DASD SEDNEY'S MARCH 1-3 SECURITY POLICY MEETINGS

S E C R E T SEOUL 000445 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO DNI ADMIRAL BLAIR, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND S/CRS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019 TAGS: PHSA PINS PREL PTER MARR MASS AF KN KS SUBJECT: DASD SEDNEY'S MARCH 1-3 SECURITY POLICY MEETINGS IN SEOUL Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Close coordination on North Korea, significant progress in three areas of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and a push for a major ROK contribution in Afghanistan characterized DASD David Sedney's March 1-3 meetings in Seoul. -- (C) Sunday March 1, DASD Sedney reached agreement with MOFAT DDG Lee on the new Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP) for camp returns. At the 21st Security Policy Initiative talks the following day (SPI-21 report septel),the US and ROK delegations pledged to apply the JEAP to the return of seven USFK facilities later this year. Most expect that will be difficult, particularly in the case of Camp Hialeah. -- (C) At the March 2 meeting with the Minister of National Defense, MND Lee said the ROK was thinking of providing both military and non-military assistance to Afghanistan, but the decision on troops would take more time. Blue House DNSA Kim said the same. -- (C) DASD Sedney's focus was on Afghanistan. After first holding a coordination lunch with the Afghan ambassador to the ROK, he met with DNSA Kim and MOFAT DFM Lee to discuss the issue, making it clear the ROKG's Afghan assistance package was welcomed, but inadequate. Quoting key Afghan ministers he had met with the previous week in Kabul, Sedney called for immediate, serious, and large contributions of money, mentoring, and capacity building efforts. -- (S) ROK officials he met with were all keenly interested in hearing his views on recent DPRK actions (TD2, NLL, GO talks). DNSA Kim cautioned that the DPRK was most likely attempting to use the General Officer (GO) talks to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul. Mr. Sedney warned against further damaging intelligence leaks and stressed the importance of close U.S.-ROK consultation in the handling of those matters. ¶2. (SBU) In addition to the successful conclusion of the JEAP negotiation, the visit ended on two very positive notes with word that the National Assembly had passed both the SMA and the legislation to send a ROK destroyer to the Horn of Africa. -------------- END SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (SBU) From March 1-3, David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs, led a U.S. delegation of State and DOD officials to Seoul for the 21st round of U.S.-ROK Security Policy Initiative talks (SPI-21). During his visit, Sedney held separate meetings with Lee Young-joon, Deputy Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),Lee Baek-soon, MOFAT Deputy Director General for North American Affairs, Minister of National Defense (MND) Lee Sang-hee, Ambassador Karim Rahimi, Afghanistan's Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (ROK),Grand National Party (GNP) National Assembly members Kim Jang-soo and Park Jin, and Deputy National Security Advisor Kim Tae-hyo. He also met with three security experts from outside the government: former National Security Advisor Kim Byung-kuk and Seoul National University professors Ha Young-sun and Yun Young-kwan, The outcome of the SPI-21 talks has been reported septel. -------------- SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF JEAP NEGOTIATION -------------- ¶4. (C) DASD Sedney's schedule of meetings in Seoul began with a Sunday morning March 1 final negotiation session with MOFAT DDG Lee on the U.S.-ROK Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP). DDG Lee, who had been ordered by the Blue House and MOFAT to conclude the year-long negotiation prior to SPI-21 on March 2 or abandon the effort entirely, requested five final and relatively minor changes in the wording of the JEAP agreement. The U.S. side agreed to his requests where it could, and DDG Lee offered to compromise on the rest. ¶5. (C) Lee complained that the USG had gone back on more forward leaning language in the prior draft negotiated on December 8, 2008, and said he was concerned that in the end, the renegotiation had resulted in language the ROK side would find to be "too watered down." However, being motivated to reach an agreement rather than fail in his assignment, Lee shook hands over the final text and stated that he had the authority to accept it on behalf of the ROKG. Immediately following the negotiation, DASD Sedney confirmed that the final changes were also acceptable to the DOD Office of the General Counsel. With State and USFK's approval, he then notified DDG Lee that we had reached an agreement. The JEAP was formally approved by both sides at SPI-21 the following day (March 2). The U.S. and ROK SOFA Joint Committee co-chairs will soon sign an agreed memorandum after which the agreement will enter into force. -------------- -------------- ROK CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN WELCOME, BUT NOT NEARLY ENOUGH -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Prior