Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL527
2009-04-01 07:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ALLIANCE COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Tags:  KPAO MARR PREL PARM 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0527/01 0910745
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010745Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3864
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5575
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5670
RUEAMDA/MDA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000527 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: KPAO MARR PREL PARM
SUBJECT: ALLIANCE COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A TD-2 LAUNCH

REF: A. SECSTATE 29932

B. SEOUL 00514

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSEPH YUN. REASONS 1.4 (b
),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000527 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 TAGS: KPAO MARR PREL PARM SUBJECT: ALLIANCE COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A TD-2 LAUNCH REF: A. SECSTATE 29932 ¶B. SEOUL 00514 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSEPH YUN. REASONS 1.4 (b ),(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Post has conveyed reftel A points on alliance coordination of public diplomacy following a Taepodong2 launch by the DPRK to MOFAT and Blue House National Security Advisor. The Ambassador has underlined to National Security Advisor Kim that Seoul and Washington should be closely coordinated on public messages before and after the TD-2 launch, noting that we wanted to avoid creating a crisis atmosphere that would reduce our flexibility to pursue diplomat opportunities, including further progress in the Six-Party Talks. NSA Kim and other senior MOFAT officials have expressed satisfaction with close Seoul-Washington consultations on this issue, agreed that either the Blue House or MOFAT would have the ROK lead in addressing the matter in public, and stated that the ROKG would respond calmly to the launch and did not contemplate a bilateral response, beyond their likely endorsement of PSI (reported ref B). On April 1, MOFAT provided us with a preview of the talking points the ROKG intends to use after the launch (para 7). END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On March 30, the Ambassador called on Republic of Korea National Security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan and conveyed reftel A points on alliance coordination of public diplomacy following a TD-2 launch by the DPRK. The Ambassador underlined that Seoul and Washington should be closely coordinated on public messages before and after the TD-2 launch, noting that Washington wanted to avoid creating a crisis atmosphere that would reduce our flexibility to pursue diplomacy, including further progress in the Six-Party Talks. ¶3. (C) NSA Kim responded that the ROKG was fully satisfied with close consultations between Seoul and Washington, and between MOFAT and Embassy in recent days. Most recent public statements, including those of President Lee and SecDef Gates, showed that the U.S. and ROK would respond calmly to the North's TD-2 launch. Thus far, NSA Kim shared, the ROKG was not contemplating any specific bilateral measures, because Seoul expected an international response, focused around the UNSC. Most likely, the ROKG would also sign on to full participation in PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative),but even that was a multilateral measure, Kim noted. ¶4. (C) Earlier, post reviewed the public diplomacy points with Chang Ho-jin, Director General of the Bureau of North American Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, urging the ROKG to preserve diplomatic flexibility by responding calmly to the launch with points similar to our own. To help assure that, the U.S. side would limit public statements to those from the White House and the Department. Chang said he too would seek to have only the Blue House and MOFAT address the media on TD-2 launch issues. ¶5. (C) Asked if the ROKG contemplated taking any other actions in response to the launch, aside from its likely move to join PSI (reported reftel B),DG Chang replied that he did not think so, and that if the ROKG intended to take any other measures, it would be sure to coordinate the move with Washington. ¶6. (C) Vice Foreign Minister and Six-Party Talks Wi Sung-lac is heading a ROKG task force established to deal with North Korea's expected TD2 launch. His deputy on the task force is DG for Nuclear Affairs Hwang Joon-kook, with Director of North Korea Nuclear Policy Ham Sang-wook assisting. Other offices involved are North America Division I, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, International Treaties, and Public Affairs. During an April 1 meeting, Director Ham told us that the ROKG was in sync with the USG's planned press guidance as well as the UNSC follow-up plan aiming for a new UNSC resolution with annexes. ¶7. (C) Ham previewed a ROKG announcement to be made soon after the launch. He said it would make the following points: The DPRK long-range rocket was launched at xx date/time; ROKG is cooperating with the USG in confirming the details; despite DPRK claims, the launch violates UNSCR 1718, is a provocative act, and has consequences for the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and Korean Peninsula; ROKG and the international community repeatedly warned the DPRK to refrain from conducting the launch; the ROKG is concerned that the DPRK had committed this provocative act, and; the ROKG will take measures to strengthen its defenses. Ham added that the ROKG would announce its full participation in PSI quite soon after the launch. ¶8. (SBU) The Blue House and MOFAT have both repeatedly expressed sincere appreciation for the USG's clear strategy on the public affairs message, and close coordination with the ROKG at this critical moment. STEPHENS

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