ROK NSA AND 6PT ENVOY DISCUSS NEXT STEPS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000647 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM KNNP OREP EWWT KS KN SUBJECT: ROK NSA AND 6PT ENVOY DISCUSS NEXT STEPS WITH STAFFDEL JANNUZI Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: National Security Advisor (NSA) Kim Sung-hwan and Six-Party Talks Envoy Wi Sung-lac separately told Staffdel Jannuzi on April 17 that the timing of reengaging North Korea would be important and Seoul and Washington should not appear "anxious." Wi suggested a dialogue should be offered after condemning North Korea for threatening to resume plutonium production. Kim and Wi separately agreed that the North's true intention was to engage the United States bilaterally and another nuclear test was "within Pyongyang's imagination." Kim linked the postponement of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announcement to a South Korean detainee at Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),depicting it as a "no-win" situation. Wi said the PSI had a symbolic importance for the North and predicted repeal or partial restriction of the Inter-Korean Maritime Agreement as a possible North Korean reaction -- a response damaging to South Korea. End Summary. -------------- Not In a Hurry to Reengage DPRK -------------- ¶2. (C) During an April 17 meeting with Senior East Asia Advisor for the Democratic Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Frank Jannuzi, NSA Kim Sung-hwan said that finding the right timing to restart dialogue would be important. The ROKG would continue to try to persuade China to apply more pressure on Pyongyang. The ROK itself had taken steps to further reduce trade with the North; its Ministry of Unification had banned the 5-year importation of sand for construction on April 4, 2009. ¶3. (C) In a separate meeting, ROK Six-Party Envoy Wi Sung-lac told Jannuzi that the ROKG would attempt to reengage the North right after condemning its actions for threatening to resume production of plutonium at Yongbyon -- a negative response followed by an offer of a dialogue -) and through NGOs, academics and other non-government channels to diversify opportunities. While reengaging the North at the right time would be important, Wi cautioned that Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo should not be seen by Pyongyang as "anxious" for a meeting. "We should not sell ourselves cheap," Wi said. -------------- -- DPRK's Real Intention: U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Talks -------------- --- ¶4. (C) Positing that North Korea continued to ratchet up tensions for both domestic reasons and to gain the attention of the United States, Kim said North Korean officials were guided by their perceptions of past experience "winning" dialogue from the United States by taking strong measures. Kim acknowledged, however, that recent measures such as the April 5 rocket launch were also intended for a domestic North Korean audience. ¶5. (C) Like Kim, Wi underscored that the preferred modality of negotiation for North Korea was bilateral talks with the United States and Pyongyang was preparing for this opportunity. Wi explained that by enhancing its missile capability and demonstrating its will to "act," North Korea was attempting to strengthen its position at the next negotiation. Wi predicted more hostile statements and actions from the DPRK in the coming months and noted that another nuclear test is "within Pyongyang's imagination." -------------- PSI, KIC -------------- ¶6. (C) Of immediate concern was the impact the pending announcement of ROK participation in the PSI might have on the treatment of the detained South Korean Hyundai Asan employee in Kaesong. If North Korean authorities decided to try him for espionage, he might be taken to Pyongyang, Kim said. The ROKG had attempted to contact North Korea about the detainee both directly and through Beijing, but had received no response. ¶7. (C) Seoul had postponed its announcement on PSI until April 19 because of intelligence that suggested the detainee might be released on Kim Il-sung's birthday, April 15. Kim fretted that he was in a no-win situation as he would be criticized heavily if he put off the PSI announcement again, but would also be in the hot seat in the event the ROKG went ahead with the PSI announcement regardless of the consequences for the detainee. If the United States succeeded in securing the release of the two American journalists detained by North Korea, this would make it even more difficult for the Lee Administration as there would be even more public pressure to get the South Korean detainee released, too. (Note: On April 18, the ROKG announced that it had received a fax message from North Korea requesting to meet on April 21. The ROKG accepted the proposal to meet and a 10-member team headed by Ministry of Unification Director General for Kaesong Industrial Complex Project Bureau Kim Yong-tak is scheduled to attend the KIC meeting. End Note.) ¶8. (C) 6PT Envoy Wi stated that the PSI had a symbolic importance for the North and predicted a strong reaction by North Korea if the ROKG joined. Wi suspected, however, that the North Korean reaction would be limited to inter-Korean agreements and would "not spill over to denuclearization issues." According to Wi, possible North Korean reaction could include: -- Repeal or partial restriction of the Inter-Korean Maritime Agreement, of which South Korea is a "bigger beneficiary": (NOTE: Signed in June 2004, the inter-Korean Maritime Agreement provides the legal framework for safe and direct maritime transportation between the two Koreas and eliminates the need for the third-party ships. The Agreement states: 1. Sea routes between the South and the North are internal domestic routes; 2. The two Koreas shall open sea routes between seven new ports; and 3. The two Koreas shall treat each other's ships on the same footing within their harbors and cooperate with each other in case of maritime accident. End Note.) -- Partial or complete shutdown of the KIC -- Complete Expulsion of South Korean personnel from Mt. Kumgang Resort: This would affect the Hyundai Asan maintenance crew of approximately fifty persons remaining at the resort since the shooting of a South Korean tourist in July 2008. While the eviction of the maintenance crew would not have any political weight, Wi reminded that it would have a symbolic effect for North Korea. STEPHENS