Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL485
2009-03-25 08:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

SOUTH KOREANS CALM ABOUT NORTH KOREAN THREATS

Tags:  KS KN PGOV PREL 
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DE RUEHUL #0485/01 0840800
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250800Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3773
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5510
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9405
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5605
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3090
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000485 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019
TAGS: KS KN PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SOUTH KOREANS CALM ABOUT NORTH KOREAN THREATS

Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000485

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019
TAGS: KS KN PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SOUTH KOREANS CALM ABOUT NORTH KOREAN THREATS

Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: The South Korean public has reacted calmly
to North Korea's increasingly hostile rhetoric and actions
over the last six months. Even in the shadow of the North's
impending missile launch, polls show only a slight up tick in
public concern about the North Korean threat, and debate in
the National Assembly has predictably split along party
lines, with the progressives calling for improving
inter-Korean relations and the conservatives focused on
punitive responses to a launch. The recent restrictions on
access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),which
stranded South Korean nationals in the North, and North
Korea's arrest of two American journalists have received much
media coverage, but we do not sense any increase of public
unease. Support for President Lee Myung-bak's insistence on
a reciprocal relationship with the North remains firm;
however, at the same time the majority of Koreans also want
to see improved inter-Korean relations. This dichotomy makes
Lee vulnerable to public criticism if a major incident, such
as a West Sea clash over the disputed maritime boundary, were
to take place. End Summary.

--------------
Public Sanguine but Alert
--------------


2. (C) The South Korean public has been and remains
surprisingly calm about North Korean provocations. Professor
Lee Sang-don of Chung-Ang University commented that the South
Korean people are strangely optimistic about North Korean
intentions. He noted that young people who have no memory of
the Korean War are particularly unconcerned. Recent polling
bears this out; a March 5 a Korea Society Opinion Institute
(KSOI) survey found that 49.3 percent of respondents did not
feel nervous about North Korean threats, while 48.3 percent
said they were. The percentage of those concerned was only
slightly up from previous years -- 40.2 percent in 2005 and
42.9 percent in 2006. The poll found that women and people
in their 50's were more likely to be concerned about the
North's provocations.

--------------
Politicians Concerned
--------------


3. (C) Politicians have reacted predictably with debate
split along party lines. Many in the ruling Grand National

Party (GNP) have called for South Korea to join the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),while some in the
opposition Democratic Party (DP) have advocated the
resumption of humanitarian aid to improve relations with the
North. At a Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification (FATU)
Committee meeting on March 12, GNP lawmakers harshly
criticized the North for violating the inter-Korean agreement
on security at KIC. Conservative lawmakers noted that the
KIC restrictions showed that the North was willing to take
hostages. Separately, GNP Representative Gu Sang-chan told
poloffs that KIC's closure was illegal and, in response, the
U.S. and ROK should take a harder line. When North Korea
violated its agreements, he said, we should impose stricter
sanctions. At the same time, Gu said, if the DPRK worked
toward denuclearization, the U.S. and ROK should be ready to
offer significant aid and incentives.


4. (C) DP lawmakers, however, in the March 12 FATU Committee
meeting called for resuming humanitarian assistance to the
North to improve inter-Korean relations. DP Representative
Park Jie-won told poloffs that he had given many press
interviews in order to convey former President Kim Dae-jung's
messages: one to the DPRK that Pyongyang should not launch a
missile and one to the Lee Administration that it should ease
its policy toward the North. Park conceded, however, that
the ROKG was unlikely to change its stance, so the U.S. would
have to convince Seoul to embrace a "grand bargain" the way
President Clinton had convinced President Kim Young-sam.

--------------
Hard Line Policy Could Backfire
--------------


5. (C) Public support is largely in favor of improving
inter-Korean relations. In a Hangil Research poll on March
13-14, 67.7 percent of respondents said that President Lee
should make an effort to restart dialogue witQthe North. A
KSOI poll on February 25 targeting government officials found
that 69.7 percent favored outreach to the North. The public,
however, still does not blame the South Korean government for
deteriorating ties. According to a March 17 survey, 72.2
percent of respondents said the North was directly
responsible for freezing inter-Korean cooperation at KIC.


6. (C) There is potential, however, that the blame could
shift to the President. According to a poll by an
independent polling company, more than 80 percent of South
Koreans believed that continued military threats from North
Korea will have a negative effect on South Korea's economy.
In a climate where economic difficulties are foremost in
people's minds, Lee could ultimately be blamed for allowing
inter-Korean ties to sour to the point that South Korea's
economy is impacted.

--------------
Comment
--------------


7. (C) For the most part, the Korean public is confident
that North Korea is not a threat. They are more confident
still that North Korea will not attempt anything "physical."
GNP National Assembly contacts agreed, noting in early March
that, despite the recent increases in tension on the
Peninsula, they did not expect any change in public opinion
toward the DPRK or any demand for a changed North Korea
policy. This relative nonchalance among the South Koreans
requires some North Korean cooperation; there must not be an
incident involving the militaries, especially no loss of
lives. If their assumption does not hold, President Lee will
be at the receiving end of mounting public criticism, which
could quickly threaten his North Korea policy.
STEPHENS