING 23548; C) 08 SHANGHAI 283 C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 06 shanghai 000160 Sipdis Dept for af/e, af/c, af/w, af/s, af/eps usdoc for ita mac das kasoff, melcher, szymanski nsc for loi E.o. 12958: decl: 4/9/2024 Tags: prel, etrd, einv, ch, xa, tw Subject: china and africa: shanghai views on expanding trade and investment ties Ref: a) shanghai 80; b) 06 beijing 23548; c) 08 shanghai 283 CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Pol/Econ Section Chief, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, U.S. Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d),(e) ¶1. (C) Summary: During March 2009 meetings with four Shanghai-based Africa scholars, the largest Chinese investor in Africa, and officials from the Egyptian and South African Consulates General in Shanghai, Congenoffs examined the evolving state of China-Africa relations. The upcoming Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Egypt, on which the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) is an advisor, will showcase rapid progress in bilateral economic relations. Though private Chinese investors have made significant headway expanding exports to Africa, resource and commodity extraction remains dominated by large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Lack of communication between the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) makes it difficult to keep track of Chinese private investment
in Africa, said one interlocutor. Scholars believe that while the Chinese Government is increasingly concerned about its image, government policy will continue to be driven by core economic and political interests, including securing access to natural resources, developing markets for Chinese exports, and achieving greater influence in international institutions. Egypt and South Africa are concerned about the growing "imbalance" in their bilateral trade with China. End Summary. Upcoming Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Currently planned for November 2009 in Cairo, Egypt, the 4th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC will be led by Chinese President Hu Jintao and the political leaders of 49 African nations. On this visit to Africa, his seventh in the past 10 years, Hu will attempt to deepen China's relationship with all African countries while exploring further investment opportunities, according to xxxxxxxxxxxx. Hu will also try to counter media perceptions that China is only interested in the resource-rich nations of Africa, and one topic for discussion will be evaluating progress in the China-Africa relationship since the 3rd FOCAC Ministerial Conference hosted by Beijing in 2006. Since then, trade between China and Africa has increased sharply, with total trade volume rising 32 percent in 2007 and an estimated 50 percent in 2008, to over USD 106.8 billion, indicating that the goal proposed by the 2006 summit "to push China-Africa trade volume to USD 100 billion by 2010" was realized two years ahead of schedule. (Note: According to Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) trade statistics, Africa maintains a slight overall surplus due to strong commodity exports in oil, minerals, wood, cotton, iron-ore, diamonds, and copper, among others. China's exports to Africa consist largely of light industrial products, textiles, electronics, and consumer goods. MOFCOM statistics, however, indicate that bilateral trade is not equitably balanced throughout the continent. In 2008, just five countries (Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria, and Egypt) accounted for 61 percent of total bilateral trade. End note.) 3.xxxxxxxxxxxx -------------- ¶4. (C) Shanghai scholars expect that of Africa's 53 nations, only the four that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland) will not attend the 2009 FOCAC, said the scholars. Forty-eight nations attended the 2006 3rd Ministerial Conference of FOCAC. Malawi has since switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). xxxxxxxxxxxx diplomatic relations with China could attend the upcoming summit. (Note: African countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan were invited as observers to the 2006 FOCAC in Beijing but elected not to attend. xxxxxxxxxxxx was not clear whether the four African nations currently maintaining diplomatic ties with Taiwan will be invited to attend as observers this year. See Ref B. End note). xxxxxxxxxxxx also noted that Senegal was specifically chosen for Hu Jintao's most recent Africa visit because it had recently (2005) dropped diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established ties with the PRC. However xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that the PRC and Taiwan currently have an unwritten agreement to cease the practice of distributing millions of dollars in aid to African nations in an attempt to gain diplomatic recognition. Educational Exchanges: Confucian Institutes in Africa -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Another focus of the 4th Ministerial of FOCAC will be to increase educational exchanges. xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that currently there are "well under 1,000" total African students in Chinese institutions in Shanghai, and that a strong push must be made to increase this number. However, significant numbers of Chinese students are traveling to Africa for the pursuit of advanced degrees, and the number of visiting scholars from China has increased by double digits each year. xxxxxxxxxxxx pointed out that China has already opened ten Confucius Institutes throughout Africa, and plans to construct ten more. China has also doubled the number of national scholarships offered to Chinese students and professors wishing to study or research in Africa to 4,000 per year. xxxxxxxxxxxx. Confucius Institutes are designed to spread knowledge and understanding of the Chinese language and culture. They also serve as educational centers for family members of Chinese employees in Africa, and offer Chinese language instruction to both African and Chinese nationals. xxxxxxxxxxxx said Chinese President Hu will make it clear to all conference participants that Chinese aid and involvement in Africa, including cultural exchanges, will continue to deepen, despite the current difficult economic situation. xxxxxxxxxxxx stressed that future bilateral cooperation will revolve around natural resources, education, cultural exchanges, infrastructure, agriculture, and energy. "Incredible Opportunity" for Private Investment in Africa -------------- -------------- Shanghai 00000160 003 of 006 ¶6. xxxxxxxxxxxx ¶7. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx, who currently has xxxxxxxxxxxx employees in Shanghai and more than xxxxxxxxxxxx in Africa, said that Africa "reminds him of China 30 years ago," and represents an incredible growth opportunity, as Africa's consumer markets continue to mature. When asked why he currently does not invest in extracting raw materials in Africa, he responded that Chinese raw materials investments are primarily controlled by large SOEs. His company is completely private, and all of his financing is arranged through private sources. xxxxxxxxxxxx is currently examining the possibility of expanding into resource extraction in Africa, but has found the process to be incredibly time consuming and difficult. While China recently pledged an additional USD 2 billion to its China-African Development Fund, xxxxxxxxxxxx said this money is completely "off-limits" to private investors. xxxxxxxxxxxx, his investments are not seen as "strategic" by the Central Government, and thus not a priority for the Development Fund. ¶8. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx also expressed a strong preference for hiring local African employees for his projects in Africa, xxxxxxxxxxxx explained that Chinese employees are significantly more costly, and that with proper training, African employees perform just as well. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he sends his managers to xxxxxxxxxxxx, and several universities in South Africa on annual recruiting missions. xxxxxxxxxxxx disagrees with scholars such as xxxxxxxxxxxx, who feel that Chinese investors usually prefer importing Chinese laborers to Africa because of a perception that they are more hardworking and easier to train and manage than their African counterparts. xxxxxxxxxxxx," travels to Africa to manage his investments xxxxxxxxxxxx, and has also received acclaim from the Nigerian government for bringing in over 100 other Chinese investors to open businesses in the country. Finally, he noted that while corruption and mismanagement is a constant concern, most African nations have adopted free market systems, and he finds it relatively easy to Shanghai 00000160 004 of 006 conduct business there. Shanghai Scholars See Expanded China-Africa Ties -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) When asked why President Hu Jintao visited countries that do not have extensive natural resource holdings during his most recent visit to Africa, xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that China's interests are broad, and its leaders seek good relations with the entire continent, not only specific countries. xxxxxxxxxxxx said Africa has recently moved forward with democratic reforms in some countries, but countries such as Kenya, Madagascar, and Burkina Faso have struggled with political reforms. xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that China's core focus will remain peace, stability, and development in Africa in order to create an environment conducive to further trade and investment from China. xxxxxxxxxxxx, who frequently travels to Africa and was a visiting scholar in Zambia in 2008, agreed that China's main goal for Africa is the pursuit of "win-win cooperation," especially on the economic front. He believes China will continue to increase investments in Africa's energy, raw material, and resource industries while developing its infrastructure and helping Africa acquire advanced technologies. He stated that since 1995, Africa's economy has outperformed the rest of the world, and China hopes to deepen its foothold in this growing market. ¶10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx, stated that, despite the Chinese Government's longstanding position not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations, China's leaders are increasingly sensitive to external criticism of its Africa policies and have made greater effort to address humanitarian issues, such as the ethnic violence in Sudan. China feels greater "responsibility" for Africa's development than other regions such as Latin America, which Chinese officials view as "in the United States' backyard, and therefore their (the United States') responsibility." Because of China's long history with Africa dating back to the 1950s and the influence China seeks to cultivate in the continent, African development and poverty reduction are major Chinese concerns, said xxxxxxxxxxxx. Additionally, xxxxxxxxxxxx foresees the China-Africa relationship evolving to where, in another 10 years, a significant number of Chinese corporations move some of their manufacturing operations to Africa because of rising wages and costs in China. However, in order to make this possible, China will have to continue escalating investments in infrastructure, education, and training, and increase technology transfers to Africa. Lack of Coordination Between Chinese Government Ministries -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) In light of the global financial crisis and the resulting decline in commodity prices, international media have recently reported cases of Chinese investors abandoning copper mines in Congo and Zambia, leaving local workers with unpaid back wages. When asked about these reports, xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that the Chinese Government expressly forbids the abandonment of investment without paying back wages and meeting other obligations, as it causes a "loss of face." xxxxxxxxxxxx agreed that such cases represent a small percentage of total Chinese investment in Central Africa, and that it was only private investors who had fled. They reiterated that China has Shanghai 00000160 005 of 006 a long-term commitment to African development, and that SOEs would never be allowed to abandon assets or obligations to local employees. ¶12. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx agreed that it was likely private investors who had fled, as "many private investors from Zhejiang Province are operating small mines in Africa, and the Central Government has little knowledge or control of events on the ground." He explained that Chinese Government bureaucracy is often to blame, with complaints of wrongdoing in Africa always going first to the MFA, which often has no knowledge of individual investor activities. MOFCOM receives information from local governments in China but is often reluctant to share it with the MFA, he said. xxxxxxxxxxxx such bureaucratic difficulties diminish oversight and accountability, and it is almost impossible for the government to track small-scale private investors. African nations have recently begun to push back, requesting the MFA notify them if investors with bad records in China or elsewhere try to enter their countries. Africa's View: Investment Welcomed, with Reservations -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) With an eye on Shanghai as China's commercial and financial capital, two African countries, Egypt and South Africa, have Consulates in the city, and Nigeria currently is in the process of establishing a Consulate in Shanghai.xxxxxxxxxxxx, lamented that of the total USD 6.3 billion in annual trade between Egypt and China, Egypt exports a mere USD 420 million to China. Of that amount, one product (marble) constitutes 50 percent of Egypt's exports to China. When asked if this imbalance or the growth of Chinese exports to Egypt have generated any negative feelings in his country, xxxxxxxxxxxx responded that a frequent source of irritation was the heavy use of imported Chinese labor and the limited number of joint ventures with local Egyptian companies. Egpyt opened its Consulate General in Shanghai 5 years ago with the primary purpose of finding opportunities for Egyptian businesses in China, but xxxxxxxxxxxx acknowledged this effort has had limited success so far. One recent sign of Egypt's rising interest in China was the 2008 opening of a branch of the National Bank of Egypt in Shanghai's posh Pudong District, home to much of the international financial services industry in China.xxxxxxxxxxxx hopes this bank will help facilitate transactions for bilateral trade and investment. ¶14. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx, relayed similar concerns about their nation's large trade deficit with China. xxxxxxxxxxxx told Congenoff that South Africa's primary imports from China include machinery, mining equipment, industrial tools, textiles, electronics and footwear, while exports are mainly raw materials and precious metals, such as gold. South Africa hopes to significantly increase the number of Chinese tourists to balance this deficit; however, this effort is not progressing as quickly as hoped.xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that Chinese investment is generally welcomed by African leaders because, unlike other investors, China is willing to provide money with "no strings attached" and invest in the infrastructure necessary to extract and export resources. xxxxxxxxxxxx cited Botswana, which obtains almost 70 percent of its foreign exchange through diamond sales, and Angola, whose trade Shanghai 00000160 006 of 006 with China accounts for one-fourth of China's trade with the entire continent. Chinese SOEs are also willing to "build roads and railways through the jungle to otherwise inaccessible areas to extract resources," she said. ¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx, however, posited that investments of this magnitude were riddled with corruption, and were "preferred by African dictators as a way to line their pockets while avoiding interference." In the past few years, xxxxxxxxxxxx has also noticed a trend of African governments becoming more selective with investments, and an increasing willingness to negotiate hard for favorable terms, such as the employment of local labor, skills development and training, as well as technology transfers. When asked whether these advances were threatened by the global financial crisis, xxxxxxxxxxxx responded that while Chinese investments have yet to dry up (as Western investment has), several major projects such as China's proposed USD 9 billion investment in the Congo seem likely to unravel. He cited falling commodity prices as the major cause, and the most serious likely side effect for African economies could be the bankruptcy of secondary industries. xxxxxxxxxxxx reiterated that while Chinese investments in Africa have provided benefits for both sides, the Chinese market remains difficult to penetrate for African investors. Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) Congenoffs' meetings revealed a general optimism about the future of Chinese investment in Africa. xxxxxxxxxxxx believe that China has developed traction in Africa, and that the economic relationship will continue to expand despite the global financial crisis. In economically focused Shanghai, which hosted the African Development Bank's annual meeting in May 2007, businessmen, academics, and African diplomats are increasingly interested in expanding China-Africa trade and investment ties, and they see the 2009 FOCAC as a means to further deepen China's relations with the continent. Camp

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