21ST SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE MEETING

S E C R E T SEOUL 000446 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: MARR MCAP MOPS PREL KS KN SUBJECT: 21ST SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE MEETING REF: SEOUL 330 Classified By: POLMC JOSEPH YUN FOR REASONS 1.4 (A,B,D,G) ¶1. (C) Summary. The 21st session of the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) opened on March 2, at the ROK Ministry of National Defense in Seoul. The meeting covered a wide range of topics concerning the U.S.-ROK security alliance, including: the North Korea (DPRK) missile situation, an update on the Alliance Korean Joint Command and Control System (AKJCCS) and C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence),the relocation/consolidation of U.S. military bases, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) tour normalization, transition of wartime operational control (OPCON),bilateral operation plans (OPLAN),lessons learned for stabilization and reconstruction operations, Global Hawk, ROK participation in Afghanistan and counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. The meeting ended with a commitment on the proposed agenda for the 22nd SPI meeting, tentatively scheduled for May 7, 2009 in Washington, D.C. End Summary. -------------- Opening statements -------------- ¶2. (C) Deputy Minister (DM) for Policy Jeon Jei-guk from the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) opened the morning Session by informing the group that the ROK National Assembly had scheduled the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for a vote later the same day (reftel). Deputy Director General (DDG) Lee Baek Soon from the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) summarized the 2008 U.S.-ROK Alliance successes, highlighting the SMA and the upgrade of the ROK's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) status to NATO 4. He said that the ROKG looked forward to issuing a new vision statement for the U.S.-ROK alliance. New MND Director General (DG) for International Policy Cho Baek Sang said the SPI is a great mechanism for discussing policy and working through issues. ¶3. (C) U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) for East Asia David Sedney noted that, as Secretary Clinton reaffirmed, the U.S.-ROK alliance is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and the USG is committed to maintaining our current force level on the Korean Peninsula. While the new U.S. administration would include many new faces and some adjustments in priority, he offered that the continuation of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense (SecDef) meant further continuity in defense policy. Sedney said the U.S. was currently consulting with our allies on DPRK issues and the missile issue in particular. He highlighted the SMA signing as a major success story, as well as reaching an agreement on the Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP) for camp returns, and said he looked forward to the return to the ROKG in the coming weeks of the next six camps. ¶4. (C) Maureen Cormack, Deputy Director of the Office of Korean Affairs at the Department of State, reflected on the changing bilateral relationship as the U.S.-ROK alliance moved from a Korean peninsula focus to a global focus. She stated that the new administration was focusing on Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan's successful transition to a peaceful and stable democracy was in the best interest of all democratic nations. She mentioned that there is still much work to be done on camp returns as USFK moves away from urban centers to centralized facilities in other areas of the country. Cormack noted that the return of Camp Hialeah would be an important symbol of progress in alliance relations for both countries, a very good news story for the public. ¶5. (C) DASD Sedney highlighted a number of additional recent developments in the Alliance: the U.S. had temporarily replaced the Apache Battalion (scheduled to redeploy in March 2009 to CONUS) with rotational F-16 fighters; USFK had provided briefings on tour normalization and wartime OPCON transition to the ROK National Assembly; and Commander UNC/CFC/USFK General Sharp and ROK CJCS Kim signed the bilateral CONPLAN 5029. DM Jeon expressed appreciation for the U.S. deploying F-16s prior to the movement of the Apache battalion off the Korean Peninsula, ensuring that there will be no gap in capability. -------------- North Korea Update -------------- ¶6. (S) DM Jeon stated that in the last year, inter-governmental communications between the North and South had nearly ceased and that hostile rhetoric and propaganda from North Korea had increased dramatically. In January the North Korean General Staff and Committee for Peaceful Reunification announced that the DPRK was pulling out of all treaties and formal agreements with the ROK. Jeon believed there was a high possibility that North Korea would incite "local" provocation, such as an incident in the Northern Limit Line (NLL) of the West Sea or a missile launch. Jeon stated that the ROKG would not be swayed and would continue to seek a dialogue with the DPRK; however the ROKG was ready to respond to any provocation. ¶7. (S) DM Jeon said the DPRK had been actively preparing for a missile launch since January and, much like the 1998 missile launch, will claim that it was launching a satellite and not testing a missile. Regardless of DPRK claims, Jeon said, the DPRK would use the Taepodong missile platform, making the launch a violation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718. The ROKG views any missile or rocket launch as a military provocation. Jeon said the alliance needs to strengthen its intelligence and surveillance posture and effectively work together to monitor the launch and to prepare a joint response. Jeon said the U.S. and the ROKG should work with the international community and possibly within the United Nations Security Council to prepare a proper response ahead of any DPRK missile launch. Jeon proposed that both sides agree to disclose portions of the SPI dialogue to the media. ¶8. (S) DASD Sedney said that Alliance coordination and cooperation is key to dealing effectively with North Korea, noting that the U.S.