SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; June 18, 2009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 SEOUL 000973 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; June 18, 2009 TOP HEADLINES -------------- Chosun Ilbo ROK-U.S. Summit Produces New Approach to N. Korea's Nuclear Issue: U.S. Should Negotiate with N. Korea as Representative of the Five Countries of the Six-Party Talks JoongAng Ilbo Leaders of China and Russia "Urge N. Korea to Quickly Return to the Six-Party Talks" Dong-a Ilbo Soft Obama? That was N. Korea's Illusion: Less than Five Months into Office, Obama Sends Strong Message to N. Korea, Saying, "We will Break Past Pattern of Rewarding ¶N. Korea's Bad Behavior" Hankook Ilbo ROK-U.S. Summit Demonstrates Firm ROK-U.S. Cooperation on N. Korea's Nuclear Issue... but Fails to Produce Incentives for N. Korea to Return to Dialogue Hankyoreh Shinmun ROK-U.S. Summit Only Toughens Stance on N. Korea, "Declaring New Cold War" on Korean Peninsula Segye Ilbo ROKG Begins Work to Enforce UNSC Resolution 1874 Seoul Shinmun U.S. Congress Pledges Cooperation on KORUS FTA, N. Korea's Nuclear Issue DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS -------------- According to diplomatic sources, Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama agreed on a new approach to the North Korean nuclear issue, an eclectic mix of Clinton-era bilateral talks and the Bush-era Six-Party Talks. (Chosun, JoongAng) According to an ROKG source, a North Korean patrol boat briefly intruded into ROK territorial waters (the Northern Limit Line) in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) on June 16. (Chosun) The Seoul High Court ruled yesterday that MBC TV must run two more corrections concerning last year's controversial "PD Diary" episode about mad cow disease. (All) INTERNATIONAL NEWS -------------- The State Department, in its "Trafficking in Persons Report 2009," again listed North Korea, along with 16 other countries, as one of the worst countries in human trafficking. (Hankook, Segye, Seoul, all TVs) According to the AP, Marine Gen. James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a June 16 Senate hearing that the (U.S.) West Coast may be vulnerable to a missile attack from North Korea within three to five years. (Chosun, Segye, Seoul) MEDIA ANALYSIS -------------- -ROK-U.S. Summit -------------- The June 16 ROK-U.S. summit in Washington continued to grab the SEOUL 00000973 002 OF 012 headlines in the ROK media. Most media assessed the summit as a "success" in terms of alleviating the ROK's security concerns about North Korean provocations, but regretted the summit's failure to come up with solutions on how to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Newspapers carried the following headlines: "Soft Obama? That was N. Korea's Illusion: Less than Five Months into Office, Obama Sends Strong Message to N. Korea, Saying 'We Will Break Past Pattern of Rewarding N. Korea's Bad Behavior'" (conservative Dong-a Ilbo); "ROK-U.S. Summit Demonstrates Firm ROK-U.S. Cooperation on N. Korea's Nuclear Issue... But Fails to Produce Incentives for N. Korea to Return to Dialogue" (moderate Hankook Ilbo); and "ROK-U.S. Summit Only Toughens Stance on N. Korea, 'Declaring New Cold War' on Korean Peninsula" (left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun) Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "The summit did help reduce concerns about a third North Korean nuclear test, but it has not entirely erased the basic sources of anxiety. The two nations ... didn't come up with any solutions on how to actually solve the nuclear conundrum. Given that China holds the key to imposing sanctions on North Korea, more must be done to persuade China to become more active in putting pressure on Pyongyang and helping to resolve the nuclear issue. ... Without fundamental solutions to these problems, the North Korean nuclear reserves will continue to grow and we may, in the end, reach a point of no return. We can use either the stick or the carrot. Time is running out." Conservative Dong-a Ilbo's editorial argued: "The question is whether such firm determination (by the two leaders) can result in changes in North Korea's behavior. ... Pyongyang is set to defy the U.N. Security Council's new resolution ... Therefore, the ROK and the U.S. must be prepared for further provocations and aggression by the North. No less important is the need to create an international atmosphere to promote sanctions against the North. The G8 Summit next month in Italy is expected to discuss North Korean issues. Washington should take the lead in enforcing UN. sanctions on the North and implementing what was agreed upon in the Seoul-Washington summit." Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun editorialized: "The two leaders failed to mention ways to fundamentally resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. ... The continuing commitment of 'extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella,' in the Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance collides with the objective of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula because it is based on the premise that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons." Conservative Chosun Ilbo front-paged a report from Washington that Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama agreed on a new approach to the North Korean nuclear issue, an eclectic mix of Clinton-era bilateral talks and the Bush-era Six-Party Talks. The report went on to say that under the new plan, the U.S. will serve as the main negotiating partner for North Korea, representing the five nations in the Six-Party Talks - the ROK, China, Japan and Russia - and the pattern will differ from the Clinton-era bilateral dialogue from the following standpoints: First, the U.S. will engage in talks with the North after discussions with the five countries regarding a joint plan as to what price the North should pay if it doesn't abandon its nuclear ambitions and what benefits the North will gain in return for its nuclear abandonment. Second, while the U.S.