Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL602
2009-04-14 07:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
FORMER BLUE HOUSE INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS CHIEF ON
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #0602 1040750 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 140750Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4007 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5679 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9549 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5770 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 4224 RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000602
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: FORMER BLUE HOUSE INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS CHIEF ON
DPRK SITUATION AND POSSIBLE DIALOGUE
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000602
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: FORMER BLUE HOUSE INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS CHIEF ON
DPRK SITUATION AND POSSIBLE DIALOGUE
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The current standoff between North and South
Korea will continue for several months, according to former
Blue House Senior Secretary for Inter-Korean Affairs Um
Jong-sik, but the North's serious food and fertilizer
situation might lead to South-North dialogue later in the
year. At a midday meeting on April 14, Um predicted that the
North would announce its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks
(in line with the KCNA statement later that day),adding that
the North would likely approach the USG after several months
to discuss the nuclear issue bilaterally, in line with its
past preferences. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) At an April 14 meeting, Ministry of Unification (MOU)
veteran and former Blue House Senior Secretary for
Inter-Korean Affairs Um Jong-sik, said that North Korea was
internally stressed because Kim Jong-il was weakened after
his illness, a succession plan was not in place, and the
reversal of 2002 economic reforms meant that the economy was
functioning poorly. The missile launch was an attempt to
show Kim Jong-il's and the system's strength. Um worried
that the ROKG decision to join the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) could be "oil on the fire," given the
North's internal stress.
3. (C) Um predicted that the DPRK would react to the UN
Presidential Statement condemning the April 5 missile launch
by withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks (in line with a DPRK
announcement later that day). However, he said, it was
plausible that the DPRK, after several months of "missile
sanctions" hostility, would signal willingness to discuss the
nuclear issue with the USG, in line with its past
preferences. Um expressed concern that the USG would accept
such overtures, potentially isolating the ROKG.
4. (C) On the prospect of South-North dialogue, Um said that
what he judged to be the North's worsening food and
fertilizer situation (approaching conditions in the
mid-1990s) could lead the North to accept ROKG aid later in
the year. The ROKG could offer aid without an official DPRK
request if the North's food situation was judged to be
sufficiently serious. Although the North's harsh rhetoric
made the prospect of inter-Korean dialogue seem unlikely, Um
believed that the North retained enough "tactical
flexibility" that there was a "50-50" chance of dialogue
later this year. One difficulty was that all of the North
Korean officials with experience in inter-Korean affairs
appeared to have been replaced or purged, so there was no
cadre of officials to advise Kim Jong-il on how to resume
dialogue; military officials were in their place.
5. (C) Recollecting his year in the Blue House, Um said that
he consistently advised his National Security Council
colleagues to focus not on the North's increasingly hostile
rhetoric, but on its actions. Even so, the mounting personal
attacks on President Lee were hard to stomach. The most
disturbing action, he assessed, was the November 12, 2008
North Korean decision to cut off the South-North Red Cross
telephone connection that had been in place, tested daily,
since the 1970s. Um saw that step as the clearest signal
from the North that it wanted no contact with the ROKG.
However, even during the late 2008 and early 2009
restrictions on access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Um
did not believe that the North would close the area, since it
was too important as Kaesong City's sole employer.
6. (SBU) Bio note: Um Jong-Sik, a 24-year veteran of the
Ministry of Unification (MOU) and former Director General for
Unification Policy Planning who participated in many
negotiation sessions with North Korean counterparts, joined
the Blue House as Senior Secretary for Inter-Korean Affairs
in March 2008, soon after President Lee Myung-bak's
inauguration, and returned to MOU in February 2009.
Unassigned as yet, he expects to serve as DG for Inter-Korean
Dialogue.
STEPHENS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: FORMER BLUE HOUSE INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS CHIEF ON
DPRK SITUATION AND POSSIBLE DIALOGUE
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The current standoff between North and South
Korea will continue for several months, according to former
Blue House Senior Secretary for Inter-Korean Affairs Um
Jong-sik, but the North's serious food and fertilizer
situation might lead to South-North dialogue later in the
year. At a midday meeting on April 14, Um predicted that the
North would announce its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks
(in line with the KCNA statement later that day),adding that
the North would likely approach the USG after several months
to discuss the nuclear issue bilaterally, in line with its
past preferences. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) At an April 14 meeting, Ministry of Unification (MOU)
veteran and former Blue House Senior Secretary for
Inter-Korean Affairs Um Jong-sik, said that North Korea was
internally stressed because Kim Jong-il was weakened after
his illness, a succession plan was not in place, and the
reversal of 2002 economic reforms meant that the economy was
functioning poorly. The missile launch was an attempt to
show Kim Jong-il's and the system's strength. Um worried
that the ROKG decision to join the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) could be "oil on the fire," given the
North's internal stress.
3. (C) Um predicted that the DPRK would react to the UN
Presidential Statement condemning the April 5 missile launch
by withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks (in line with a DPRK
announcement later that day). However, he said, it was
plausible that the DPRK, after several months of "missile
sanctions" hostility, would signal willingness to discuss the
nuclear issue with the USG, in line with its past
preferences. Um expressed concern that the USG would accept
such overtures, potentially isolating the ROKG.
4. (C) On the prospect of South-North dialogue, Um said that
what he judged to be the North's worsening food and
fertilizer situation (approaching conditions in the
mid-1990s) could lead the North to accept ROKG aid later in
the year. The ROKG could offer aid without an official DPRK
request if the North's food situation was judged to be
sufficiently serious. Although the North's harsh rhetoric
made the prospect of inter-Korean dialogue seem unlikely, Um
believed that the North retained enough "tactical
flexibility" that there was a "50-50" chance of dialogue
later this year. One difficulty was that all of the North
Korean officials with experience in inter-Korean affairs
appeared to have been replaced or purged, so there was no
cadre of officials to advise Kim Jong-il on how to resume
dialogue; military officials were in their place.
5. (C) Recollecting his year in the Blue House, Um said that
he consistently advised his National Security Council
colleagues to focus not on the North's increasingly hostile
rhetoric, but on its actions. Even so, the mounting personal
attacks on President Lee were hard to stomach. The most
disturbing action, he assessed, was the November 12, 2008
North Korean decision to cut off the South-North Red Cross
telephone connection that had been in place, tested daily,
since the 1970s. Um saw that step as the clearest signal
from the North that it wanted no contact with the ROKG.
However, even during the late 2008 and early 2009
restrictions on access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Um
did not believe that the North would close the area, since it
was too important as Kaesong City's sole employer.
6. (SBU) Bio note: Um Jong-Sik, a 24-year veteran of the
Ministry of Unification (MOU) and former Director General for
Unification Policy Planning who participated in many
negotiation sessions with North Korean counterparts, joined
the Blue House as Senior Secretary for Inter-Korean Affairs
in March 2008, soon after President Lee Myung-bak's
inauguration, and returned to MOU in February 2009.
Unassigned as yet, he expects to serve as DG for Inter-Korean
Dialogue.
STEPHENS