NIS DEPUTY DIRECTOR KIM SOOK ON DPRK LAUNCH AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000530

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: NIS DEPUTY DIRECTOR KIM SOOK ON DPRK LAUNCH AND
BEYOND

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador and the Special Advisor
discussed DPRK launch assessments, the state of the Six-Party
Talks, the status of the South Korean detained in Kaesong,
and ROK policy toward North Korea with ROK National
Intelligence Service (NIS) First Deputy Director Kim Sook
over lunch March 31. Former Six-Party negotiator Kim
questioned whether the timing was right for a 6PT working
group meeting given the apparently imminent missile launch by
North Korea. China was also ambivalent about the WG idea.
NIS assigned growing credence to the possibility that the
DPRK had "pre-planned" incidents leading to the detention of
two American journalists on the North Korea-China border and
now a South Korean citizen in Kaesong; Pyongyang appeared to
be "gathering chits" for political and diplomatic use
following the launch. Kim Jong-il had returned to smoking
and possibly drinking; as NIS Director Won Sei-hoon had
commented to the Ambassador in an earlier meeting, Chang
Song-taek would be the key figure in any succession. While
President Lee Myung-bak continued to stress the importance of
dialogue with the North, there would be no inter-Korean
breakthroughs as long as a missile launch was in the offing;
the ROKG had in fact informed Pyongyang that it would begin
responding to the North's anti-Lee Administration rhetoric
after April 1, though in practice it would likely wait until
after the launch. Kim said that former President Kim
Dae-jung's criticism of Lee Myung-bak was "annoying"; the Lee
Administration's objectives as they concerned North Korea
were to divest the ROK of its previous "pro-North" policy
bent and "regain" the trust of the U.S. on DPRK matters. END
SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Post-Launch "Cooling Period" Before Working Group Meeting
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Named to the second highest ranking position in the
NIS February 27, South Korea's former chief Six-Party Talks
negotiator Kim Sook told the Ambassador on March 31 that a
"cooling period" would need to follow the presumed North
Korean launch before another Six-Party heads of delegation or
working group meeting. At present, North Korea was "not in
the mood" for such a meeting. Wondering out loud how the
Japanese viewed the prospects for a working group meeting,
Kim stated that South Korea did not oppose the idea, but the
timing should be realistic and go hand-in-hand with
dissuading North Korea from launching a Taepo Dong-2.


3. (C) China, on the other hand, was ambivalent about the
working group idea, Kim said. Beijing had been frustrated in
its attempts to convince North Korea not to launch a missile
and probably felt it had lost face.


4. (C) Kim understood the idea of a working group meeting was
part of Special Representative Bosworth's first effort to
engage with North Korea. While South Korea wanted to support
Ambassador Bosworth's efforts, the United States needed to
understand the timing nuances. Proposing a working group at
the present point in time would convey the impression that we
were reducing pressure on North Korea.

--------------
Arrests, Detentions "Pre-Planned"?
--------------


5. (C) The South Korean Hyundai Asan employee (age 44) North
Korean officials had arrested in Kaesong, Kim said, was
likely in Kaesong city now, not the Kaesong Industrial
Complex. North Korea would likely bring charges against him
for trying to persuade a female North Korean employee to
"cooperate in an inappropriate manner." Linking the Kaesong
arrest with the mid-March arrests of two U.S. journalists on
the China-North Korea border, Kim said that more and more,
NIS viewed these incidents as "pre-planned." The journalists
could potentially be charged with espionage under North
Korea's anti-hostility law, Kim noted. A conviction carried
a five to ten year sentence, but it was unlikely that the
journalists would serve it. Rather, NIS analysts believed
that the North Koreans were "gathering chits" for political
and diplomatic use in the aftermath of a missile launch.

--------------
Chang Song-taek and Succession
--------------



6. (C) Kim noted that Kim Jong-il had returned to smoking and
possibly drinking. He further echoed previous comments to
the Ambassador by NIS Director Won Sei-hoon that Korea
Workers Party Administrative Department head Chang Song-taek
would be a key figure in any succession; Chang would probably
act as a "regent" to Kim Jong-il's third son Kim Jong-un, who
was probably being belatedly prepared to be his successor.

--------------
Food Aid, Lee Administration Pyongyang Policy
--------------


7. (C) ROK President Lee Myung-bak stressed the importance of
dialogue with the North, Kim said, but any talks would have
to wait given the impending missile launch dates. By spring
or summer North Korea would have to return to the
international community for more food aid. Pyongyang had
refused earlier food aid offers partly because it had planned
all along to increase tensions and then return with larger
food demands. Even while North Korea refused food aid, it
had sent its agents to Southeast Asia to buy food on credit,
though they had met with little success.


8. (C) The ROKG had heretofore refrained from responding to
the rhetorical invective directed at the Lee Administration,
but had decided, and informed the DPRK, that after April 1,
it would respond in kind. In practice, however, Seoul would
likely wait until after a missile launch.

--------------
Kim Dae-jung and the "Left"
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador asked about South Korean public
attitudes toward LMB's North Korea policy. Kim stated that
the government presently enjoyed majority support on North
Korea issues. Former President Kim Dae-jung had recently
renewed his criticism of Lee Myung-bak's policies, saying
that South Korea should not join the Proliferation Security
Initiative, and advocating that the ROK give up the Northern
Limit Line so as not to provoke North Korea; Kim said he
wished that former Korean presidents behaved more like
former American presidents, and stayed silent on policy
matters. A former president was parroting North Korea's
political line, he said, and the whole situation was very
"annoying."


10. (C) The Lee Administration has two objectives as far as
its North Korea policy is concerned, Kim continued. First,
it wanted South Korea to "regain its national identity" by
divesting itself of the ROKG's previous "pro-North" policy
bent. Second, it was imperative that the Lee government
"regain" mutual trust with the United States on North Korea.

--------------
NIS Launch Assessment
--------------


11. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about the NIS assessment of
the chances of a successful North Korean missile launch, Kim
said, "My analysts tell me that given Iran's successful
launch of a similar missile -- albeit a two-stage version --
they have greater confidence in North Korea's ability and
believe that North Korea is more confident in its ability to
carry out a successful launch."

--------------
Encryption
--------------


12. (C) The Ambassador raised the ARIA issue with Kim, and
noted our concerns about the ROKG,s plans to introduce a new
Korean encryption standard called "ARIA" for
government-to-government Internet telephony. She added that
NIS was part of the ROKG task force working on this issue.
Kim said that he was unfamiliar with the issue but would look
into it.
STEPHENS