ROK'S KAESONG MANAGER: DPRK TRYING TO SHAKE ROK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000808 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019 TAGS: PREL ECON KN KS SUBJECT: ROK'S KAESONG MANAGER: DPRK TRYING TO SHAKE ROK POLITICS Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: North Korea is trying to change the ROK's "political geography" through its hostile actions, including those targeted at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), according to President of the Kaesong Industrial Management Committee (KIDMAC) Moon Moo-hong. Moon, an Assistant Minister of Unification and two-time Presidential Spokesman under previous conservative administrations, said the KIC, where he currently serves as the ROK's de facto senior representative, is a "Trojan Horse" that is subverting North Korea's control over its citizens there. He pointed to an intense power struggle/succession process in the DPRK, arguing that the Six-Party Talks should continue as a stabilizing factor even though there was no prospect of the DPRK relinquishing its nuclear weapons under the current regime. END SUMMARY. Inter-Korean Relations and the KIC -------------- ¶2. (C) In a May 18 dinner meeting with POL M/C and POL/EXT, KIDMAC President Moon Moo-hong explained that he resigned as Assistant Minister of Unification after the 1997 election of President Kim Dae-jung, because he opposed Sunshine Policy. MOU DG Yang Chang-seok, who accompanied Moon, explained that Moon had been a visiting scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace after his dismissal from the MOU, and that Moon had gotten to know future President Lee Myung-bak quite well, as Lee too was in Washington, DC. It was ironic, Moon said, that President Lee Myung-bak had asked him to serve as the senior ROK "civilian" at the KIC, the hallmark of Sunshine Policy, but after six months of spending Tuesday-Friday at the Complex, Moon had come to regard it as an effective "Trojan Horse" that had already changed North Koreans' attitudes. His counterparts on the North's Central Special Guidance Bureau (CSGDB) at the KIC, for example, freely complained about officials in Pyongyang, and female North Korean clerical staff working in the KIDMAC office had told Moon that they yearned to marry "diligent, tall, handsome" South Korean men. ¶3. (C) Moon said that North Korean authorities feared the KIC's subversive potential; they were agonizing about its future and, more broadly, the pros and cons of becoming economically dependent on South Korea and the accompanying cultural and ideological contamination. The North's recent steps -- declaring KIC contracts null and void after demanding higher wages and other payments -- were not necessarily a prelude to closing KIC, but were instead part of an ongoing effort to reassert the North's control over the rules of engagement with the South. Through these steps, the North believed that it could also change the "political geography" of the ROK. The ultimate goal of the North Korean leadership was to make sure the North was in the driver's seat of the Peninsula's fate, especially reunification. This was hard to believe given the failings of the DPRK, but the top North Korean leaders were all in their late-60s or 70s, very much living in the past. Moon thought recent media reports saying that DPRK officials formerly in charge of inter-Korean relations, including Choe Sung-chol, the deputy in the United Front Department of the KWP, and Kwon Ho-gyong, a cabinet secretary who headed inter-Korean dialogue, had been purged or executed were accurate, because their rosy scenarios, promising great gains through dialogue, had been discredited. These officials had also failed in their political tasks because Lee was elected. By the same token, DPRK officials continued to see potential to shake ROK politics and ensure that a more friendly government would follow Lee. ¶4. (C) Moon said the increased payments North Korea was insisting on at the KIC -- raising monthly wages from about USD 40 per month perhaps to a Chinese-equivalent level of USD 200 per month, and imposing land rent and taxes in violation of signed agreements -- would drive all but a handful of ROK companies out of the Complex if enacted. Still the ROK, through KIDMAC, was trying to set up discussions. Moon said he had taken a tough position concerning bilateral meetings recently, so would not be overly surprised to be expelled from the KIC. He added that Kim Jong-il, or at least someone on the National Defense Commission, was calling the shots on the KIC issue, which was clearly under military authority. ¶5. (C) The DPRK had not provided any information on the South Korean Hyundai Asan engineer held in or around the KIC since March 30. The CSGDB was technically correct in saying that the matter was not under its jurisdiction, so should not be part of talks about the future of the KIC. However, Moon emphasized that the DPRK was violating inter-Korean agreements which clearly stated that, even in the case of serious allegations, ROK citizens should at worst be fined USD 500 and expelled. As an aside, Moon mentioned that the security environment at the KIC was subtle: there were low fences with occasional openings, but rocks were piled up at each opening so that they would cascade an alarm if anyone passed through. Young boys from the area sometimes snuck into the KIC at night looking for food, whereupon ROK workers would occasionally slip them food in seclusion and send them packing. Leadership and Succession -------------- ¶6. (C) Moon said that Kim Jong-il's 2008 stroke and ill health since then had become widely known in North Korea and had sparked an intense power struggle that would also determine succession. Citing information from Japanese intelligence gained from a former mistress of Kim Jong-il now living in Tokyo, Moon said he believed that KJI brother-in-law Chang Song-taek and newly appointed National Defense Commission Vice Chairman Oh Kuk-ryul had won a power struggle against Ri Che-gang, first Vice Director of the Workers Party's Organization and Guidance Department. He also cited the mistress as saying that Kim Hyon-nam (37),an illegitimate son of Kim Il-sung, could emerge as KJI's successor, since KJI's third son Kim Jong-uhn was too young at age 25. Moon doubted that Kim Jong-uhn could be a viable successor, given the third son's young age and a "total" lack of experience. Moon believed that Chang Song-taek was "by far" the most powerful figure after KJI and that KJI must be succeeded by one of his sons. DPRK-U.S. Relations -------------- ¶7. (C) Moon, who said he tracks North Korean intentions in part by reading the North's Rodong Sinmun newspaper each day, maintained that North Korea would never relinquish its nuclear weapons, which were essential for domestic legitimacy and seen as part of the DPRK's plan for taking eventual control of South Korea. Still, he argued for a continuation of the Six-Party Talks and U.S. efforts at dialogue with the DPRK for the sake of stability. We should not expect engagement with the DPRK to bring about fundamental change there, but should instead try to induce the DPRK to behave in accord with international norms, such as non-proliferation. This patient approach would be needed until "time finally takes care of the regime." Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Having dealt with North Korea for most of his adult life, Moon Moo-hong is intimately familiar with North Korean politics and leadership. We find Moon's views generally balanced, although quite conservative. Lately, however, through his leadership position in the KIC, Moon has become a true believer in the project's potential to subvert North Korean ideology and, ultimately, its regime stability. This is not a natural position for the conservative Moon, who was essentially fired by the Kim Dae-jung Administration for his opposition to Sunshine Policy. STANTON