DPRK'S NORTH-SOUTH MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS CUTOFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000381 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019 TAGS: PREL ECON KS KN SUBJECT: DPRK'S NORTH-SOUTH MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS CUTOFF HAS UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As Pyongyang promptly restored the inter-Korean movement of goods and personnel in the two transportation corridors after closing them for 24 hours on March 9, ROK Government and private contacts see an unforced error on the part of DPRK authorities, who seem not to have realized that access to and from the Kaesong Industrial Complex -- for people, cash and food -- would be cut off when they cut off military-to-military communications. ROK observers see a "rational" Pyongyang, not wanting to kill a cash cow. Some observers go a step further, seeing a "win" for President Lee Myung-bak's policy of not reacting to North Korean threats. END SUMMARY. -------------- Confusion in the Transportation Corridors -------------- ¶2. (C) The DPRK's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published an article on March 9 stating that any attempt to shoot down its "satellite launch" would be considered an act of war. In what appeared to be a secondary point, the article said that the North would cut off military-to-military communications with the South during the Key Resolve/Foal Eagle joint U.S.-ROK military exercise (March 9-21). The communications cutoff resulted in a day of confusion during which ROK personnel and materials could not cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL),preventing access into and out of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). ¶3. (SBU) Since December 2008, the DPRK has allowed three crossings per day to the North, at 9:00, 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., and three crossings to the South, at 3:00, 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., with 250 persons maximum for each crossing, for a total of 750 persons going each direction per day. The protocol for MDL crossings to the KIC starts with individuals submitting applications to Hyundai Asan company, which then seeks Ministry of Unification (MOU) approval and passes the lists of people and materials to the ROK Ministry of Defense (MND). After a review by the United Nations Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC),MND faxes the lists to the North's Korean People's Army (KPA),giving the North 24-48 hours notice; all but a few requests are usually approved. Since December 2008, these communications have gone through the eastern corridor fax line, since the North blocked western corridor lines. ¶4. (C) Lately, the North has been approving access lists at about 8 a.m. on the day of requested transit. On March 9, Ministry of Unification (MOU) contacts said, after phone calls to the North went unanswered for several hours, the ROKG cancelled the planned transits and eventually established contact between the South's civilian Kaesong Industrial Complex Management Committee (KIDMAC) and its Northern counterpart, the Central Special Direct General Bureau (CSDGB). However, according to Hyundai Asan Senior Vice President Jang Whan-bin, the North's Korean People's Army (KPA) escort vehicle was visible at the Military Demarcation Line during these usual morning crossing hours, suggesting that local KPA soldiers expected crossings to occur. "They were confused," Jang said. ¶5. (C) During March 9, the key issue became whether 80 ROK private businesspeople (out of 550-700 who usually reside at the KIC during much of the workweek) who wanted to leave the KIC that day would be able to do so. MOU Director of the Kaesong Infrastructure Office Kim Ki-woong told us on the afternoon of March 9 that KIDMAC had asked the North's CSDGB this question by fax, but was told by return fax that Pyongyang had yet to answer the question. The personnel were unable to leave the KIC on March 9, and as of the afternoon of March 11 were still waiting for their applications to leave to be approved. Jang said that Hyundai Asan was able to communicate by phone with its employees at both KIC on March 9, where there are 180 employees from Hyundai Asan and affiliated companies, and Mt. Kumgang, where there are 35 employees from Hyundai Asan and 48 Korean-Chinese resort staff, throughout March 9 by telephone. Employees had remained calm and had protested the access closure to their North Korean counterparts. ¶6. (C) On the morning of March 10, crossings to the KIC were restored. In addition, crossings through the eastern corridor to Mt. Kumgang were allowed on March 10 -- Tuesday is the one day per week that crossings to Mt. Kumgang have been allowed since December 2008. However, the personnel who were able to leave the KIC on March 10 were only those initially approved to leave on March 9; others were still waiting for their applications to cross the MDL to be approved as of the evening of March 11, suggesting that the North was still applying strict transit rules. -------------- Analyzing the North's Steps -------------- ¶7. (C) Most of our ROKG and private contacts agree that the DPRK did not intend to block the two