MORE ON LEE-ASO SUMMIT: JOINT AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000071 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019 TAGS: PREL JA KS KN SUBJECT: MORE ON LEE-ASO SUMMIT: JOINT AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE OFFING? REF: STATE 03512 Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The January 11-12 summit between Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and ROK President Lee Myung-bak was a quiet affair, just as the two principals had hoped for; no protests on history, territory or the Aso family's past use of forced Korean labor in its mining business. This was the fifth meeting between the two in less than three months, reflecting the positive direction of ROK-Japan relations, according to ROK MOFAT Director General for Northeast Asian Affairs Cho Tai-young. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate and consult in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issues. One area of future ROK-Japan cooperation was joint development projects in Afghanistan, such as training vocational trainers and working together to engineer soybeans for cultivation in Afghanistan. On economic and financial issues, the ROK, as a member of the G-20 "troika," agreed to consult closely with Japan in preparation for the next G-20 financial summit meeting in April; Japan supported Korea's entry into the Financial Stability Forum. Notably, the Prime Minister's delegation included a large business delegation, showing the two governments' support for closer private sector ties. The summit was also unusual in that it concluded without any mention of territorial sovereignty or history issues. End summary. -------------- Seoul Summit: Warming Relations -------------- ¶2. (C) ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Director General for Northeast Asian Affairs Cho Tai-young on January 14 provided POL M/C with further detail regarding PM Aso's visit to Seoul, January 11-12. The January 12 summit meeting between Aso and Lee, DG Cho said, was the fifth in less than three months. This was unprecedented frequency, a great sign of improving ROK-Japan relations. The two had affirmed their commitment to "Shuttle Diplomacy," agreeing to continue to meet regularly, regardless of whether or not there were any pressing matters to discuss, much in the manner of European leaders. Lee had accepted Aso's invitation to visit Japan this year; DG Cho thought it would probably take place in the second half of the year. Other opportunities for meetings in 2009 would be on the sidelines of the April G-20 in London, October ASEAN plus 3 meeting in Thailand, and the next Korea-China-Japan summit in China, the dates for which were yet to be determined. A trilateral Foreign Ministers meeting in China was also in the offing. Cho also confirmed that Japanese Foreign Minister Nakasone would make his first visit to Korea as foreign minister on February 10-11, cautioning us that this was closely held because the Japanese Diet, which had not yet been notified, was very sensitive about members taking time off during legislative sessions. -------------- North Korea -------------- ¶3. (C) During their meeting, Lee and Aso reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue and agreed that a thorough verification protocol was a requirement before progressing to stage three of the Six-Party process. Both said they would continue their close consultations and cooperation with the U.S. on denuclearizing North Korea. President Lee expressed "sympathy" for the Japanese abduction victims, saying "he would do what he could do" to help, according to DG Cho. -------------- Afghanistan -- Joint Development Projects -------------- ¶4. (C) Following up on a suggestion PM Aso made at their Fukuoka meeting in December, the two leaders discussed plans for joint development projects in Afghanistan. For now, there were two projects under consideration, DG Cho outlined. One was to work together in vocational training centers, of which Japan already had nine and Korea had one. The focus would be to train the trainers, with Japanese trainers working in Korean-run centers and also the other way round. The second was joint development of soybeans specifically engineered for cultivation in the Afghan environment, Cho told us, noting scarcity of food production in Afghanistan and the nutritional value of soybeans. The joint projects would not take away from either country's other ODA projects, DG Cho emphasized; these would continue as before. -------------- G-20, FSF, Business Ties -------------- ¶5. (C) As future chair of the G-20, Korea would play a role in arranging the financial summit in April in London. President Lee told PM Aso that he would consult closely with Japan in all matters relating to the meetings and, more broadly, in coping with the ongoing international financial turmoil. PM Aso took this opportunity to make clear Japan's support for ROK entry into the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). DG Cho noted ROKG hopes for U.S. support for FSF membership. ¶6. (C) The entourage of 18 business leaders who accompanied PM Aso, DG Cho said, was unprecedented. That PM Aso had personally called many of them to join showed how eager he was to cooperate with Korea, he added. Post contacts at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul indicated that the business group was initially reluctant to take part in the visit, but relented under pressure from the PM. -------------- Territorial Issues Avoided -------------- ¶7. (C) The summit concluded without specific mention of history issues or the Liancourt Rocks territorial dispute, although President Lee did at one point mention the need for Japan to "face history squarely." Some had expressed criticism in Korea, DG Cho said, for not addressing the territorial issue, but they were not as vocal as before. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Hosting a Japanese prime minister is always a tricky affair for the South Koreans, and this one could have gone badly. On top of all the usual baggage associated with history and territorial issues, PM Aso is not a well-liked figure in Korea, because of his outspokenness and his family's mine which used Korean forced labor during the colonial era. Still, the visit was a remarkably quiet affair, with no rancor. For this, President Lee should get some credit, because he has been steadfast in promoting stronger Seoul-Tokyo ties. South Koreans too seemed to be coming around, because they showed very little interest in the visit, with press coverage focused around economic issues. STEPHENS