Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL569
2009-04-08 07:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
ROKG WANTS UNSC RESOLUTION, NOT STATEMENT;
how-toVZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #0569 0980740 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 080740Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3950 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 5642 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1222 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 9519 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1838 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 0521 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 5732 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0815 RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR IMMEDIATE RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR IMMEDIATE RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000569
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KS KN CH RS UNSC
SUBJECT: ROKG WANTS UNSC RESOLUTION, NOT STATEMENT;
CONTINUES TO WORK ON CHINA
Classified By: Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000569
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KS KN CH RS UNSC
SUBJECT: ROKG WANTS UNSC RESOLUTION, NOT STATEMENT;
CONTINUES TO WORK ON CHINA
Classified By: Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: ROK chief Six-Party Talks negotiator Wi
Sunglac emphasized to the Ambassador April 8 that the ROKG
wanted nothing short of a UNSC resolution in response to
North Korea's April 5 launch of a Taepo-Dong 2. Substituting
a strongly worded Presidential Statement for even a
relatively toothless UNSCR would not send the right message
to North Korea. Wi recalled that UNSCR 1718 had helped
facilitate resumption of the Six-Party Talks to illustrate
his contention that a resolution would have more of an
effect. ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan would call
Chinese FM Yang Jiechi at 10 p.m. Seoul time April 8 and Wi
would call his Russian counterpart the same day to press for
a resolution. The ROKG strategy was to try to isolate the
Chinese. Timing was also important: A resolution needed to
be adopted this week. Wi also confirmed that the ROKG
intends to join PSI. Wi expressed appreciation for the
strong U.S. engagement in New York and Washington, and urged
more. End Summary.
--------------
Form Over Content
--------------
2. (C) Seoul was pleased with its bilateral coordination with
Washington and coordination at the UN in the wake of the
North Korean rocket launch of April 5, MOFAT Special
Representative Wi Sunglac told the Ambassador April 8.
However, a stronger effort needed to be made to persuade
China and Russia to support a UNSC resolution. The Japanese
had told ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan April 7 that they
would continue to press for a resolution. FM Yu would speak
with Chinese FM Yang Jiechi at 10 p.m. April 8 Seoul time.
Wi would also speak with his Russian counterpart. Both would
stress that a UNSCR was the proper form to send the right
message to Pyongyang. It was equally important to have a
timely resolution -- even if somewhat watered down -- rather
than a delayed one or a Presidential Statement, even strongly
worded. Any temptation to compromise because of the approach
of the Easter weekend, however, should be resisted.
--------------
Chinese Position Weakening
--------------
3. (C) The ROKG strategy for now would be to talk with the
Russians and try to separate them from, and in so doing
isolate, the Chinese. The Chinese position, Wi noted, had
weakened since the launch. The next P5 plus 1 meeting had
been postponed to April 8; the time was right to provide
input to the Chinese, Wi said. FM Yu had told his Chinese
interlocutors at a dinner earlier in the week that the ROKG
may consider tougher bilateral actions against the DPRK if a
UNSCR were not adopted.
STEPHENS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KS KN CH RS UNSC
SUBJECT: ROKG WANTS UNSC RESOLUTION, NOT STATEMENT;
CONTINUES TO WORK ON CHINA
Classified By: Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: ROK chief Six-Party Talks negotiator Wi
Sunglac emphasized to the Ambassador April 8 that the ROKG
wanted nothing short of a UNSC resolution in response to
North Korea's April 5 launch of a Taepo-Dong 2. Substituting
a strongly worded Presidential Statement for even a
relatively toothless UNSCR would not send the right message
to North Korea. Wi recalled that UNSCR 1718 had helped
facilitate resumption of the Six-Party Talks to illustrate
his contention that a resolution would have more of an
effect. ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan would call
Chinese FM Yang Jiechi at 10 p.m. Seoul time April 8 and Wi
would call his Russian counterpart the same day to press for
a resolution. The ROKG strategy was to try to isolate the
Chinese. Timing was also important: A resolution needed to
be adopted this week. Wi also confirmed that the ROKG
intends to join PSI. Wi expressed appreciation for the
strong U.S. engagement in New York and Washington, and urged
more. End Summary.
--------------
Form Over Content
--------------
2. (C) Seoul was pleased with its bilateral coordination with
Washington and coordination at the UN in the wake of the
North Korean rocket launch of April 5, MOFAT Special
Representative Wi Sunglac told the Ambassador April 8.
However, a stronger effort needed to be made to persuade
China and Russia to support a UNSC resolution. The Japanese
had told ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan April 7 that they
would continue to press for a resolution. FM Yu would speak
with Chinese FM Yang Jiechi at 10 p.m. April 8 Seoul time.
Wi would also speak with his Russian counterpart. Both would
stress that a UNSCR was the proper form to send the right
message to Pyongyang. It was equally important to have a
timely resolution -- even if somewhat watered down -- rather
than a delayed one or a Presidential Statement, even strongly
worded. Any temptation to compromise because of the approach
of the Easter weekend, however, should be resisted.
--------------
Chinese Position Weakening
--------------
3. (C) The ROKG strategy for now would be to talk with the
Russians and try to separate them from, and in so doing
isolate, the Chinese. The Chinese position, Wi noted, had
weakened since the launch. The next P5 plus 1 meeting had
been postponed to April 8; the time was right to provide
input to the Chinese, Wi said. FM Yu had told his Chinese
interlocutors at a dinner earlier in the week that the ROKG
may consider tougher bilateral actions against the DPRK if a
UNSCR were not adopted.
STEPHENS