ROKG AID EFFORTS DISAPPOINT AFGHAN AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000491 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/A E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF KS SUBJECT: ROKG AID EFFORTS DISAPPOINT AFGHAN AMBASSADOR Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. During a lunch meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney on March 1 in Seoul, Afghan Ambassador to the ROK, Mohammad Karim Rahimi, discussed the upcoming elections in Afghanistan, the current USG Afghanistan/Pakistan policy review, and the ROK aid efforts in Afghanistan. Rahimi said that he did not believe holding elections by May 22 was logistically possible. He thought the current USG Afghanistan/Pakistan policy review process was a good one, and was hopeful it would lead to actions that would improve the situation in Afghanistan. Rahimi focused the bulk of his comments on his disappointment with the ROKG's aid efforts in Afghanistan. He said that the ROKG did not take the situation in Afghanistan, nor his efforts to engage ROKG officials, seriously. Rahimi believed that the ROKG responded only to USG pressure, and even then, with an eye on public opinion, which the ROKG did not do enough to influence. Rahimi asked if it was possible for him and the U.S. Ambassador to the ROK to make joint or coordinated efforts to engage ROK officials. Sedney promised to transmit the request to the Ambassador. Ahmad Jawid Azadzoy, First Secretary of Political and Economic Affairs, also attended the meeting. End Summary. -------------- Afghan Elections -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador Mohammad Karim Rahimi started his remarks by saying that he was up to date on election issues in Afghanistan and was happy about the way the election was going. Rahimi he did not know Afghan President Hamid Karzai's motivation for wanting to have the election by May ¶22. Still, Rahimi agreed with the USG response that August was a more reasonable time to hold elections because he thought that it was "logistically impossible" to hold an election by May 22. Rahimi said that having clean and fair elections were one of the issues that made the current year such a critical one for Afghanistan. -------------- Afghanistan/Pakistan Policy Review -------------- ¶3. (C) Rahimi thought the current Afghanistan/Pakistan policy review process underway in Washington was a good one, specifically that Afghan and Pakistani views are being included in the review process. Afghans, he said, wanted to see drastic and positive changes in Afghanistan, which he believed comprehensive, coordinated, state and institution building could achieve. Rahimi said the changes in Pakistan and in the Pakistani government were reasons for the Afghans to hope for an end to the instability in Afghanistan. He was concerned, however that the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) allowed the Taliban to regroup due to the lack of police, which was the reason that more, better trained police were so important for security in Afghanistan. -------------- ROKG Aid Efforts Disappointing -------------- ¶4. (C) Sedney concurred on the importance of increasing the capacity of the police, but that efforts to train and improve the police had been less successful because Afghanistan had only ten percent of the police mentoring (training) teams it needed. Agreeing, Rahimi said that he was disappointed by the ROKG's failure to provide more trainers and other aid. When he had discussed this with ROKG officials (National Assembly representatives, Interior Ministry officials, the former police chief, and the Deputy Foreign Minister), initially, they seemed receptive, but grew evasive and non-committal as the discussions progressed. Rahimi told the ROKG that he was not asking it to send troops to Afghanistan, but that without increased security, there could not be any meaningful construction contracts that would attract Korean construction interests. He received the same reply at each encounter: that ROKG aid to Afghanistan was under review. Rahimi said that he was surprised by the continuing influence that the killing of the Korean missionaries in 2007 had on ROKG officials. His assessment was that ROKG officials, who feared negative public fallout if a similar event occurred, were not trying to build public support for deeper ROK engagement in Afghanistan. According to Rahimi, the ROKG reacted lukewarmly when told of the GOA's eagerness to send GOA officials to Seoul for discussions. Rahimi thought the reaction was due to ROKG expectations that the GOA officials would likely talk about the need for police trainers and additional aid. ¶5. (C) Rahimi said that he had expected the ROKG to announce a bigger (and better) aid package for Afghanistan before the inauguration of President Obama. Then he had expected a big change in ROKG aid policy when he learned of ROK-Japan discussions of joint aid projects, but was disappointed with the small programs that materialized instead. Rahimi said the ROKG re-started communications with him before Secretary Clinton's visit to Seoul, but had since reverted to past patterns and responses. ¶6. (C) Rahimi concluded that only USG pressure seemed to get the ROKG to respond concretely with aid. Sedney replied that he tried to communicate to the ROKG that it should provide support to Afghanistan not because of USG pressure, but rather because it was in their own interests to do so. Rahimi agreed saying that he also tried to communicate the same message, but thought that the ROKG really did not want to hear it. Rahimi concluded by asking about the possibility of coordinated or joint USG-GOA efforts to engage the ROKG in Seoul about additional support for Afghanistan. Sedney said that he would transmit the request to the Ambassador. ¶7. (U) DASD Sedney cleared this cable. STEPHENS