transportation corridors when it made the bellicose March 9 announcement. They also agree that the North opted to restore the crossings largely so that cash and food, as well as personnel, could get to the KIC. An MOU contact said that while the access issue was being worked intensively at the working level in the ROKG all day on March 9, it did not rise to senior Blue House levels that day, but would have on March 10. Our understanding is that the ROKG sent a message to the North late on March 9, using the KIDMAC to CSGDB channel, stating that the issue would be considered an inter-Korean emergency/hostage situation if personnel were not allowed to depart the KIC on March 10. MOU officials also told us that among the items expected to be shipped to the KIC on March 9 was USD 1.8 million or more in cash, and two weeks worth of food supplies for the KIC. The cash was not shipped on March 11, perhaps because it had been returned to Seoul for safe keeping. ¶8. (C) MOU Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Bureau Trade Support Division Deputy Director Kim Seong-hyoun told us on March 11 that the temporary closure of the transportation corridors was evidence of North Korea's lack of inter-agency communication and coordination. Kim suspected that the proposal to cut off military communication with the South was one of what the ROKG estimates is 300 decision memos that go forward to Kim Jong-il every day, and the potential consequence -- i.e., KIC access disruption -- was not studied sufficiently. According to Kim, the North Korean entity in charge of access to Mt. Kumgang asked Hyundai Asan about the current situation in the KIC on March 9, a sign that the left hand was not talking to the right in North Korea. ¶9. (C) Kim said that several messages crossed between North and South on March 9 via telefax from KIDMAC to CSDGB. During the evening of March 9, about 12 hours after the North's initial announcement, the ROK military sent a message stating that the ROKG would consider a prolonged closure of the KIC crossing as a serious hostage situation and the two sides then exchanged several messages through this cumbersome method: ROK military to KIDMAC; KIDMAC to CSDGB; CSDGB to KPA, and then back again, resulting in the March 10 restoration of KIC access. The new protocol is still being worked out: on March 11, a KIDMAC official joined the group going to the KIC so he could present 150 pages of access requests to the CSDGB. ¶10. (C) Media reaction to this episode was mild, partly because it was resolved within 24 hours. The conservative "Dong-a Ilbo" reported on March 11 that "North Korean officials involved in the KIC were not aware of the background of the military communications cutoff and were confused/embarrassed." March 10-11 media interpretation focused on three possible reasons for the DPRK's rapid reaction to the MDL closure: concern about losing money, with some reports noting that a cash payment was due to be delivered to the KIC on March 9; the strong reaction from the South about KIC access; and concern about DPRK-U.S. relations. On the other hand, former MOU official Yang Moo-jin, now at the Kyungnam University of North Korean Studies, argued that the North deliberately raised tensions on March 9 in connection with Special Representative Stephen Bosworth's Seoul visit, and that the KIC closure was meant to remind the South that a hostage situation could arise if the North wanted it to. ¶11. (C) Most reactions were milder than that. Two National Assembly members from President Lee's ruling Grand National Party told us on March 11 that the thought never occurred to them that the North might shut down the KIC and they were confident there was no reason for concern over the safety of South Koreans in Kaesong. They said the DPRK earns too much money from South Korean businesses in Kaesong for closure to be a realistic consideration. They interpreted the March 9 halt of traffic in and out of Kaesong as another episode in the North's psychological tug of war with the Lee government. Without speculating on the implications for the KIC's long-term prospects, they said the March 9 closure was an indication of the power struggle in Pyongyang between civilians and the military in the wake of KJI's illness. ¶12. (C) Commenting on the episode's broader context, "Choson Ilbo" (conservative) newspaper editorialist Kim Dae-jung, considered the dean of Seoul journalists, told POL M/C on March 11 that the outcome of the standoff reflected well on President Lee Myung-bak's strategy of staying calm and not reacting to the North's threats. Kim also saw significance in the fact that a KPA spokesman appeared on DPRK television to make the March 9 announcement, adding that the prevalence of military spokesmen and pronouncements recently could indicate that the military was gaining power in Pyongyang. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Over the past several months, the DPRK has continued to turn up its anti-ROK and, in some cases, anti-U.S. rhetoric. The March 9 announcement was more of the same. However, it is encouraging to see an element of pragmatism in the North's behavior, since authorities promptly reversed a policy that could have led to the closure of the KIC or worse. STEPHENS