Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL591
2009-04-10 07:53:00
SECRET
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROKG RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO

Tags:  PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF KS 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0591/01 1000753
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 100753Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3985
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5663
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1562
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8881
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0716
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0221
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1235
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9534
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2230
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1851
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0836
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5754
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RUEHUL/USDAO SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SEOUL 000591 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF KS
SUBJECT: ROKG RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO
AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 31102

Classified By: A/POL Brian McFeeters for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SEOUL 000591 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF KS SUBJECT: ROKG RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN REF: STATE 31102 Classified By: A/POL Brian McFeeters for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See para 6. ¶2. (S) Summary. The responses from Director-General Choi Jongmoon (South Asian and Pacific Affairs) and First Secretary Kim Hyon-du (ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation Division) indicated that the ROKG: had yet to make a decision on contributions to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund; were providing vehicles and personal equipment; were expanding its KMVTT presence in Bagram, but not Kabul; were planning to send police trainers after the police facility in Bagram was built; misunderstood the request for military trainers; had yet to make a decision on sending intelligence/engineering assets, but appeared willing to substitute civilian engineering assets for military ones; and had yet to make a decision on increasing its $500,000 contribution to the UNDP fund for Afghan elections. The ROKG said that it understood the importance of Afghanistan to the USG, but had to consider domestic factors, (the media and the National Assembly),in its decision process. End summary. ¶3. (S) POLMC on April 8 delivered reftel demarche to Choi Jongmoon, Director-General for South Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). Contribution to Afghan National Army Trust Fund: Choi said that the ROKG is aware of the request to contribute $100 million per year for five years to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. Choi did not say anything more in response to the request after saying, "We know about that." Provide vehicles and personal equipment: Choi said that the order for the motorcycles, ambulances, and equipment had already been placed, and that the ROKG would finalize the details for delivery of the items on the working level. Medical/Vocational Training: Choi said that activities were in process to provide civilian and technical experts for vocational training and skills development. Police trainers: Choi produced and referred to Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan's statement at the International Conference on Afghanistan at The Hague on March 31 which specifically said that ROKG assistance to Afghanistan will include police training. Military trainers: Since Choi first believed the request for military trainers was new, he did not have any information on
the ROKG's response. (See para 5.) Intelligence/engineering assets: Choi said that the ROKG was looking into the issue, but that it would take some time before the ROKG would be in a position to offer these assets. Election support: Choi noted that the ROKG already pledged $500,000 to the UNDP fund, (which is coming from the amount pledged at the June 2008 donors' conference in Paris),but did not have any information on whether the ROKG would provide more. ¶4. (S) After discussing each request, Choi said that the ROKG was looking forward to the June 16 summit between Presidents Obama and Lee. POLMC told Choi that movement on a ROKG contribution to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund or on intelligence/engineering assets would be a positive event in the run-up to the summit meeting. Choi said that the ROKG would study the situation in detail before the summit but noted that dealing with the media and the National Assembly posed potential challenges for the ROKG. Choi concluded by saying that the ROKG understood the importance that the USG attached to Afghanistan. ¶5. (S) Separately on April 9 and 10, Kim Hyon-du of the ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation Division called poloff to discuss each of the specific requests in reftel. Kim said that the ROKG was aware of the seven requests and was not ignoring any particular ones. Instead, the ROKG's approach was to look at the requests as a package, but first work on the ones where urgency of need and feasibility of ROKG execution coincided. Contribution to Afghan National Army Trust Fund: Kim said that the ROKG was aware of the request to contribute $100 million per year for five years to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund, but did not have any information about where the request stood. Neither did he know if any movement on it would occur by the June 16 summit. (Note: Kim emphasized that the ROKG was not ignoring this request. End note.) Provide vehicles and personal equipment: Kim confirmed that the order for the motorcycles, ambulances, and equipment had already been placed, and that the ROKG would finalize the details for delivery of the items on the working level. Medical/Vocational Training: Kim said that the ROKG was responding to the request for medical and vocational training. Kim said that the ROKG inquired about establishing a second KMVTT in Kabul, but there was no space immediately available. Since there was a need and space in Bagram Air Base, the ROKG is focusing its attention on expanding the KMVTT there with three new buildings, one each for police training, vocational training, and a new hospital. Police trainers: Kim said that KOICA, the Korea Overseas International Cooperation Agency that was in charge of providing police trainers, planned to provide 12 police trainers upon the completion of the facility at Bagram. Military trainers: Kim said that the request for military trainers was not entirely new, but that the ROKG thought that the requests for police and military trainers were interchangeable. By seeing the requests demarcated and discussed separately, the ROKG now understood that the USG was asking for police AND military trainers. Kim said that the ROKG would need to look into the request further. Intelligence/engineering assets: Kim said the ROKG understood the request for intelligence assets. Regarding engineering assets, however, Kim asked if the USG was requesting military engineers/personnel or would civilian/general engineers satisfy the need. Election support: Poloff confirmed to Kim that the request was to increase the ROK's existing $500,000 pledge to the UNDP election fund for Afghanistan. Kim said that the ROKG would consider the request, but did not provide a time by which we would receive a response. ¶6. (S) Action Request: The ROKG would like a response to the following question. -- Would civilian/general engineers satisfy the need for engineering assets or is the USG asking for military engineers/personnel specifically? STEPHENS

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