CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT ROK PLANS TO JOIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000514 SIPDIS FOR NSC GARY SAMORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019 TAGS: PARM PHSA PINS PTER PREL KN KS SUBJECT: CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT ROK PLANS TO JOIN PSI REF: A. 06 STATE 172682 ¶B. 06 SEOUL 3558 ¶C. 09 SEOUL 0468 Classified By: AMBASSADOR KATHLEEN STEPHENS. REASONS 1.4 (b),(d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Republic of Korea plans to endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Statement of Interdiction Principles, becoming a full participant in PSI soon after the planned DPRK launch of a Taepodong2. The Foreign Minister stated that to reporters on March 20 in an effort to condition the Korean public for the eventuality. He privately told the Ambassador that same day (reftel C) that it was his understanding that Washington continued to support PSI and that an ROKG interagency decision-making process was underway to consider full endorsement of the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. MOFAT also assured us they would consult with the USG before making any public announcement. There has been a mixed reaction in the ROK media but no serious protests to date. The ruling GNP supports full participation in PSI; the opposition is largely against it. The key concerns voiced in the ROK political debate on the issue are: On the one side: -- Fear that ROK endorsement of PSI could set back even further the already troubled state of inter-Korean relations, and even potentially leading to confrontation or conflict, giving the DPRK another rationale for continuing to refuse inter-Korean dialogue, or marginalize the ROK in the Six-Party Talks; On the other side: -- The perceived need to stand up to the DPRK in the interest of ROK national security, and to demonstrate that Pyongyang must pay a price for its bad behavior, and; -- Growing public awareness that PSI is a multilateral effort that is not targeted against North Korea, coupled with the desire, in keeping with the ROK's aspirations to take on a larger role in world affairs, to join in that international effort to counter the potential threat posed by WMD-armed terrorists. ¶2. (C) The debate over ROK participation in PSI has been thoughtful. In building its position in favor of PSI, the ROKG has clearly weighed all the pluses and minuses, including the likely adverse affect on inter-Korean relations, the positive boost to the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the overall merits of increasing South Korean participation in international security cooperation. For now, South Korea has the consensus to do it, but the decision could open the ROKG to criticism if the DPRK reacts strongly, or there is confrontation. END SUMMARY -------------- -------------- HIGH PROBABILITY ROK WILL BECOME FULL PSI PARTICIPANT -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On March 20, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu Myung-hwan told reporters that if the DPRK went ahead with its plans to launch a Taepodong2 in violation of UNSCR 1718, the Republic of Korea would consider becoming a full participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In an earlier interview he gave to the English-language Korea Herald, FM Yu had been careful to say a launch would "possibly" prompt Seoul to become a full participant in PSI, and that "special circumstances" on the Korean Peninsula would need to be taken into account. His March 20th statement effectively dropped those qualifications. ¶4. (SBU) FM Yu's remarks followed earlier statements last October and again in February by Minister of National Defense Lee Sang-hee who said it was in the ROK's national security interest to increase participation in PSI. The same day FM Yu made his March 20th statement, the MND spokesperson told reporters that joining PSI "could be a form of protest that can pressure North Korea." ¶5. (C) Privately, FM Yu also told the Ambassador on March 20 (reftel C) and earlier (as reported via email) that MOFAT was involved in an interagency process to consider whether the ROK would fully endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. He added that it was his understanding that Washington continued to support PSI. He said that full PSI participation would become a real possibility if the DPRK went ahead with a successful launch of a Taepodong2 issile. The Ambassador told the Foreign Minister that if the ROKG were to make that decision, the USG would appreciate being informed and consulted before the ROKG made it public. ¶6. (C) On March 26, MOFAT Disarmament and Nonproliferation Director Lee Jangkeun confirmed there was now a consensus among senior ROKG officials that the ROK should become a full participant in PSI, and a high probability the ROKG would make that decision if the DPRK launched a TD2 missile. He dismissed some media reports that indicated the ROKG might choose the middle road of participating more in PSI while stopping somewhere short of full endorsement. Lee pointed out that PSI was not structured to allow for varying degrees of participation. You were either a participant or you were not, he said. He added that preparations for the ROK's full endorsement of PSI were underway, but assured us MOFAT would confer with the USG before making a public announcement. On the way to the meeting in Director Lee's office, his assistant director, Kim Jae-woo, told us with obvious pleasure that a Korean karaoke song entitled "P.S. I Love You" had become the anthem of his office. -------------- MIXED PUBLIC/MEDIA REACTION -------------- ¶7. (C) Immediately following the Foreign Minister's public statement on March 