ROKG WANTS UNSC RESOLUTION, NOT STATEMENT;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000569 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM KS KN CH RS UNSC SUBJECT: ROKG WANTS UNSC RESOLUTION, NOT STATEMENT; CONTINUES TO WORK ON CHINA Classified By: Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ROK chief Six-Party Talks negotiator Wi Sunglac emphasized to the Ambassador April 8 that the ROKG wanted nothing short of a UNSC resolution in response to North Korea's April 5 launch of a Taepo-Dong 2. Substituting a strongly worded Presidential Statement for even a relatively toothless UNSCR would not send the right message to North Korea. Wi recalled that UNSCR 1718 had helped facilitate resumption of the Six-Party Talks to illustrate his contention that a resolution would have more of an effect. ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan would call Chinese FM Yang Jiechi at 10 p.m. Seoul time April 8 and Wi would call his Russian counterpart the same day to press for a resolution. The ROKG strategy was to try to isolate the Chinese. Timing was also important: A resolution needed to be adopted this week. Wi also confirmed that the ROKG intends to join PSI. Wi expressed appreciation for the strong U.S. engagement in New York and Washington, and urged more. End Summary. -------------- Form Over Content -------------- ¶2. (C) Seoul was pleased with its bilateral coordination with Washington and coordination at the UN in the wake of the North Korean rocket launch of April 5, MOFAT Special Representative Wi Sunglac told the Ambassador April 8. However, a stronger effort needed to be made to persuade China and Russia to support a UNSC resolution. The Japanese had told ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan April 7 that they would continue to press for a resolution. FM Yu would speak with Chinese FM Yang Jiechi at 10 p.m. April 8 Seoul time. Wi would also speak with his Russian counterpart. Both would stress that a UNSCR was the proper form to send the right message to Pyongyang. It was equally important to have a timely resolution -- even if somewhat watered down -- rather than a delayed one or a Presidential Statement, even strongly worded. Any temptation to compromise because of the approach of the Easter weekend, however, should be resisted. -------------- Chinese Position Weakening -------------- ¶3. (C) The ROKG strategy for now would be to talk with the Russians and try to separate them from, and in so doing isolate, the Chinese. The Chinese position, Wi noted, had weakened since the launch. The next P5 plus 1 meeting had been postponed to April 8; the time was right to provide input to the Chinese, Wi said. FM Yu had told his Chinese interlocutors at a dinner earlier in the week that the ROKG may consider tougher bilateral actions against the DPRK if a UNSCR were not adopted. STEPHENS