-North Korea talks during the Clinton era followed a single track - freeze the North's nuclear program through bilateral talks - the talks now will follow a double track policy in which the U.S. will prepare to impose sanctions on the North through five-way talks on the one hand, and invite the North to multilateral talks through the U.S.-North Korean dialogue channel on the other. Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo filed a similar report entitled "Will the Five-Way Talks, Proposed by Lee Myung-bak and Agreed to by Obama, Become a New 'Negotiating Framework' to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue?" In a related development, conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized: SEOUL 00000973 003 OF 012 "In a situation where North Korea is looking only at the U.S., negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea will be inevitable. However, we must keep in mind that the U.S. can change its attitude at any time, depending on its national interests. During the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, the ROK maintained this kind of cooperation with the U.S., but was left out in the cold soon after the U.S. undertook talks with North Korea. ... Above all, it would be "out of the question" for the U.S.-North Korea talks to develop into nuclear disarmament talks, which would amount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state." -Human Trafficking Report -------------- Most ROK media gave straight, inside-page play to the State Department's "Trafficking in Persons Report 2009," in which North Korea was again listed as one of the worst countries in human trafficking, along with 16 other countries. OPINIONS/EDITORIALS -------------- Pres. Lee-Obama Summit (Dong-a Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 31) President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama, in their summit talks Tuesday in Washington, agreed on principles to deal with North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. They also adopted a "joint vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance." Due to the two leaders' commitment to close cooperation, they were able to accomplish this significant achievement to stave off nuclear proliferation and eliminate security fears on the Korean Peninsula, in addition to taking the bilateral alliance to the next level. Presidents Lee and Obama pledged their commitment to achieving the "complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic missile programs." President Obama also reaffirmed that he will not recognize the North as a nuclear state. He provided a written guarantee providing "extended deterrence," which includes putting the ROK under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. pledge to defend the ROK against the North's nuclear, biochemical and missile attacks. By doing so, the two leaders not only pledged to prevent Pyongyang from possessing nuclear weapons, but also affirmed a joint defense principle to protect the ROK from the North's weapons of mass destruction. The question is whether such firm determination (by the two leaders) can result in changes in North Korea's behavior. Strong cooperation between Seoul and Washington is an inevitable response to Pyongyang's confrontational policies. Before taking office, President Obama suggested the possibility of direct talks with the North, but has shifted to a hard-line stance after Pyongyang exhibited anachronistic and contemptuous behavior. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il made a serious mistake by throwing cold water on President Obama's show of goodwill. Kim might have assumed that the North's old brinkmanship tactics would also be effective on the Obama Administration. Instead, Pyongyang should stop its reckless confrontations with the international community by responding to President Obama's offer of negotiations with the North. Pyongyang is set to defy the UN Security Council's new resolution condemning its second nuclear test and missile launches. Therefore, the ROK and the U.S. must be prepared for further provocations and aggression by the North. No less important is the need to create an international atmosphere to promote sanctions against the North. North Korean issues are expected to be discussed at the G8 Summit next month in Italy. Washington should take the lead in enforcing UN sanctions on the North and implementing what was agreed upon in the Seoul-Washington summit. It must persuade China and Russia to agree with President Obama's stance of not rewarding the North for its improper behavior and take the initiative in curbing further provocations. SEOUL 00000973 004 OF 012 On the fate of the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong, President Lee said he will reject excessive demands from the North. He is correct given that Pyongyang's demand is unacceptable from an economic point of view, and President Lee's hard-line stance is also necessary to press the North to abandon its improper actions. When the two Koreas meet tomorrow for their third working-level talks on the (Kaesong Industrial) complex, Seoul officials should drive home the point to Pyongyang that the ROK and the U.S. will follow through on what they agreed in the summit. The joint vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance is the creation of a future-oriented bilateral cooperation on a global level. For the partnership to evolve into a genuine comprehensive and strategic alliance that shares the same values, the ROK should aim beyond the resolution of the North's nuclear program. The best way for Seoul to actively improve its fortunes and survive between the two main Asian powers -- China and Japan -- is to strengthen ties with the U.S., the world's sole superpower. The joint vision includes principles to deepen the bilateral alliance, such as enhanced cooperation in space development and the peaceful use of nuclear power. Concrete measures to implement these principles should be developed. Being seen as a global partner of the U.S. can sometimes require the ROK to pay a hefty price or make sacrifices. Therefore, Seoul needs to explain to its people the future vision of the bilateral alliance and convince critics. It should also overcome pro-North Korean forces resistant to the principle of pursuing "peaceful reunification based on the principles of free democracy and a market economy." On the bilateral free trade agreement, Presidents Lee and Obama agreed on "working together to chart a way forward." The U.S. Democratic Party continues to oppose the accord, and opinions differ over the timing of the ratification and certain details. However, the two sides must begin work to move it forward since they have recognized the accord's significance in raising economic, trade and investment relations." In particular, Washington must follow in Seoul's footsteps in its effort to ratify the accord. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) No Time to Lose (JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 42) We regard the ROK-U.S. summit as a success that will contribute to alleviating the ROK's security concerns about the recent situation on the Korean Peninsula. As President Lee Myung-bak said at the joint press conference following the meeting, the U.S. reaffirmed its security pledges to the ROK, including its commitment to maintaining the nuclear umbrella. That was the biggest accomplishment of the summit. In the statement which was adopted -- "The Joint Vision for the Alliance of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America" -- both countries affirmed support of their security interests and outlined a provision for "extended deterrence." The summit was held amid heightened tensions on the peninsula, with North Korea conducting its second nuclear test and acknowledging its uranium enrichment program. The fact that the ROK and the U.S. declared their strong intention to make a coordinated response against the nuclear problem was an outstanding achievement as well. In the statement, the two leaders said they would try to build "a comprehensive strategic alliance" on a global scale based on "common values and mutual trust." Although this is overshadowed by the North Korean nuclear issue, it is nonetheless a very important SEOUL 00000973 005 OF 012 agreement regarding the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. It is a declaration that the alliance will develop and evolve beyond its current form. The summit did help reduce concerns about a third North Korean nuclear test, but it has not entirely erased the basic sources of anxiety. The two nations said they would not recognize North Korea as a nuclear power but would pressure the North via sanctions. But they didn't come up with any solutions on how to actually solve the nuclear conundrum. Given that China holds the key to imposing sanctions on North Korea, more must be done to persuade China to become more active in putting pressure on Pyongyang and helping to resolve the nuclear issue. And although United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 allows for inspections of suspicious North Korean cargo on the open sea, there are still several risks involved with carrying them out. The possibility of a North Korean provocation on the peninsula cannot be ruled out. At this moment, the most important task is to ensure the practical efficacy of sanctions while limiting these dangers. But without fundamental solutions to these problems, the North Korean nuclear reserves will continue to grow and we may, in the end, reach a point of no return. We can use either the stick or the carrot. Time is running out. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) The Risks of Direct Talks Between N. Korea and the U.S. (Chosun Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 35) Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama agreed on a five-country framework that requires the ROK, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan to meet together first to discuss the North Korean nuclear impasse and then one of these countries would negotiate with Pyongyang afterwards on behalf of the group. An ROK official said the U.S. would likely to be the representative for the five countries as long as none of the other countries object. In the end, it means that there will be bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang. The U.S. and North Korea will not start talks immediately. At a press conference that followed the summit, Obama said there will be no repeat of the pattern of rewarding North Korea for its provocations. If North Korea continues to pose a threat, it would face tough sanctions, he said. Following UN Security Council Resolution 1874, the U.S. Navy has ordered its forces to search all suspicious North Korean ships. But Obama left open the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis through talks, saying North Korea would be rewarded if it embarks on a road to peace and economic development and strives to win the recognition of the international community. The proposed method by which the five countries that have tackled the North Korean issue for the past five years come up with a solution and then let one of them deal directly with Pyongyang is a plan that would be put into effect if the situation enters into a "negotiating stage." In a situation where North Korea is looking only at the U.S., negotiations between the U.S, and North Korea will be inevitable. However, we must keep in mind that the U.S. can change its attitude at any time, depending on its national interests. During