-ROK alliance was forged in blood by the North Korean threat. Sedney stressed the importance of keeping the internal SPI discussions secret and stressed the importance of operational security. He stated that recent leaks of U.S.-origin intelligence by Japanese and Korean officials politicized the issue, hindered the Alliance's ability to properly respond to a missile launch, and will have a negative impact on future intelligence collection. Sedney agreed with the ROKG's assessment that a missile or rocket launch would violate UNSCR 1718, adding that a launch would be provocative and damaging to regional security. Sedney said our current efforts should attempt to deter the DPRK from launching, but also that the U.S. and ROK need to coordinate their response to a possible launch. ¶9. (S) U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) J-5 Major General Frank Panter noted that intelligence cooperation is a daily activity, highlighting the daily 0900 combined operations/intelligence update brief and daily sharing of intelligence between the Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the ROK JCS. ¶10. (S) DM Jeon said the ROKG places a high priority on protecting intelligence sources and methods. Jeon said the ROK is conducting an investigation of the intelligence leaks, acknowledging that the inability to protect classified intelligence affects the trust of the Alliance. Jeon stated that the most important issue was deterring the DPRK from launching the missile. Jeon noted that a coordinated press release could help in the effort to deter North Korea. ¶11. (S) DASD Sedney said that the U.S. was looking at all possible options for responding to a DPRK missile launch, not just engaging to shoot down the missile. Although RADM Won of the ROK JCS J-5 noted that a DPRK missile launch would violate UNSCR 1718 because of technical components related to a ballistic missile program, Sedney noted that the U.S. position that a rocket launch would be a violation was based on the USG's legal interpretation of UNSCR 1718. Sedney noted that U.S. Special Representative for North Korean Policy, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, would likely discuss the North Korean missile issue further when he visited the region later in the week. ¶12. (S) MG Panter asked Rear Admiral Won Tae Ho about the ROK media assessment of whether the DPRK would launch a missile or a satellite. DM Jeon responded that regardless of what was launched, the ROK media would view any launch as a provocation. He said he hoped to discuss the subject more fully in another forum. -------------- Update on AKJCCS (ROK C4I reform) -------------- ¶13. (C) Colonel Park, Sun-sang of the ROK JCS C4I Division described the history of recent bilateral Alliance - Korea Joint Command and Control System (AKJCCS) discussions. He noted that the U.S. and ROK currently plan to continue to use their own command and control systems. The ROK would develop and field a new C4I system (AKJCCS) prior to wartime OPCON transition, which the ROK would use primarily in joint operational areas. Centrix-K (USFK's C4I system) could be used as a bridging system, but the U.S. and ROK have not yet formally agreed to use Centrix-K. Park concluded by saying that the ROKG plans to draw from U.S. experience and ROK information technology as it develops its C4I system. ¶14. (C) MG Panter expressed concern that, as of February 2009, the ROKG has allotted only US$2.1 million for AKJCCS development. The MND planned to request an increase from the National Assembly, but had not yet received any additional funding. (Note: DM Jeon confirmed that the MND was planning to request additional funding this month.) Panter said the U.S. and ROK should conclude a formal agreement on C4I bridging capability. Jeon concurred. Panter noted that OPCON transition will occur as scheduled regardless of what C4I system was being used. Jeon responded that the ROKG understands. DASD Sedney stated that, as SecDef Gates had mentioned at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2008, the interoperability of our C4I systems is the most critical warfighting issue. Sedney urged that this issue needs to move from "yellow" to "green" on the progress reports for the Strategic Transition Plan before the 2009 SCM. He asked for a ROK briefing on AKJCCS development and a description of the required resources to meet the C4I requirements at the next SPI. -------------- Base Relocation and Consolidation (YRP/LPP) -------------- ¶15. (C) The ROK delegation urged the U.S. to announce efforts to complete the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) by the last quarter of 2015; however MG Panter and Colonel Russell, USFK Engineer, stated that the current best-case scenario showed a completion date in the first quarter of 