UNIFICATION MINISTRY RESTRUCTURING: LEANER AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000976 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PREF KS KN SUBJECT: UNIFICATION MINISTRY RESTRUCTURING: LEANER AND MEANER Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Since the early days of the Lee Myung-bak Administration, when the Ministry of Unification (MOU) was slated to disappear, the MOU has been steadily weakened. Earlier this month, the ROKG announced a restructuring of the Ministry of Unification that: -- raises the profile of unification policy planning and analysis of North Korea's internal conditions and succession possibilities, -- deemphasizes economic/humanitarian assistance and family reunions, and -- removes several senior MOU officials closely associated with Sunshine Policy and the October 2007 end-of-term summit between then-President Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il. ¶2. (C) Summary Con't: The restructuring is essentially a recognition that there is little or no room to engage and negotiate with the North Koreans on issues ranging from economic assistance to infrastructure projects to humanitarian cooperation, i.e. the end of Sunshine Policy. Instead, the MOU is supposed to become more of a policy-and-research agency, with more emphasis on research than on policy, a role many of our MOU contacts are not eager to embrace. Among MOU offices that deal with funds, only the refugee office received an increase in funding. End Summary. -------------- Background: MOU Survived -------------- ¶3. (C) South Korea's Ministry of Unification (MOU) was on the chopping block after President Lee Myung-bak won the December 2007 election. MOU survived, largely because progressive forces came to its defense; it also helped that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) resisted the acquisition. However, it was clear from the outset of Lee's term that the Sunshine Policy era had ended and MOU was no longer riding high. MOU lost 80 out of about 500 positions, moved from its own building into the lower floors of the MOFAT building, and adopted a low profile under Lee's first Minister of Unification, veteran MOFAT diplomat Kim Ha-joong. North Korea's outright rejection of Lee's suggested "Denuclearization, Openness, USD 3,000" proposal -- calling for increased economic engagement provided that denuclearization progress continued -- reinforced MOU's low profile. There were no more inter-Korean meetings nor economic aid, MOU's bread and butter. ¶4. (SBU) The July 2008 shooting death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumkang, and the North's refusal to allow an investigation, prompted the ROKG to close the tourist resort. The North cut off tours to Kaesong City in December, leaving the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) as the only remaining inter-Korean economic project. The North's December 2008 restrictions on the number of South Koreans who could access the KIC, March temporary closures, and April announcement that all agreements pertaining to the KIC needed to be renegotiated have left even that flagship project in limbo. In short, MOU's universe has virtually disappeared, as has its clout in the ROKG. -------------- -------------- Restructuring: More Policy, Intel, Research; No Money -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The ROK cabinet on May 12 approved the Ministry of Unification,s proposal to disband its Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau and create a new Information Analysis Bureau that will focus on analyzing internal political developments in the DPRK. Assistant Minister for Planning and Coordination Kim Jung-tae told the press, "The restructuring aims to strengthen the Ministry's long-term unification policy-making and intelligence analysis functions." An intelligence analysis office with similar functions to the newly-created bureau had been disbanded a year earlier by the Lee administration with the justification that its functions overlapped with those of the National Intelligence Service (NIS),Ministry of National Defense (MND),and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). The restoration, analysts explained, was due to concerns within the ROKG and National Assembly that the MOU lacked the ability to analyze North Korean developments. A May 13 Dong-A Ilbo article said that concerns about the increase of uncertainty inside the DPRK since KJI's reported stroke last August contributed to the decision to consolidate MOU,s intelligence analysis function. ¶6. (SBU) On the other hand, the Ministry's Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau, which had overseen issues related to ROKG humanitarian assistance, separated families and DPRK defectors closed as a result of the restructuring plan. The bureau was first created in 1996 under the Kim Young-sam administration. Two of its divisions -- Separated Families and Resettlement Support -- will be absorbed into the Unification Policy Office, which will be upgraded and led by an Assistant Minister. POW/abductee and NK human rights issues will also be addressed by the Separated Families Division. The Humanitarian Assistance Division will be absorbed into the Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Bureau. ¶7. (SBU) A total of four divisions will be closed as a result of the reshuffle, but according to MOU, personnel will increase from the current 470 to 475, with the 5 new personnel that will be hired at Hanawon. Despite MOU's attempt to "right-size" for the second time since the inauguration of President Lee, North Korean defector related offices and budget have been continually increasing. In July 2009, Hanawon will open a new facility for adult males in Yangju City, located 30 Km north of Seoul. Hanawon headquarters where women and children receive training for two months upon arrival completed its expansion in December 2008, increasing their maximum capacity from 300 to 600. Hangyerae Middle and High School for defector teenagers is also planning to build a second school to accommodate the overflow. MOU also increased the number of scholarship offers to defector college students from 30 to 60 this year, providing approximately USD 3,000 per year. Three students who study overseas also receive MOU scholarship (two in the United States and one in Japan) of approximately USD 6,000 per year. ¶8. (SBU) Korean press reaction is mixed on the latest reshuffle, with even conservative papers like the Hankook Ilbo reporting on public concerns that the reshuffle could give the "wrong signal" to the DPRK under the current stalemate in inter-Korean relations. Other critical opinions include concerns that the ROK will lose its leverage in its relations with the DPRK by giving up its humanitarian assistance negotiation card. In analyzing the reshuffle, however, all papers agreed that the latest development reflected the current state of inter-Korean relations. -------------- Sunshine Policy Officials Out -------------- ¶9. (C) The restructuring also had a political element in that leading Sunshine Policy MOU officials have been forced out. Former Hanawon Defector Resettlement Center Director Koh Kyung-bin (Assistant-Minister level) and former Senior Delegate for Inter-Korean Dialogue Cho Yong-nam resigned ahead of the reshuffle. Both Koh and Cho had held high-level posts in the Roh administration -) Koh as Deputy Minister for Policy and Public Relations and Cho as Assistant Minister for Planning and Coordination -) and respectively played major working-level roles in drafting the October 2007 summit declaration. Cho Myung-kyun, another main MOU player during the Roh administration through his role as Presidential Secretary for National Strategy, had resigned last October. As a result, the South Korean press reported that all of the main MOU players from the Roh administration -) Koh Kyung-bin, Cho Yong-nam, Cho Myung-kyun -) have left the scene after a year of the Lee administration. The fourth and final key player of the Sunshine Policy, Kim Young-tak, was reassigned from his office in charge of more than 60 staff and all-things related to Kaesong Industrial Complex to an office in the North-South Dialogue building without a single staff. According to one of our MOU contacts, the move was to "prepare Kim for his departure in the coming months." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Prior to his appointment as Minister of Unification, Hyun In-taek was the Ministry's biggest critic, responsible for the LMB transition team's proposal to be completely rid of it. Ironically, Hyun is now the MOU's biggest asset, because his strong relationship with LMB means survival for the ministry. The price, however, is a distinctly weakened MOU, concentrating more on research, intel and analysis than anything operational. This change in fortune is deeply disappointing for our MOU contacts, who for decade or more were used to being in a premier ROK agency on the cutting edge of all things North Korean. STANTON