the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, the ROK maintained this kind of cooperation with the U.S., but was left out in the cold soon after the U.S. undertook talks with North Korea. When North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution and sought to implement it, but once Washington SEOUL 00000973 006 OF 012 and Pyongyang began talks, the sanctions fizzled. This time, the leaders of the U.S. and the ROK vowed they would not repeat past mistakes. But such vows may lose strength once the U.S. and North Korea begin direct negotiations. The U.S. must not be fooled again by North Korea's negotiating strategy. And the five countries must take a unified stance and pressure North Korea in unison to ensure the success of a two-way meeting between Washington and Pyongyang. China's role is essential. If Washington-Pyongyang talks begin, nothing will be accomplished as long as China pushes all of the responsibilities on the U.S. and plays a passive role. U.S. pressure will increase if North Korea lashes out against UN-imposed sanctions, conducts a third nuclear test and fires an intercontinental ballistic missile. But so far in the saga of North Korea's nuclear standoff, talks have always followed such provocations. It is easy for the ROK and the U.S. to maintain cooperation when the situation is stalled, but once that situation changes, that level of cooperation may be difficult to maintain. The government must come up with a carefully planned strategy not only in terms of sanctions against North Korea but for the next stage as well. Above all, it would be "out of the question" for the U.S.-North Korea talks to develop into nuclear disarmament talks, which would amount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) Washington Must Speed Up the Ratification of Korea-U.S. FTA (Chosun Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 35) During the Korea-U.S. summit, President Lee Myung-bak and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama said they saw the potential of the bilateral free trade deal, predicting it would deepen economic, trade and investment relations between the two sides, and agreeing to cooperate in advancing the pact. However, Obama said he would only submit the FTA bill to Congress when he and Lee feel the pact would benefit their own citizens. Obama added that he first needed to resolve the disagreement over the terms of the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement before considering submitting the bill to Congress. What he was saying was that, although he agreed in principle with the need for a bilateral free trade pact with Korea, he will only submit it to Congress when outstanding issues regarding beef and automobiles are ironed out. Obama met Lee on the sidelines of the G20 financial summit in April, saying he was aware of the substantial amount of effort the ROK government had put into the FTA, adding that he intended to see the issue move forward. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk also expressed their willingness to see progress in the bilateral FTA. Working-level talks between Seoul and Washington over the ratification of the trade pact began last month. Considering these and other announcements, Obama's latest comments appear to represent a step backwards. Both countries completed talks in April 2007, but further steps have still yet to be taken to ratify the deal and put it into effect. Braving physical clashes with those against the FTA, the National Assembly of Korea passed the bill at the standing committee level in April before handing it over to the plenary session of parliament. However, in the United States, the FTA bill has not yet even been presented to Congress. It would be inappropriate to renegotiate the bilateral pact, a pact already agreed upon by both sides. The existing agreement is a balanced representation of the interests of both countries. Both countries signed the deal based on mutual interests. Seeking a renegotiation of the existing deal signed back in 2007 because some terms are now deemed unfair will derail the entire deal. However, if the U.S. government simply cannot accept the agreement as it is, then it is up to it to propose alternatives that Korea can SEOUL 00000973 007 OF 012 accept without breaking its stance. As seen in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),the success or failure of the Korea-U.S. FTA depends on the leaders of both nations. Obama must speed up the ratification and implementation of the Korea-U.S. FTA from the standpoint of strengthening the bilateral alliance. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) Don't Rush to Ratify KORUS FTA (JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2009, Page 42) At their summit in Washington, ROK President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama adopted a "Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance" which calls for mutual efforts toward progress on the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS-FTA) as well as the North Korean nuclear issue. It is quite disappointing that, contrary to expectations for concrete progress on the trade deal during this summit, the two leaders only issued a principled declaration. President Obama said that he has a firm belief in the KORUS FTA and expects there will be progress (on the pact). However, he added it will take time to submit a ratification bill to the U.S. Congress. Obama went on to say that the ROK seems to be concerned about U.S. beef and the U.S. is concerned about the pact's automotive provisions. He noted that even if these concerns are settled, what matters is the political timing for submitting the trade pact to Congress for a vote. President Obama said that he does not want to put the cart before the horse, adding that the ratification of the KORUS FTA should be sought in the proper order. This is construed to mean