to meeting with DNSA Kim and MOFAT DFM Lee to discuss the ROK contribution to Afghanistan, DASD Sedney held a coordination lunch with Karim Rahimi (reported septel),the Afghan ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Rahimi complained that the ROKG was not doing nearly enough to help Afghanistan and that MOFAT officials were largely giving him the cold shoulder. At his subsequent Blue House meeting with DNSA Kim, Sedney was asked to give a frank assessment of the ROK contribution to Afghanistan. Sedney replied that the situation in Afghanistan posed a serious security threat but that the USG believed we could turn the tide provided our efforts and those of the NATO members were augmented with strong support from other friends and allies around the world. He stated that the USG was looking for major assistance from the ROK, including a financial contribution of USD 100 million a year for five years. He said the assistance package the ROK had earlier outlined to the NSC was welcome, but not nearly enough. A drop of water is welcome if you are thirsty, a cup of water is better, but a new water system would solve the problem, Sedney explained. As an example, Sedney noted the U.S. decision to deploy an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan, which will have a major and immediate positive impact - even though the increased presence will likely result in more combat and more U.S. casualties. During his meeting with DNSA Kim, Sedney commented that the U.S.-ROK Alliance will face a critical test on the basis of what happens in Afghanistan. He noted that if there is another major attack on the U.S. from terrorists, it will have been planned from the border/tribal area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sedney quoted Ambassador Holbrooke as saying, "What happens in Afghanistan affects the whole western world," to which Deputy Foreign Minister Lee (MOFAT) replied that the ROK is a part of the western world. ¶7. (S) DNSA Kim replied that he understood both the seriousness of the problem in Afghanistan and Washington's view of the ROK response to date. He stated that the ROK offer of assistance conveyed to the NSC in February was only a first round, and that the ROKG was now considering a package of additional military and non-military assistance. He said it was important for the ROK to do more in Afghanistan for the sake of the U.S.-ROK security alliance, as well as for South Korea's own global diplomacy, adding that the ROKG would be emphasizing the latter purpose to the Korean public. He added that the Blue House would be talking to senior U.S. officials about round two in several weeks time. ¶8. (S) Following his meeting at the Blue House, DASD Sedney paid a courtesy call on Deputy Foreign Minister Lee at MOFAT. Lee, who headed the ROK survey team that visited Afghanistan in January, handed Sedney a copy of the ROK assistance package the ROK National Security Advisor had given to NSA Jones in February. Quoting Sedney's comment the day before at SPI-21 that an immediate, serious, and large commitment by the ROK was needed, he inquired whether the U.S. was asking for more. Yes, Sedney replied, noting that while some parts of the ROK package, such as the offer to provide 300 motorcycles and 100 ambulances, would be helpful, other parts, such as the plan to increase civilian medical personnel at Bagram Air Base would only bring ROK staffing of that facility back to the level of two years ago when the medical mission was being carried out by the ROK military. ¶9. (S) Sedney encouraged the Foreign Ministry to think more strategically about how it could assist the "clear, hold, build" strategy being pursued in Afghanistan. He also invited the ministry to offer input to the USG strategic review due to be completed on March 20. We want your input, your implementation, and a substantial effort, Sedney urged. DFM Lee stated that he anticipated that the ROK would provide greater assistance, but added his view that the preference would be for those additional contributions to be in-kind, rather than in cash. DASD Sedney replied that in-kind contributions could be useful, but only if they have an immediate, positive effect. He cautioned that any mechanical assistance must come with a maintenance package. Finally, he pointed out that Afghan ministers he had met with the previous week in Kabul had identified money, mentoring and capacity building as being in greatest need and had not asked for in-kind contributions. ¶10. (S) During a March 2 courtesy call on Lee Sang-hee, the Minister of National Defense, DASD Sedney highlighted Canada's contribution to the war in Afghanistan as very impressive. Despite suffering a higher rate of casualties than other countries, the Canadians were there not because they are a U.S. ally, but because of the role they wish to play in the world, Sedney related. MND Lee replied that he would order his ministry to look into what the Canadian military was doing in Afghanistan. He said the ROKG had a clear understanding of the changes in the Obama Aministration's approach to Iraq and Afghanistan, and was having a lot of internal discussions about future contributions. MND Lee