ROK FM YU: STRONG UNSC RESPONSE KEY TO 6PT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000545 SIPDIS OPS CENTER PLS PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY. E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM KS KN CH RS UNSC SUBJECT: ROK FM YU: STRONG UNSC RESPONSE KEY TO 6PT RESUMPTION Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan told the Ambassador during a meeting April 5 shortly after the North Korean Taepo-Dong-2 (TD-2) launch that a strong, unified UN Security Council response to the launch was key to eventual resumption of the Six-Party Talks. A "lukewarm, mild attitude" on the part of Russia and China was of concern; FM Yu would call Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and FM Sergei Lavrov to urge tough UNSC action. Seoul also wanted to see the Six-Party process resume "after a short cooling period," FM Yu said. Yu believed that North Korea would use the two detained American journalists to try to begin a dialog with the U.S., and that it was unlikely the Six-Party Talks could convene until the two were released. The ROKG is focused on the UNSC as the venue for action and is not contemplating additional measures; a decision on ROK's full participation in PSI had been made but will not be announced "today or tomorrow." Seoul might also reduce cash transfer to DPRK slowly, especially the purchase of sand from the North, but the ROKG would continue to cooperate on KIC operation, because it helped the 40 thousand North Korean workers there understand the differences between North and South Korea. The Ambassador noted that both sides saw "eye to eye" on the substance of a UNSCR and would continue close coordination. After the meeting with Yu, the Ambassador made a short statement to the large assembled press, emphasizing the close coordination between Seoul and Washington, and that the TD-2 launch was in violation of UNSCR 1718. End Summary. -------------- Strong UNSC Action Needed for Sake of 6PT -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan April 5, shortly after the TD-2 launch by North Korea. FM Yu expressed satisfaction with U.S.-ROK pre-launch and post-launch coordination; the "real-time cooperation" had been effective and speedy. The Ambassador concurred with the Foreign Minister's positive assessment of the coordination to date. ¶3. (C) As President Obama and President Lee Myung-bak had discussed at the G-20 London Summit on April 2, the ROKG shared the U.S. desire to see the resumption of the Six-Party process after a "short cooling period," FM Yu said. In order to achieve this, FM Yu counseled a strong UNSC response to the launch, rather than a "lukewarm" one. The latter, more reserved reaction would only encourage Pyongyang to continue the mixture of bluffing and intimidation. ¶4. (C) The "mild attitude" of Russia and China was of concern, FM Yu said; he would call Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi of China and Russian FM Sergei Lavrov to urge tough UNSC action and argue that this was what was needed to preserve the Six-Party process. Of the two, FM Yu thought Russia would be harder to convince, noting that Chinese President Hu Jintao had told President Lee Myung-bak on April 3 that Beijing would try to prevent the launch "until the last moment." This was why Yu had said in his post-launch public statement that Beijing, Moscow, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul had tried to dissuade Pyongyang until "the last minute." -------------- -------------- Yes on Working Group Meeting, but After Detainee Resolution -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) FM Yu said that ROKG thinking on the Six-Party Talks had not changed; it needed to be convened as soon as possible. One way to do this was to convene working group meetings. There needed to be coordination with Washington, as well as with Tokyo and Beijing. Yu also thought that the issue of the detention of the two American journalists captured along the North Korea-China border and the South Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) employee would need to be resolved first. The arrest and detention of these three had been deliberate, FM Yu continued, part of a North Korean plot to "make a scene" and bargain for post-launch reengagement. -------------- PSI Announcement Forthcoming -------------- ¶6. (C) The ROK would announce its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in due time, FM Yu confirmed, but after consultations among various ministries and actions in the UNSC. The announcement would not be made "today or tomorrow" as this would convey the impression that the ROKG had waited for the launch to announce its PSI participation. The ROKG wanted to do everything in order not to provoke the North, Yu said. -------------- Subjecting the DPRK to a "Slow Squeeze" -------------- ¶7. (C) FM Yu said it made no sense for the North to spend "hundreds of millions of dollars" on rockets while its citizens starved. This was why he had pointedly included in his post-launch public statement language linking the launch to the North Korean food situation. Something should be done to deny North Korea cash. Seoul might "slowly squeeze" the DPRK, FM Yu said. One such lever was the cash paid by the South for the North's sand, which is used for construction. Perhaps, Seoul could use some pretext, such as the tension around the Northern Limit Line, close to the sand mines, or the slumping construction industry to buy less sand from the North. KIC operations would, however, continue because this "experiment" opened a window on the differences between North and South Korea for the 40 thousand North Korean workers there. ¶8. (SBU) After her meeting with FM Yu, the Ambassador made a short statement to the MOFAT press corps. The Ambassador underlined the close cooperation of Seoul and Washington in dealing with North Korea's TD-2 launch, and that both governments agreed that the launch had been in violation of UNSCR 1718. Our two governments would also work together in the UN in calling for strong action by the Security Council to condemn this act. STEPHENS