Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL602
2009-04-14 07:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

FORMER BLUE HOUSE INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS CHIEF ON

Tags:  PREL KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0602 1040750
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140750Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4007
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5679
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9549
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5770
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 4224
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000602 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: FORMER BLUE HOUSE INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS CHIEF ON
DPRK SITUATION AND POSSIBLE DIALOGUE

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000602 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019 TAGS: PREL KS KN SUBJECT: FORMER BLUE HOUSE INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS CHIEF ON DPRK SITUATION AND POSSIBLE DIALOGUE Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The current standoff between North and South Korea will continue for several months, according to former Blue House Senior Secretary for Inter-Korean Affairs Um Jong-sik, but the North's serious food and fertilizer situation might lead to South-North dialogue later in the year. At a midday meeting on April 14, Um predicted that the North would announce its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks (in line with the KCNA statement later that day),adding that the North would likely approach the USG after several months to discuss the nuclear issue bilaterally, in line with its past preferences. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) At an April 14 meeting, Ministry of Unification (MOU) veteran and former Blue House Senior Secretary for Inter-Korean Affairs Um Jong-sik, said that North Korea was internally stressed because Kim Jong-il was weakened after his illness, a succession plan was not in place, and the reversal of 2002 economic reforms meant that the economy was functioning poorly. The missile launch was an attempt to show Kim Jong-il's and the system's strength. Um worried that the ROKG decision to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) could be "oil on the fire," given the North's internal stress. ¶3. (C) Um predicted that the DPRK would react to the UN Presidential Statement condemning the April 5 missile launch by withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks (in line with a DPRK announcement later that day). However, he said, it was plausible that the DPRK, after several months of "missile sanctions" hostility, would signal willingness to discuss the nuclear issue with the USG, in line with its past preferences. Um expressed concern that the USG would accept such overtures, potentially isolating the ROKG. ¶4. (C) On the prospect of South-North dialogue, Um said that what he judged to be the North's worsening food and fertilizer situation (approaching conditions in the mid-1990s) could lead the North to accept ROKG aid later in the year. The ROKG could offer aid without an official DPRK request if the North's food situation was judged to be sufficiently serious. Although the North's harsh rhetoric made the prospect of inter-Korean dialogue seem unlikely, Um believed that the North retained enough "tactical flexibility" that there was a "50-50" chance of dialogue later this year. One difficulty was that all of the North Korean officials with experience in inter-Korean affairs appeared to have been replaced or purged, so there was no cadre of officials to advise Kim Jong-il on how to resume dialogue; military officials were in their place. ¶5. (C) Recollecting his year in the Blue House, Um said that he consistently advised his National Security Council colleagues to focus not on the North's increasingly hostile rhetoric, but on its actions. Even so, the mounting personal attacks on President Lee were hard to stomach. The most disturbing action, he assessed, was the November 12, 2008 North Korean decision to cut off the South-North Red Cross telephone connection that had been in place, tested daily, since the 1970s. Um saw that step as the clearest signal from the North that it wanted no contact with the ROKG. However, even during the late 2008 and early 2009 restrictions on access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Um did not believe that the North would close the area, since it was too important as Kaesong City's sole employer. ¶6. (SBU) Bio note: Um Jong-Sik, a 24-year veteran of the Ministry of Unification (MOU) and former Director General for Unification Policy Planning who participated in many negotiation sessions with North Korean counterparts, joined the Blue House as Senior Secretary for Inter-Korean Affairs in March 2008, soon after President Lee Myung-bak's inauguration, and returned to MOU in February 2009. Unassigned as yet, he expects to serve as DG for Inter-Korean Dialogue. STEPHENS

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -