Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL504
2009-03-31 00:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
(S) ROK CONCERNED BY TURKISH INTERMEDIARY EFFORTS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #0504 0900035 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 310035Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3817 INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0246
S E C R E T SEOUL 000504
SIPDIS
STATE PASS TO ISN/MTR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL MTCRE IR TU KS
SUBJECT: (S) ROK CONCERNED BY TURKISH INTERMEDIARY EFFORTS
TO SUPPLY SOUTH KOREAN MACHINE TOOLS TO IRAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 28283
B. SECSTATE 27957
Classified By: POLMC Joseph Yun for reasons 1.4 (b,c,d).
S E C R E T SEOUL 000504
SIPDIS
STATE PASS TO ISN/MTR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL MTCRE IR TU KS
SUBJECT: (S) ROK CONCERNED BY TURKISH INTERMEDIARY EFFORTS
TO SUPPLY SOUTH KOREAN MACHINE TOOLS TO IRAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 28283
B. SECSTATE 27957
Classified By: POLMC Joseph Yun for reasons 1.4 (b,c,d).
1. (U) This is an action request. See para 3.
2. (S) POLOFF on March 26 delivered reftel A demarche to
Kim Jae-woo of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division.
Kim said the following.
-- The ROKG was unaware of the information (in reftel A),
but would refer the case to the appropriate agencies since
Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) is involved.
-- Since the items were not controlled by any of the
multilateral export control regimes, Kim was unsure if Ak
Makina would have needed to submit an end-use certificate.
In the event that Ak Makina did submit an end-use certificate
issued by the Government of Turkey (GOT),then by
international agreement, the ROKG would have to accept the
certificate as legitimate.
-- After being told that the GOT in the past had denied Ak
Makina some export licenses on other unrelated cases for
proliferation activities with Iran (reftel B),Kim replied
that the case then was much more serious and that as part of
its investigation, the ROKG also would examine the end-use
certificates that Ak Makina may have submitted for unrelated
transactions.
-- When the investigation is completed, the ROKG would
inform the USG of the results.
3. (S) The ROKG requests that the USG share any additional
information it may have on Ak Makina and Ardalan Machineries
Company.
STEPHENS
SIPDIS
STATE PASS TO ISN/MTR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL MTCRE IR TU KS
SUBJECT: (S) ROK CONCERNED BY TURKISH INTERMEDIARY EFFORTS
TO SUPPLY SOUTH KOREAN MACHINE TOOLS TO IRAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 28283
B. SECSTATE 27957
Classified By: POLMC Joseph Yun for reasons 1.4 (b,c,d).
1. (U) This is an action request. See para 3.
2. (S) POLOFF on March 26 delivered reftel A demarche to
Kim Jae-woo of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division.
Kim said the following.
-- The ROKG was unaware of the information (in reftel A),
but would refer the case to the appropriate agencies since
Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) is involved.
-- Since the items were not controlled by any of the
multilateral export control regimes, Kim was unsure if Ak
Makina would have needed to submit an end-use certificate.
In the event that Ak Makina did submit an end-use certificate
issued by the Government of Turkey (GOT),then by
international agreement, the ROKG would have to accept the
certificate as legitimate.
-- After being told that the GOT in the past had denied Ak
Makina some export licenses on other unrelated cases for
proliferation activities with Iran (reftel B),Kim replied
that the case then was much more serious and that as part of
its investigation, the ROKG also would examine the end-use
certificates that Ak Makina may have submitted for unrelated
transactions.
-- When the investigation is completed, the ROKG would
inform the USG of the results.
3. (S) The ROKG requests that the USG share any additional
information it may have on Ak Makina and Ardalan Machineries
Company.
STEPHENS