AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ROK NATIONAL SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000045 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ROK NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR KIM SUNG-HWAN Classified By: Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a cordial lunch at the Residence on January 7, the Ambassador and ROK National Security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan reviewed recent bilateral and regional developments. NSA Kim said President Lee Myung-bak looks forward to establishing a cooperative relationship with President Obama, noting the two had had a warm telephone conversation soon after the election. Kim expressed frustration at North Korean intransigence on improving North-South relations, but said President Lee remained ready to be patient, particularly as polling showed a majority of South Koreans, some 60 percent, supported ROKG policy toward the North. On Afghanistan, Kim said he was aware of the urgency of the situation. The ROKG was looking into sending a military unit capable of ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) tasks. The challenge, however, was how to secure National Assembly approval, because such a deployment could otherwise trigger National Assembly opposition such as we had just seen over the KORUS FTA. Still, Kim said, President Lee could begin to do more as his approval rating had improved steadily over the past six months, from high teens to around 35 percent now. Kim thanked the Ambassador for the Embassy's role in reaching an agreement on burden sharing. This was a major achievement, removing a major potential irritant in the bilateral relationship for years to come. The Ambassador said we should now turn our attention to ensuring that USFK facilities could be returned rapidly and efficiently; camp returns should be a good news story for both sides. The Ambassador also conveyed her appreciation for the assistance of MOFAT and the Blue House in making progress on the New Embassy Compound (NEC). Kim said that President Lee, from his days as Seoul mayor, was well versed in the issues involved in finding a new home for the Embassy, and that he had instructed the Blue House and ministries to be helpful. End Summary. -------------- Blue House-White House -------------- ¶2. (C) National Security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan said that President Lee Myung-bak appreciated the warm relationship he had enjoyed with President Bush. Lee was grateful for the President's decisive help in getting over the Dokdo controversy last summer, when a website of the U.S. Board on 
Geographic Names (BGN) seemed to raise new questions about ROK sovereignty claims. Kim believed that the turnaround in President Lee's approval rating, from the high teens in the summer last year to around 35 percent now (Comment: other polling is not as favorable to LMB. End Comment),could be traced to President Bush's visit in August and the USG decision on the BGN site. Now, President Lee's detractors, especially the opposition Democratic Party, were saying that Lee could not build such a rapport with President Obama, because he was not a fellow conservative. This was nonsense, Kim said. Presidents Obama and Lee had a very warm conversation soon after the election. Lee was delighted to learn that the President-elect knew so much about him, especially Lee's tenure as CEO of Hyundai Construction. The Ambassador said that she too looked forward to an excellent relationship between our two Presidents. President Lee's background, personality and can-do attitude would strike a positive chord in the new Administration. ¶3. (C) NSA Kim said it appeared that the first encounter between the two Presidents would be on the margins of the G-20 financial summit in London in April. He hoped there could be a bilateral meeting between the two leaders. If not, Korea, as the next chair of the G-20, would be part of the troika, along with the UK and Brazil, allowing Lee to participate in a US-troika summit meeting. Kim said that the timing of the Korean chairmanship of the G-20 (taking the chair in 2010) was quite fortuitous, providing Seoul with a bigger voice in global financial issues. -------------- North Korea -------------- ¶4. (C) NSA Kim said that the ROKG had not had any recent substantial contact with Pyongyang. Seoul had tried back channel contacts several times, but to no avail. Instead, Pyongyang was heaping insults on President Lee, trying its old trick of dividing South Koreans. President Lee was unperturbed by these tactics. Recent polling showed around 60 percent of the South Korean public supported the ROKG stance, while some 30 percent were more critical, wanting to see more accommodation of North Korean concerns. ¶5. (C) It was difficult to know what was going on in North Korea, Kim said. For example, recent press reports suggested that Choe Sung-chol, a ranking North Korean official in charge of handling inter-Korean affairs, was fired last year and sent to a "chicken factory," a Korean euphemism for very menial factory work. -------------- Japan -------------- ¶6. (C) Kim confirmed that Japanese Prime Minister Aso would visit Korea January 11-12. On Sunday, January 11, Aso, accompanied by Japanese businessmen, would have a large luncheon meeting with Korean business representatives. President Lee would host an official dinner, also on January 11; the summit meeting was scheduled for the morning of January 12. The Prime Minister would depart on the afternoon of January 12. This visit had not yet been announced, Kim noted. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶7. (C) Asked about Blue House thinking on Afghanistan, Kim said that the ROK Administration was acutely aware of the importance attached to Afghanistan by the current and incoming U.S. administrations. Internally, the ROKG was reviewing whether an ISR unit could be deployed. The big challenge, however, was how to deal with the National Assembly, because any military deployment would require legislative approval. There would be enormous opposition in the National Assembly such as we had just seen over the KORUS FTA. In addition, there was certainly no public support among South Koreans, as the 2007 kidnapping and death of some Korean missionaries were still fresh in their minds. The Lee administration would like to do what it could to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, Kim said, making no commitment. -------------- KORUS FTA -------------- ¶8. (C) NSA Kim said that the agreement in the National Assembly -- that the FTA would be considered after the January 20 inauguration in Washington -- was putting off the issue at least until February. The Administration had hoped that the FTA could be aired and debated in committee and then be ratified by the National Assembly. This would have left the onus on the U.S. Congress for ratification. However, opposition legislators had a different perspective; they did not want to take the difficult step of ratifying the FTA when action on the other side of the ocean looked quite uncertain. Both views had merits, but, Kim believed, South Korea had lost a valuable opportunity to take an important step toward realizing the FTA. -------------- SMA and Camp Returns -------------- ¶9. (C) NSA Kim said that the five-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was a major accomplishment; the ROK side was pleased with the outcome. The agreement was more transparent than previous agreement, and the provision of in-kind contributions in lieu of cash was especially important. Seoul and Washington had removed a major irritant in the bilateral relationship for years to come, because SMA negotiations were always contentious. Kim praised the efforts of the Ambassador and U.S. SMA team. The Ambassador said that the U.S. too was pleased to see the issue resolved; she looked forward to the signing ceremony on January 15. ¶10. (C) NSA Kim said that continued delays and uncertainties related to USFK's move to Pyongtaek were posing difficulties for his Government. This was particularly true of the move of the Second Infantry Division, because local governments and businesses had already made plans on the basis of earlier commitment dates for the move. The Ambassador said that she knew USFK was also keen to move to the new facilities, but construction had been delayed for a variety of reasons, including a lack of funds and the delays in land transfers. The Ambassador and NSA Kim agreed we needed to work to reach a common approach and a common public message. ¶11. (C) Turning to already vacated USFK facilities, the Ambassador said the two sides should agree on a more rapid and efficient handover. Some of these facilities had been vacant for over two years, creating frustration for all concerned. Camp returns should be a good news story. NSA Kim agreed that the delays were an irritant and that he would do all he could to speed up the process. --- NEC --- ¶12. (C) Asked about the progress of NEC, the Ambassador said that there had been some positive movement recently, especially with the Seoul Municipal authorities and the Cultural Heritage Administration, but that a lot more work remained. We wanted to move forward on this project, the Ambassador said, showing conceptual NEC designs. The new Embassy would be a reflection of the importance the U.S. attaches to the US-ROK relationship; it would be a first-class facility that would reflect our shared vision of a 21st century alliance. The Department was committed to the move to Camp Coiner. The Ambassador said she would like to reach an early property exchange agreement and begin construction as soon as possible. ¶13. (C) NSA Kim recalled that he had been MOFAT's Director General of North America Bureau when the ROKG made the decision that the new embassy could not be built on the site of the old Kyunggi Girls' High School. This time around, Kim emphasized, the Embassy had to take irreversible steps. Certainly, the political stars were well aligned, with President Lee and Seoul Mayor Oh very sympathetic to the need to find a proper home for the U.S. Embassy; the Embassy must exploit this advantage, Kim said. He reiterated that President Lee had instructed the Blue House and relevant ministries to be helpful. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) NSA Kim was more upbeat than during an initial lunch with the Ambassador in October but we were still struck by his focus on the domestic political constraints facing Lee. In addition, the improved poll numbers he cited conflict with other polls. For example, Myungji University's Polling Center found in a December 26-27, 2008 poll that 49 percent of respondents said they voted for Lee but only 16 percent said he was performing his job well. STEPHENS