added that the ROKG was thinking about providing both military and non-military assistance, but repeated the Foreign Minister's comment to Secretary Clinton on February 20 that is government needed more time because of opposition within the National Assembly. ¶11. (S) Two key National Assembly members from the conservative Grand National Party (GNP),Kim Jang-soo and Park Jin, expressed support for sending ROK troops to Afghanistan in separate meetings with DASD Sedney. Rep. Park focused more in his meeting on what the U.S. could do for the ROK by passing the Korean-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, but Rep. Kim (the former MND) said a direct request from the United States asking that the ROK send troops to Afghanistan would strengthen the hand of GNP supporters in the National Assembly. He worried that if the ROK did not answer that call, the U.S. might choose to transfer more troops from Korea to Afghanistan. Alliances, Kim concluded, are all about sharing costs and responsibilities. DASD Sedney reassured him of the U.S. commitment to President Lee that we would maintain our force level at 28,500, but did express the concern that U.S. colonels fighting in Afghanistan would not share the same bonds with the ROK military that U.S. colonels fighting in Korea or Vietnam had experienced. Someday, those colonels will be senior U.S. military leaders, and when they look back to their days of combat, they will not be able to recall that the ROK had fought by their side, as they had in the past. Sedney also noted that troops with full combat capabilities are needed in Afghanistan, stating that because some countries have such restrictive national caveats on their troops, those contributions can be counterproductive. ¶12. (C) In a March 3 meeting, former Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan, now a professor at Seoul National University (SNU),told Sedney that there had not been much focus in the South Korean media, nor in ROK academic circles, on the Afghanistan issue. He asserted that most people were focused on a possible DPRK missile launch. He said the majority of South Koreans favored following the German model for reunification, wherein the ROK government would take the lead in reunification efforts vs. one headed by the UN. Regardless of how Korean reunification evolved, Yoon and Sedney both agreed it would require massive amounts of economic aid from the international community. Interestingly, Yoon observed that it would therefore be wise for the ROK to play a more active role today in international assistance programs, including in Afghanistan, as it would ease the way for South Korea when it came time to make similar requests for massive assistance from the international community to cope with the domestic impacts of Korean unification. -------------- - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COOPERATION ON NORTH KOREA -------------- - ¶13. (S) Everyone DASD Sedney met with in Seoul expressed keen interest in the Obama Administration approach to the DPRK. They asked for U.S. views on recent provocative statements out of Pyongyang about challenging the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and stating it was their right to launch satellites. Word that the Korean People's Army had contacted the United Nations Command on March 2 to ask for the first general officer meetings in seven years was also discussed. DASD Sedney assured his interlocutors that, broadly speaking, U.S. Asia policy would remain consistent as it had across many administrations, particularly the commitment to the U.S.-ROK Alliance, but that the USG is clearly seeking to engage the region in a more consultative manner. ¶14. (S) In a discussion of North Korean issues with former NSA Kim Byung-kuk and SNU professor Ha Young-sun, Ha said he believed that China, the United States, South Korea and Japan needed to have a collaborative response to a DPRK missile launch. He saw the missile launch as a ruse by which DPRK leadership hoped to shift focus from denuclearization to missile technology. If that were successful, Ha worried the DPRK would succeed in becoming a de-facto nuclear power. He maintained that there would be two distinct phases following any DPRK missile launch. In the first phase, the international community would collaborate with relative ease in their condemnation of the DPRK's violation of UNSCR 1718. The second phase would be characterized by a Pyongyang-initiated peace offensive with direct U.S.