2016. (Note: The current plan calls for the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) to be completed by 2014 and the LPP to be completed by 2016.) The development of USAG-Humphreys is proceeding based on these estimated completion timelines. ¶16. (C) COL Russell said USFK and ROK MND had made some progress on the transfer of land grants under the SOFA for use in a privatized family housing initiative. He also said the LPP can not be completed in 2015 because of a combination of construction saturation and the availability of funds. By the time new sites for the Second Infantry Division headquarters and the Fires Brigade become available in 2011, all YRP projects would be underway. Consequently, first quarter 2013 was the earliest that the Fires Brigade construction could begin. It would take at least two years to construct the new facilities, followed by 3-6 months to move the units to the new sites. ¶17. (C) DM Jeon said he believed that both sides were striving for the best possible results but added that the ROKG would still like to announce that the LPP would be completed by the end of 2015. DASD Sedney responded that, while he understood the political interest in using 2015 as a completion date, 2015 was not possible or realistic. Sedney expressed surprise and disappointment that some of the issues he had expected would be completed prior to the SPI - the SOFA Land Grant for family housing - remained unresolved. ¶18. (C) DM Jeon responded that the land grants for the project were almost resolved, but noted that the ROKG was still carefully working through some legal issues relating to part of the project involving ROKG-owned land that would be developed by private contractors. The ROKG, wanting to avoid future litigation, was concerned about what would happen when the leases expire. The ROK Prime Minister's office had a special team to oversee the infrastructure developments (sewers, roads, gas, electricity) needed for USAG Humphreys. This team was coordinating weekly with the local Pyeongtaek government, Jeon assured. ¶19. (C) After viewing the ROK's development timeline for the USAG Humphreys vicinity, DASD Sedney stated that he noticed some discrepencies between the MND and USFK presentations. DASD Sedney suggested both sides give a joint presentation on a comprehensive construction timeline at the next SPI. ¶20. (C) DASD Sedney reiterated that both sides had reached an agreement on the Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP),and that the ROK and U.S. should focus on implementing the agreement. He hoped that the ROK would receive the next six camps within the next few months. He noted that if the return of Camp Hialeah takes a year, that would be a huge disappointment. Rather, he hoped that the return of Camp Hialeah in Busan could be completed prior to this year's SCM. Sedney suggested that a future SPI be held in Busan in order to visit Camp Hialeah. DM Jeon agreed to the proposal. MajGen Panter thanked DDG Lee and his office for all their hard work on camp returns, but said like the SMA, the true test would be in the execution. He suggested that a quick return of the next six camps would show success in the new JEAP. ¶21. (C) DDG Lee said that the JEAP agreement was a big step forward. However, completing the transfer of the six camps in a few months time was overly optimistic. The ROK President and Foreign Minister were scheduled to be out of the country frequently in the coming weeks, Lee said, so coordination within the ROKG could be delayed. -------------- Tour Normalization -------------- ¶22. (C) At the start of the afternoon session, DASD Sedney introduced Richard Parker from USFK Transformation (J8) who explained that USFK's two main goals for tour normalization were to make a standard USFK tour 3 years accompanied (2 years unaccompanied) and to develop the infrastructure to support the dramatic increase in military family members. Tour normalization would increase military readiness by reducing service member turnover and increase positive interactions between soldiers and their families and Koreans, thereby strengthening the alliance, Parker said. The first phase of the three phase plan would use current infrastructure to accommodate an increase in accompanied tours. The second and third phases require increased infrastructure for families at Osan, Kunsan, Pyeongtaek, Daegu, and Chinhae. With tour normalization, USFK projected that the number of families would grow from the current 2,220 to approximately 14,250 families by 2020. ¶23. (C) DM Jeon welcomed tour normalization, saying that it would ensure stability and improve soldiers' lives. DASD Sedney informed him that tour normalization would place the ROK in the same status as Japan, the United Kingdom, and other key U.S. allies in Europe in terms of U.S. military personnel stationing. He noted the importance of the U.S. and ROK maintaining a coordinated message on tour normalization. DM Jeon said that he would be happy to help if there was anything that USFK needed for tour normalization, to which DASD Sedney asked him and his colleagues to convey to the National Assembly that tour normalization was good for the alliance and symbolized, like the FMS status upgrade, a U.S. long-term commitment to the Alliance. -------------- OPCON Transfer -------------- ¶24. (S) Colonel Park Sang-rae, Director of the STP Implementation Division of the ROK JCS OPCON Transition Group, said key OPCON transition tasks are on schedule, but work remains to be done on the intelligence coordination system