that he is carefully weighing the timing for persuading Congress and presenting a ratification bill since it is politically tricky to push for the ratification of the pact when massive restructuring efforts are underway in the auto industry. It is understandable that due to Obama's lukewarm attitude, some observers note pessimistically that the trade pact is unlikely to be ratified this year. However, it is not wise to abandon hope for the KORUS FTA based on mere speculation. What is important is to get the KORUS FTA ratified, even if it takes time. President Obama has taken issue only with the timing and order in presenting a ratification bill but has consistently expressed his belief in the trade deal itself. The U.S. government wants to ratify the KORUS FTA but has not submitted the pact to Congress for a vote due to potential opposition from the U.S. Congress. Since the U.S. government is not in a position to press Congress, it will not rush to present a ratification bill to Congress. What is most needed now is for (the ROK) to give the Obama Administration time to persuade Congress, and the two countries and (their) economic sectors should work together to create an atmosphere for the ratification of the pact. For the sake of the future of the ROK, we cannot give up the trade deal. ¶S. Korea-U.S. Summit Raises More Issues Than Solutions on N. Korea Nuclear Issue (Hankyoreh Shinmun, June 18, 2009, page 23) The content of the Washington summit between ROK President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama a few days ago was disappointing. They discussed a coordinated response to the North Korea situation and adopted a "joint vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance," but they presented no solution to the biggest pending issue, North Korea's nuclear program, and only went as far as voicing their concerns. The confirmation given by the two leaders that North Korea cannot be recognized as a nuclear state is significant in that it draws a clear line with regard to speculation by some people in the U.S. that it is inevitable that (North Korea) would be recognized (as a nuclear state.) In addition, their pledge to faithfully carry out the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which specifies sanctions against North Korea, reflects unity in the SEOUL 00000973 008 OF 012 international community's response to North Korea's unilateral actions that include its second nuclear test. However, the two leaders failed to mention ways to fundamentally resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Although President Obama said North Korea's economic opportunities and integration into the international community could "only be reached through peaceful negotiations that achieve the full and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," he did not discuss a method for achieving this. At the time Obama took office, he expressed support for comprehensive negotiations in which North Korean denuclearization, the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, the construction of a system of peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and economic cooperation with North Korea would all be discussed together. Yet this remains only at the level of diplomatic rhetoric, with no specific framework for discussions presented, ultimately leaving the nuclear problem to worsen. President Lee, for his part, has carried a biased attitude emphasizing only pressure against North Korea. He calls for North Korea's complete abandonment of its nuclear program, saying that the nation will "come to realize that the methods of the past do not work any more." Far from resolving the nuclear issue, this kind of attitude that seems to view simply strengthening sanctions and pressure against North Korea as sufficient could instead very likely heighten conflict between the countries. Also, holding five-party talks, as he suggested, apart from any question of the feasibility of such talks, would likely conflict with the larger principle of resolving the nuclear issue peacefully. President Lee also evinced an understanding reminiscent of the Cold War era when he said, "North Korea has a lingering attachment to war, but it will not turn that into action." The continuing commitment of 'extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella,' in the Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance collides with the objective of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula because it is based on the premise that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. Going beyond the level of the ROK-U.S. alliance and adding a phrase about "peaceful unification based on the principles of liberal democracy and the market economy" was also careless. In connection with the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA),President Obama made it clear that he would not rush things, saying that he did not want to "put the cart before the horse." This means that while the Lee Government is rushing the agreement through, the U.S. is calmly weighing the benefits. Instead of first creating a desirable solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and eliciting cooperation from the U.S. at these talks, the ROK government opted for the misguided approach of focusing on a self-serving hard-line response. Without any other alternative, the U.S. also appeared to get awkwardly caught up in a hard-line argument. Now some figures in both nations are arguing that discussions are useless, since North Korea's goal lies in securing its status as a nuclear state. This easily ties in with an ultra-hard-line argument for increasing pressure against North Korea, even if it means war. It would be incredibly unfortunate if these talks contribute to the spread of such a perspective. It is time for both nations to actively reexamine their North Korea policy. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) MBC Ordered to Broadcast Two More Corrections (JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 10) By Reporter Park Sung-woo Makers of 'PD Diary' might go the Supreme Court to overturn ruling The Seoul High Court ruled yesterday that MBC must run two more corrections concerning last year's controversial "PD Diary" episode about mad cow disease. SEOUL 00000973 009 OF 012 MBC was appealing a previous ruling but yesterday's upper court not only upheld the lower court's ruling from last year, but also told MBC it had to clarify two other points. The Seoul-based MBC broadcast a report in April 2008 warning that the consumption of U.S. beef may lead to the human form of mad cow disease. In response, tens of thousands took to the streets to protest a Seoul-Washington agreement to resume U.S. beef imports. The Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries subsequently filed a complaint against the program makers claiming the April 29 episode contained seven errors. On July 31, 2008, the Seoul Southern District Court ordered the current affairs program to make corrections on two parts of the program and include a refutation. The program had maintained that Koreans are genetically more vulnerable to mad cow disease and had shown footage of a downer cow supposedly suffering from the disease. Judges ordered both items to be corrected. In yesterday's ruling, the court said PD Diary does not need to run another correction on the downer cow because it had already voluntarily run one. PD Diary had also asserted that the ROKG could do little if mad cow disease breaks out in the U.S. The ministry had demanded a correction, but in the first ruling the lower court said MBC did not have to because the issue was actually media opinion. Yesterday's ruling, however, said that MBC must run a correction on this matter. "Under the current import safety measure signed in the Seoul-Washington beef deal, (the ROKG) can halt imports of U.S. beef if a case of mad cow disease is confirmed in the U.S. Therefore, (PD Diary's claim) is false," the court ruled. In regard to PD Diary's statement that the ROKG has little knowledge about U.S. slaughter houses, the court ordered it to run a correction. "It is not true that the government either did not know about the risks of U.S. beef or it tried to conceal and curtail (health) risks posed by U.S. beef," the court said. MBC said it will make a decision after receiving the written record of the ruling from the court. It will decide whether to appeal to the Supreme Court. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) FEATURES -------------- Wait! Measures to Get Pyongyang to Abandon Nuclear Weapons and Missiles Are Missing (JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2009, Page 3) By Senior Columnist Kim Young-hie News Analysis The Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance came out, but regrettably, it relies on hard power, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the ROK... China, which can communicate with North Korea, must be pushed to move. North Korea may have wanted to see a strong and sensational response to its nuclear and missile provocations at the U.S.-ROK summit. In order to overcome UN Security Council sanctions, North Korea inevitably needs internal unity. If there is a crisis, which North SEOUL 00000973 010 OF 012 Korea can publicly tell its people is being created by the ROK and the U.S., that internal unity will be solidified effectively. The "Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance," announced by the ROK and U.S. Presidents, is strong and defiant enough for the North to welcome. In the Joint Vision, the U.S. reaffirmed its previous promise to protect ROK security with an extended deterrence, including a nuclear umbrella. Although the U.S. made the same promise in 2006, it was made under the name of the Secretary of Defense. This time, however, the promise was put into writing, thereby increasing the importance of the promise and strengthening the determination of the U.S. to fulfill it. North Korea will probably use the U.S. promise of a nuclear umbrella to justify its nuclear and missile development. In the Vision, the phrase that the North is most worried about is as follows: "Through our Alliance, we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to 'peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.'" This provision reflects the view of President Lee Myung-bak. He said in Washington last November that the ROK's ultimate goal is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under free democracy. Such reunification denies North Korea's Stalinist dictatorship and planned economy, among other things. While reading that provision, North Korea would see the specter of a frightening reunification of the Korean Peninsula through absorption. The Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance calls for the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Ballistic missiles were newly added to those subject to complete and verifiable elimination. This reaffirmed the determination of the ROK and the U.S. to denuclearize North Korea. It is noteworthy that in the provision mentioned above, the two nations also agreed to work together to promote the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people. The North Korean human rights issue has been elevated to the same level of significance as denuclearization. This provision will infuriate the North and remind it of the good-old days of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations. The ROK-U.S. summit took place amid unprecedentedly heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's continuing belligerent provocations against the international community, which desires a denuclearized North Korea. By agreeing to build a comprehensive strategic alliance based on common values, the ROK and the U.S. met today's