20, activists began protesting in front of MOFAT, chanting that such a move would heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Those protests, however, were very small, and criticism from the opposition to date has been muted. More significantly, former ROK president Kim Dae-jung voiced a widely-held concern in an interview on March 23 that ROK participation in PSI had the potential to bring ROK vessels into confrontation with North Korean ships, potentially sparking a battle at sea that could escalate into war. As evidence that Kim Dae-jung's argument found resonance with a larger audience in Korea, the moderate Hankook Ilbo cautioned on March 23 that it was unwise for the ROKG to decide to participate fully in PSI. The paper urged the ROKG to stick to countermeasures authorized by the United Nations. ¶8. (C) The ruling conservative Grand National Party (GNP) consistently supported full ROK participation in PSI, particularly following the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test. A number of prominent GNP lawmakers have advised caution, however, citing as Kim Dae-jung did the increased possibility of armed conflict. The Foreign Minister himself said in the past, "We haven't joined PSI because if the PSI takes place in waters around the peninsula, the chances are high for an armed conflict." But that was in October 2006, when he was a vice foreign minister under the previous government. ¶9. (C) The other key element in the opposition's stance is less persuasive. It is the contention that the Inter-Korean Maritime Transportation Agreement concluded between the DPRK and the Roh Government in 2005 will conflict with PSI. Sometimes opponents argue that PSI is redundant because of the 2005 agreement, and sometimes they make the case that ROK participation in PSI conflicts with, and so would violate, that agreement. Director Lee countered both claims by clarifying the workings of the agreement. He said that because North and South Korea remain technically in a state of war, DPRK vessels are not allowed free passage afforded to the vessels of other countries, even outside of ROK territorial waters. Rather, DPRK vessels must stay in special north-south lanes as they pass through the international waters paralleling the eastern and western coastlines of the ROK. They also are allowed to use a special east-west sea lane through ROK territorial waters, passing between Jeju Island and the ROK mainland. ¶10. (C) In all cases, such transit is only allowed for DPRK vessels traveling between North Korean and South Korean ports, or from one North Korean port to another. DPRK vessels destined for a third country are not allowed to use those lanes and therefore fall outside of the agreement. Director Lee concluded that PSI was therefore neither redundant to, nor in conflict with, the Inter-Korean Maritime Transportation Agreement because it would focus on other ocean traffic heading to and from third country destinations. ¶11. (SBU) During the third week of March there was a flurry of media reporting and op-eds debating whether the ROK should or should not endorse PSI. Kyunghyang and the far left Hankyoreh voiced fierce opposition to the move. Chosun Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun, Munwha Ilbo, Syegye Ilbo, and DongA Ilbo all expressed strong support for ROK participation. Seoul Shinmun in fact changed its editorial stance. On February 18 it had called the Defense Minister's remarks on PSI "inappropriate," but on March 20 advised its readers that in light of the fight against terrorism, particularly the terrorist attacks that had killed four South Korean tourists and their local guide in Yemen five days earlier, the ROKG "should actively consider joining PSI." JoongAng Ilbo seemed to bridge the gap between the pro and con camps by warning the DPRK not to further increase tensions by launching a missile, but saying in effect that if Pyongyang continued to engage in such provocative behavior, the ROK would have no choice but to join PSI. -------------- EVOLUTION OF SOUTH KOREA'S STANCE ON PSI -------------- ¶12. (C) The previous left-of-center Roh Moo-hyun government resisted the efforts of PSI participants to persuade the ROK to endorse the Statement of Interdiction Principles, even after the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test (reftels A and B). The furthest the Roh Administration would go was to say it needed more time before it could fully endorse PSI, while agreeing in the interim to adhere to some, but not all, of the PSI principles. At a November 18, 2006 press briefing in Hanoi (after meeting with then-President Bush) Roh said, "Even though the ROK decided not to fully participate in PSI, we support the goals and principles of PSI and will continue to make case-by-case consultations to prevent nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia." Since 2005, the ROK has also been an observer at some PSI exercises. ¶13. (C) Following the election of President Lee in December 2007, we again urged the ROK to endorse PSI in conjunction with PSI's fifth anniversary event in Washington in May 2008, but the ROKG position remained unchanged. In addition, President Lee himself has made no public statements to date altering his predecessor's position. Director Lee revealed, however, that the LMB Administration had placed PSI policy under review shortly after President Lee's February 2008 inauguration. He said the thinking of the new government was that while they needed to remain sensitive to DPRK reactions, if the DPRK was not engaging in WMD proliferation activities, ROK participation in PSI should not be an issue, and if the DPRK was engaging in such activities, the ROK had to do its part as a responsible member of the international