-DPRK talks as the ultimate objective, Ha opined. He urged caution to both the U.S. and ROK, as it was during this second phase that the DPRK would seek to drive a wedge between the two allies. Former Minister of National Defense Kim noted disapprovingly of the sensitive language in the JFCOM 2008 Joint Operating Environment, which states that North Korea is a nuclear power. When Former Minister Kim asked what response the U.S. would take if it did not know whether a rocket launched by the DPRK were a missile or SLV, Sedney replied that if the U.S. had to, the U.S. has the capability to intercept the rocket. ¶15. (S) Blue House DNSA Kim cautioned the U.S. against any overly optimistic views of the previous day's call by the DPRK for the first round of KPA-UNC General Officer Talks in seven years, calling it a "romantic decision" to meet with the KPA. We should take our time and let them know there is no gap between the U.S. and the ROK, Kim advised. Sedney interjected by stating that USFK GEN Sharp had closely consulted with both the ROK CJCS and Minister of National Defense Lee before moving forward with the decision to have the UNC meet with the KPA. DNSA Kim said Secretary Clinton's February 20 comments in Seoul were timely and important because of her emphasis on the need for North Korea to take steps to improve North-South relations. Kim opined that if North Korea thought the USG would employ BDA-like (Banco Delta Asia) sanctions against the DPRK, Pyongyang would not dare to fire another Taepodong missile. DASD Sedney asked if employing such sanctions was in fact the recommendation of the ROK Government, but Kim demurred, stating that for the ROKG the key issue was to balance the Six-Party Talks with its own approach on North-South relations. Asked for the ROK's view of what to do if conflict erupted in the North, Kim replied that we would need to work together to gather up the WMD, cope with the refugee problem, and restore stability, and establish a market economy in the north as quickly as possible. He said that CONPLAN 5029 was almost complete in terms of military planning, but that more consideration now needed to be given to the diplomatic and political dimensions of coping with instability. He mentioned the need for more discussion about China's role/reaction in particular. ¶16. (S) Defense Minister Lee told DASD Sedney that the ROK would not respond one-to-one to all the DPRK rhetorical threats, but rather was instead displaying a calm demeanor. He added, however, that the North's provocative actions would result in a firm response befitting those actions. Minister Lee noted that, even if the DPRK were to launch a ballistic missile, North Korea will claim that they launched a SLV, as they did after the 1998 missile launch. All the senior ROK officials with whom DASD Sedney met advised close U.S.-ROK consultations and cooperation before, during and after such actions by the North. Several praised the excellent cooperation then taking place on the preparation of coordinated talking points for the GO Talks. ¶17. (S) At both the Blue House and MND meetings, DASD Sedney underlined the need to avoid any further leaks of sensitive intelligence information concerning North Korea's missile activities. He explained how such leaks damaged our interests by constraining our options. He offered a strategic solution by inviting the ROKG to coordinate with the USG whenever it feels it has a need to communicate such information to its public. That way, we could work out releasable information on mutually agreeable terms that would appropriately protect sources and methods, Sedney advised. The ROKG officials he addressed this to appeared solemn and contrite, but offered no firm guarantees that leaks would cease. -------------- -------------- PRAISE FOR POSITIVE NEW STEPS THAT STRENGTHENED THE ALLIANCE -------------- -------------- ¶18. (C) During all of Sedney's meetings with South Korean counterparts, ROKG officials praised the excellent bilateral cooperation that had resulted in positive steps taken that week to further strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance. Accomplishments they cited included the March 2 ratification of the 2009-2013 Special Measures Agreement (SMA),the successful conclusion that same day of the year-long negotiation of the Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP) for camp returns, and the National Assembly's approval of the ROKG plan to dispatch a KDX-II destroyer to assist with counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. MND Lee stated that SPI was more important than ever in helping to achieve those results. On the SMA, DFM Lee accepted DASD Sedney's appreciation for the key role played by President Lee Myung-bak. DFM Lee commented that President Lee's role was not well known even within MOFAT, but that he had indeed been personally involved in the decision. MND Lee told Sedney he had "ordered" MOFAT to agree to a long-term SMA agreement. ¶19. (C) After exchanging congratulations on the JEAP agreement, DFM Lee revealed that he had told the ROK negotiator to conclude the agreement in time for SPI-21, or revert back to the use of the Tab A procedures. He cautioned that the smooth (and MND Lee urged rapid) implementation of the JEAP for the return of seven USFK facilities later this year was more important than the text of the agreement itself. As for the dispatch of the destroyer "Munwoo The Great" to Somalia, MOFAT and MND both proudly held it up as a great example of South Korea's participation in addressing global security concerns. Summing up the state of the alliance, Defense Minister Lee said there was no problem too difficult for the U.S. and ROK to solve, but that the support of the National Assembly and the Korean public was needed as well. Minister Lee urged our alliance managers to continue to conduct their business well. ¶20. (U) DASD Sedney has cleared this message. STEPHENS