demand. We now have the vision that we had expected, and we are supposed to welcome it. Still, regret lingers. A 21st century vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance would have to be based on soft power. However, because of North Korea, rather, thanks to North Korea, the vision was mainly focused on hard power, which is an extended deterrence, including a nuclear umbrella. In this sense, the Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance is retrogressive rather than being future-oriented. What is lacking in the Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance are measures to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons and missiles. The U.S.'s provision of a nuclear umbrella is premised on the assumption that North Korea launches a nuclear attack on the ROK. What is important for us is to deter North Korea from arming itself with nuclear weapons. North Korea will use international sanctions to its favor and improve its nuclear and missile technologies on a path towards becoming a nuclear state. For the time being, the situation will continuously get worse. The nation that can communicate with North Korea is China. The ROK and the U.S. should do their best to make China act in a way to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. A vision that does not include measures to prevent North Korea from going nuclear is just a conceptual discourse about the future. The nuclear umbrella in the Joint Vision is a matter in the far distant SEOUL 00000973 011 OF 012 future. However, North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles are in our own backyard. ¶S. Korea, U.S. Moot New Dialogue Framework for N. Korea (Chosun Ilbo, June 18, 2009, Front page) By Reporter Joo Yong-joong Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama agreed on a new approach to the North Korean nuclear issue, an eclectic mix of Clinton-era bilateral talks and the Bush-era Six-Party Talks. Under the new plan, the U.S. will serve as the main negotiating partner for North Korea, representing the five nations in the Six-Party Talks - the ROK, China, Japan and Russia - and the pattern will differ from the Clinton-era bilateral dialogue from the following standpoints. First, the U.S. will engage in talks with the North after discussions with the five countries regarding a joint plan as to what price the North should pay if it doesn't abandon its nuclear ambitions and what benefits the North will gain in return for its nuclear abandonment. Second, while the U.S.-North Korea talks during the Clinton era followed a single track - freeze the North's nuclear program through bilateral talks - the talks now will follow a double track policy in which the U.S. will prepare to impose sanctions on the North through five-way talks on the one hand, and invite the North to multilateral talks through the U.S.-North Korean dialogue channel on the other. In a press conference, Obama said, "North Koreans must understand that they will not be able to gain compensation by provoking a crisis. This has been a pattern in the past, but this will no longer be the case. The firm U.S.-Korea cooperation and alliance will not allow that... The message we're sending -- and when I say 'we,' not simply the U.S. and the Republic of Korea, but I think the international community -- is that we are going to break that pattern." The U.S. does not intend to repeat the old pattern in which every time North Korea pretends to engage in negotiations, the process of sanctions is stopped, giving North Korea time to develop nuclear programs and gain other economic benefits. On June 16, when the ROK-U.S. summit was held, the New York Times reported that the U.S. will take the most "confrontational" North Korea policy ever, under which North Korean ships suspected (of carrying banned cargo) would be stopped and directed to a nearby port for inspection. The U.S. intends to make North Korea realize that its endless pursuit of nuclear weapons will drive the country into a blind alley and induce the North to follow the path of denuclearization. The ROK apparently proposed the new dialogue framework. Before leaving for Washington, Lee made his suggestion public, telling the Wall Street Journal, "Our ultimate objective is to try to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program, but we must also ask ourselves: What do the North Koreans want in return for giving up their nuclear weapons program? I think this is the type of discussion that the five countries should be engaging in now, robustly." After the summit, Cheong Wa Dae said, "The two leaders agreed to seek concerted and effective ways for the five countries to cooperate to see the irretrievable dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons." The statement is apparently mindful of public concerns that the ROK could be left out in the cold in the process of the U.S.-North Korean talks. But whether the new framework will work depends on North Korea and China. North Korea has said it will never return to the Six-Party Talks. But it would not be against principle for the North to sit down with SEOUL 00000973 012 OF 012 the U.S. North Korea will have to make the choice whether to continue its nuclear weapons program in the face of the U.S.-led sanctions or consider seeking denuclearization. Whichever choice it makes, ROK and U.S. authorities speculate the North will likely either propose or accept senior-level talks with the U.S. at an appropriate time. China signed up to adopt UN Security Council Resolution 1874 against the North last week, having clarified it does not want the North to become a nuclear state. Now that the Six-Party Talks exist in name only, the ROK and the U.S. expect that China can be persuaded to accept the new dialogue framework. (We have compared the English version on the website with the Korean version and made some changes to make them identical.) STANTON