community to prevent the spread of WMD. ¶14. (C) The first sign of a change in Lee Administration policy was seen on October 8, 2008, when Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee spoke about PSI to The Korea Herald. Four months later, Yonhap reported on February 16, 2009 that he had told the National Assembly Defense Committee that "under the situation in which North Korea is developing long-range missile and nuclear weapons, it was time for South Korea to reconsider its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative." -------------- THE KEY STRANDS IN CURRENT ROK THINKING -------------- ¶15. (U) There are several key areas of concern that permeate the academic, political, media and public debate on PSI. ¶16. (C) Impact on Inter-Korean Relations: Foremost is the aforementioned fear that ROK endorsement of PSI could negatively affect the already troubled state of inter-Korean relations. The timing now is both good and bad for the ROK. It is good in the sense that continued provocative DPRK actions call for an appropriate ROK response and give the ROKG justification for shifting its policy on PSI at this time. The timing is bad, however, because the move is sure to displease Pyongyang, adding to the already heightened state of tensions between the two Koreas. Korean society appears split between those who think the North deserves to be punished for its provocations and those who see PSI participation as a provocation in and of itself. ¶17. (C) National Security Concerns: A March 24 editorial in the Dong-a Ilbo pointed out that the argument that full participation in PSI would needlessly provoke North Korea distorted the reality that North Korea was the party prompting tensions by its actions. If the ROK did not respond to the North's saber-rattling, it was as if it were giving up its national security, the paper concluded. Since President Lee came to power, we have heard the common refrain of the ROK national security establishment that its predecessors were dangerously nave and enabling in their engagement with Pyongyang at the expense of their fundamental obligations to the defense of the ROK. The Blue House has had to move cautiously to turn around the policies with which it disagreed, but it clearly has been attempting precisely such a major shift in policies in the unification, diplomatic, defense and intelligence realms. ¶18. (SBU) Keeping Up with the International Community: Between PSI's creation in May 2003 and this year, 93 countries around the world have become full PSI participants. In the Asia-Pacific Region those include Singapore, The Philippines, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Singapore is scheduled to lead the next such Asia-Pacific exercise in November 2009. (Note: Prior to that, there will be an Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in Miami in May, but since the ROK is not yet a full participant in PSI it is not expected to attend). Korean news reporting has made the point that PSI is not intended to target North Korea. Rather, it is a growing international cooperation system for curbing the spread of WMD. As the number of international participants has grown, the previous prevalent image of PSI as a U.S.-led activity has gradually been replaced by the more appropriate view that it is a multilateral effort undertaken by the international community as a whole in the spirit of cooperation and shared interests. That broader view has made PSI more attractive to the South Korean public. ¶19. (C) Global Security: Finally, in keeping with the ROK's aspirations to take on a larger and more integrated role in world affairs, many here argue, as the Dong-a Ilbo did on March 24, that "for the sake of global human security, participation is inevitable." They reminded their readers that North Korea was not simply using its nuclear and missile programs as leverage for negotiations with the U.S. and Seoul, but rather was known to have worked in the past with Pakistan's nuclear scientists, and is suspected of being deeply involved in both Syria's nuclear development efforts and Iran's missile program. That train of thought comes to the conclusion that if North Korea were allowed to continue those proliferation activities, there is no guarantee that WMD will not someday make it into the hands of terrorists. ¶20. (C) The Chosun Ilbo editorial of March 25th concluded by saying that ROK policy on PSI "should be decided after strategic thinking about the pluses and minuses for South Korea, considering the future of inter-Korean relations, the South Korea-U.S. alliance and international cooperation in diplomacy and security." It appears that is precisely what the ROKG interagency is doing. ¶21. (C) COMMENT: The Lee Myung-bak government has implemented an effective strategy on PSI that we have been careful to welcome, but not press upon them. There will, of course, be protests against this move, principally from the opposition Democratic Party and, more vocally, from the left-of-center NGOs. Our view is that the opposition will be manageable, at least absent a major reaction from the North, or a future confrontation at sea. The DPRK is certain not to like it -- having already equated the ROK's endorsement of PSI as an act of war -- but the ROKG has been, and remains determined for now, not to be ruffled by such typically over-the-top reactions from Pyongyang. Less certain is how the ROK decision to participate in PSI will truly affect the future of North-South relations, but we note that the ROKG has chosen PSI as its response to the TD-2 launch because it is multilateral activity it views as less confrontational and more appropriate than other bilateral options for which it lacks the right tools and conditions. STEPHENS