and C4I. MND will focus on the certification plan for assessing Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of its warfighting headquarters this year. Park explained the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reorganization, effective after April 2009, would establish a warfighting element and an administration/support element within the JCS. ¶25. (S) DASD Sedney asked if the ROK met the January/February 2009 goals in its IOC certification plan. COL Park said that the goal was to have discussions, which did occur. After complimenting the ROK for its management of OPCON transition to date, MajGen Panter said although C4I is critical to effective operations following OPCON transition, a solution to provide effective C4I was not yet evident. He urged U.S. and ROK officials to focus on solving this vital problem. ¶26. (S) DASD Sedney asked MND to provide a briefing at the next SPI on how the ROK JCS will be reorganized in order to create a theater warfighting command. He noted the importance of seeing and understanding the warfighting command structure, and the required resources, well before ¶2012. -------------- Bilateral OPLAN -------------- ¶27. (S) MajGen Panter gave a quick overview of the status of the bilateral OPLAN efforts. He noted that the July 2009 draft of OPLAN 5012, the bilateral OPLAN that will succeed OPLAN 5027 following the transition of wartime OPCON in 2012, will be used in the fall Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise. Consequently, he urged that the U.S. and ROK agree on strategic guidance with the goal of having SecDef Gates and Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee sign a Joint Strategic Guidance (JSG) document by the next Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in the fall. ¶28. (S) Rear Admiral Won said the Joint Chief of Staffs (JCS) had discussed this issue and will be able to overcome the challenges. DASD Sedney proposed to use the next two SPIs (22nd, 23rd) to review progress towards the JSG document, and to use the 24th SPI to finalize the JSG. DM Jeon agreed to the proposal, noting that once a JPG is signed by the SecDef and MinDef, the Commander USFK and ROK CJCS can sign a Strategic Directive for the operational planners. -------------- Stabilization and Reconstruction -------------- ¶29. (C) DM Jeon thanked the USG for proposing at the previous SPI that the U.S. and ROK share lessons learned from stabilization and reconstruction. Colonel Ryu Jae-ik, the Director of MND's International Peace Cooperation Division, said the ROKG is considering the proposals to increase liaison officers, exchange points-of-contact for collaboration, increase naval post graduate school slots, and conduct joint research and joint workshops/conferences on the topic, but noted that implementing the proposals were subject to ROK budget constraints. He said he hoped to provide a concrete response to the proposal to conduct a joint workshop/conference at the next SPI, but noted that there would have to be additional working level discussions and specific USG proposals by April in order to do this. ¶30. (S) DASD Sedney reiterated that SecDef Gates made the long-term institutional retention of lessons learned from stabilization and reconstruction efforts a priority. Sedney noted that collaborating on lessons learned will improve the capacity of the Alliance to execute stability and reconstruction operations in places such as Afghanistan. Additionally, he noted that collaboration will better support U.S. and ROK planners as they consider the complexities of planning for stability and reconstruction operations in the context of a potential contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Sedney said that a bilateral lessons learned conference presented a positive way forward and that perhaps there would be an opportunity for working level planning at the next SPI. DM Jeon agreed, stating that this collaboration will seal the U.S.-ROK Alliance as a global partnership, and will help with the unification process on the Korean Peninsula. ¶31. (C) EAP/K Deputy Director Cormack invited the ROK to participate in the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR) exercise scheduled for May 4-8 in the Philippines. (Note: The ROK is currently an observer.) At first, DM Jeon said that the ROK would look into the issue, but after the break (and receiving a brief), he said that due to budget constraints, the ROK would remain an observer to the ARF VDR, but could reconsider that decision in the future. -------------- Global Hawk -------------- ¶32. (S) DASD Sedney noted he invited the ROKG to re-submit a Letter of Request (LOR) for Pricing and Availability for the Global Hawk High Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HALE UAV) seven months ago. Sedney added that the ROK's acquisition of Global Hawk would visibly demonstrate the strength of the alliance since the ROK would be the first country to acquire the complete system. Sedney urged the ROK to submit a LOR for Pricing & Availability prior to the next SPI in May. ¶33. (S) DM Jeon replied that the ROK JCS originally wanted to acquire a high altitude UAV and a medium altitude UAV. He made very clear that the ROK needs Global Hawk and would like to acquire it, but due to the current economic difficulties and the on-going review of major programs, there is no set date for acquiring Global Hawk. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶34. (S) DASD Sedney introduced Ms. Aikojean Lane, the OSD Country Director for Afghanistan (APSA/CEN),who provided an Afghanistan situation update. Lane highlighted the importance of Afghanistan to the U.S. government, the inter-relatedness of the challenges in Afghanistan, the conceptual framework of the "clear, hold, and build" strategy, as well as the insufficient resources at hand to make the hold and build phases effective. Lane outlined Afghanistan's critical needs: intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) assets; infrastructure construction; election assistance; mentors, trainers, and equipment for the Afghan army and police; and combat troops. DASD Sedney said that even though the Afghanistan/Pakistan Strategic Review would identify realistic, attainable goals, it was clear that major increases, not only in troops, but in civil and police capacity, and in equipment would be needed. Sedney invited the ROK to provide input to the Strategic Review, stating that their perspectives on Afghanistan would be welcome to the review process. ¶35. (C) When asked by DM Jeon when the Strategic Review would be completed, DASD Sedney answered that it would be completed in mid-March in time for the NATO summit in early April. The U.S. was consulting with Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as other allies, partners, and friends. ¶36. (C) DDG Lee described the ROKG's recently announced additional aid package for Afghanistan: 100 ambulances; 300 motorcycles; vocational, police, and firefighting personnel; and construction projects (a vocational center, a police training facility, and a new hospital). He also noted that new facilities would be necessary in order to increase support. Lee then described the three joint ROK - Japan projects: a vocational project in Kabul, an agricultural demonstration project, and a training exchange project in the ROK and Japan. ¶37. (S) Sedney reiterated that major, substantive contributions were needed in governance, development, and security. The U.S. was sending an additional 17,000 troops, with the total number of American troops to reach 61,000 by the end of the year. However, additional civilian contributions were needed. The U.S. appreciated the ROK's present contributions, Sedney said, but he hoped that the ROKG would consider an immediate, large contribution. A ROK contribution of USD $100 million per year for five years would significantly improve the sustainment of the Afghan National Army. Sedney concluded by encouraging the ROKG to work to allay ROK citizens' fears about involvement in Afghanistan, acknowledging that the hostage situation in 2007 and the loss of life was tragic. ¶38. (S) DM Jeon said that the ROK would seek to identify the most effective way to participate, focusing on non-military upport. Regarding military contributions, the ROKG would gauge public sentiment and respond accordingly. DASD Sedney noted the U.S. and ROK delegations could discuss the results of the Strategic Review at the next SPI. -------------- Horn of Africa -------------- ¶39. (S) After predicting easy National Assembly passage of the bill authorizing the ROKG's dispatch of a ship to the Gulf of Aden (which occurred later that same day),DM Jeon introduced COL Ryu, Jae-ik to give the brief on the dispatch. Ryu said that the vessel's primary mission would be to escort Korean vessels along a transit corridor in support of the counter-piracy and maritime security operations under Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151). The deployment is scheduled for mid-March. ¶40. (S) DASD Sedney congratulated the ROKG on the deployment and suggested that it would be a good topic for discussion in the trilateral talks between the U.S., ROK, and Japan. DM Jeon agreed. He expressed concern about what the ROKG should do if the vessel caught any pirates. He said he understood that the USG had concluded Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) with Kenya and Yemen for turning over pirates for prosecution. Jeon asked if there was a similar way for the ROKG to dispose of any pirates it caught. ¶41. (C) DASD Sedney said that the prosecution of caught pirates was an issue for many coalition partners, noting that there would be an informal working group in Bahrain the following week to discuss this issue. The MOU allowed the USG to transfer some of the pirates (primarily to Kenya) for prosecution, but that the USG retained a small number in its custody. Sedney thought that even though the best forum for discussing the topic was CTF-151, the USG was interested in working with countries on the issue. -------------- Next SPI -------------- ¶42. (S) DASD Sedney proposed that the next SPI (in Washington, D.C. on May 7) cover: an update on Armistice Maintenance Responsibilities; a progress report on the Missile Program Analysis; a combined YRP/LPP brief; and a brief on the organization of the successor command to the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Sedney said that although he did not want to elevate the topic to the SPI, if air-to-ground training issues remain unresolved by late April, the U.S. would suggest discussing the topic at the next SPI. ¶43. (S) DM Jeon agreed with DASD Sedney's proposals for the timing and agenda of the next SPI, noting that he also preferred to keep the air-to-ground training issues at the working level and out of the SPI. Jeon then asked if DASD Sedney would agree to have action officers finalize a press release on the conclusion of the SPI. Sedney suggested that the SPI hold off on a press release due to the pending release from the GO-level UNC-KPA talks held that same day. STEPHENS