ROKG AID EFFORTS DISAPPOINT AFGHAN AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000491

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF KS
SUBJECT: ROKG AID EFFORTS DISAPPOINT AFGHAN AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. During a lunch meeting with Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney on
March 1 in Seoul, Afghan Ambassador to the ROK, Mohammad
Karim Rahimi, discussed the upcoming elections in
Afghanistan, the current USG Afghanistan/Pakistan policy
review, and the ROK aid efforts in Afghanistan. Rahimi said
that he did not believe holding elections by May 22 was
logistically possible. He thought the current USG
Afghanistan/Pakistan policy review process was a good one,
and was hopeful it would lead to actions that would improve
the situation in Afghanistan. Rahimi focused the bulk of his
comments on his disappointment with the ROKG's aid efforts in
Afghanistan. He said that the ROKG did not take the
situation in Afghanistan, nor his efforts to engage ROKG
officials, seriously. Rahimi believed that the ROKG
responded only to USG pressure, and even then, with an eye on
public opinion, which the ROKG did not do enough to
influence. Rahimi asked if it was possible for him and the
U.S. Ambassador to the ROK to make joint or coordinated
efforts to engage ROK officials. Sedney promised to transmit
the request to the Ambassador. Ahmad Jawid Azadzoy, First
Secretary of Political and Economic Affairs, also attended
the meeting. End Summary.

--------------
Afghan Elections
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Mohammad Karim Rahimi started his remarks
by saying that he was up to date on election issues in
Afghanistan and was happy about the way the election was
going. Rahimi he did not know Afghan President Hamid
Karzai's motivation for wanting to have the election by May

22. Still, Rahimi agreed with the USG response that August
was a more reasonable time to hold elections because he
thought that it was "logistically impossible" to hold an
election by May 22. Rahimi said that having clean and fair
elections were one of the issues that made the current year
such a critical one for Afghanistan.

--------------
Afghanistan/Pakistan Policy Review
--------------


3. (C) Rahimi thought the current Afghanistan/Pakistan
policy review process underway in Washington was a good one,
specifically that Afghan and Pakistani views are being
included in the review process. Afghans, he said, wanted to
see drastic and positive changes in Afghanistan, which he
believed comprehensive, coordinated, state and institution
building could achieve. Rahimi said the changes in Pakistan
and in the Pakistani government were reasons for the Afghans
to hope for an end to the instability in Afghanistan. He was
concerned, however that the Government of Afghanistan (GOA)
allowed the Taliban to regroup due to the lack of police,
which was the reason that more, better trained police were so
important for security in Afghanistan.

--------------
ROKG Aid Efforts Disappointing
--------------


4. (C) Sedney concurred on the importance of increasing the
capacity of the police, but that efforts to train and improve
the police had been less successful because Afghanistan had
only ten percent of the police mentoring (training) teams it
needed. Agreeing, Rahimi said that he was disappointed by
the ROKG's failure to provide more trainers and other aid.
When he had discussed this with ROKG officials (National
Assembly representatives, Interior Ministry officials, the
former police chief, and the Deputy Foreign Minister),
initially, they seemed receptive, but grew evasive and
non-committal as the discussions progressed. Rahimi told the
ROKG that he was not asking it to send troops to Afghanistan,
but that without increased security, there could not be any
meaningful construction contracts that would attract Korean
construction interests. He received the same reply at each
encounter: that ROKG aid to Afghanistan was under review.
Rahimi said that he was surprised by the continuing influence
that the killing of the Korean missionaries in 2007 had on
ROKG officials. His assessment was that ROKG officials, who
feared negative public fallout if a similar event occurred,
were not trying to build public support for deeper ROK
engagement in Afghanistan. According to Rahimi, the ROKG
reacted lukewarmly when told of the GOA's eagerness to send
GOA officials to Seoul for discussions. Rahimi thought the
reaction was due to ROKG expectations that the GOA officials
would likely talk about the need for police trainers and
additional aid.


5. (C) Rahimi said that he had expected the ROKG to
announce a bigger (and better) aid package for Afghanistan
before the inauguration of President Obama. Then he had
expected a big change in ROKG aid policy when he learned of
ROK-Japan discussions of joint aid projects, but was
disappointed with the small programs that materialized
instead. Rahimi said the ROKG re-started communications with
him before Secretary Clinton's visit to Seoul, but had since
reverted to past patterns and responses.


6. (C) Rahimi concluded that only USG pressure seemed to
get the ROKG to respond concretely with aid. Sedney replied
that he tried to communicate to the ROKG that it should
provide support to Afghanistan not because of USG pressure,
but rather because it was in their own interests to do so.
Rahimi agreed saying that he also tried to communicate the
same message, but thought that the ROKG really did not want
to hear it. Rahimi concluded by asking about the possibility
of coordinated or joint USG-GOA efforts to engage the ROKG in
Seoul about additional support for Afghanistan. Sedney said
that he would transmit the request to the Ambassador.


7. (U) DASD Sedney cleared this cable.
STEPHENS