G-20 MEETING INFO REQUEST: KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000341 SIPDIS STATE/EEB/OMA FOR ALEX WHITTINGTON STATE/EAP/EP FOR KATHY HADDA TREASURY/IMB FOR BILL MURDEN, WILBUR MONROE, AND MARY BEASLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: ECON EFIN KS SUBJECT: G-20 MEETING INFO REQUEST: KOREA REF: A. STATE 17502 ¶B. SEOUL 0002 ¶C. SEOUL 0106 ¶D. SEOUL 0152 ¶E. SEOUL 0176 ¶F. SEOUL 0187 ¶G. SEOUL 0227 ¶H. SEOUL 0237 ¶I. SEOUL 0314 Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Andrew Quinn. Reason: 1.4(B) and (D). ¶1. (U) This cable provides post assessment for South Korea with respect to Ref A request ahead of the March 14-15 G-20 Finance Ministerial and the April 2 London Summit. ¶2. (U) The text is organized in four parts (each with its own header),in accordance with Ref A. Objectives for the London Summit -------------- ¶A. (C) Korean officials have noted a wide range of goals with respect to the G20 process and the London Summit. The following three areas may be considered the highest priorities for the ROKG: financial system stabilization, prevention of adoption of trade/investment protectionism, and coordinated fiscal stimulation of economies. These goals are reflected in conversations at government-to-government level, in Korea's input into the G-20 coordination leading up to the March Ministerial and April Summit, and in public. Korea also desires entry into the Financial Stability Forum, although not necessarily as a specific outcome from the London Summit. Korean officials have also made it clear that they will support U.S. leadership in the G-20 process and will not support proposals for radical measures that would create new supranational regulatory architecture. B and C. (SBU) President Lee Myung-bak is the originator of the standstill on trade and investment protectionism which was incorporated into the Washington Declaration last November. He has continued to sound this theme in public since then and has made it clear that it remains a critical objective for Korea in the London Summit. President Lee has also stressed in public his desire for the London Summit to secure a coordinated fiscal stimulus on the part of the entire G-20. MoSF Deputy Minister Shin Je-yoon, Korea's Finance Deputy for the G-20, reiterated these themes on Korean television and added that Korea desires further measures for financial stability, including reform of the IMF. ¶D. (C) In Korea's input within the G-20 process, the ROKG made the following specific proposals: Financial System Stability: -- pooling of collective experiences of G-20 members in stabilizing their financial systems (including with respect to "bad banks" and restructuring of failed businesses) Stimulating Economies: -- listing of measures adopted by G-20 members to stimulate their economies (as an attachment to the declaration) -- coordination of stimulatory measures to achieve mutual reinforcement effect -- use analytical support from IMF, OECD and other institutions to seek ways to avoid asymmetries in size and timing of fiscal measures Helping Emerging/Developing Economies' Liquidity: -- attach list of actions that have helped emerging/developing economies gain better access to finance through the IMF, World Bank and other multilateral development banks -- encourage G-20 members with large surpluses to follow Japan's example and lend resources to the IMF for subsequent allocation -- ensure no cuts in Official Development Assistance -- consider expansion of SDRs Micreconomic Cooperation: -- share best practices on job maintenance and creation, including via job-sharing programs (i.e., ROKG has encouraged wage cuts to allow for continued absorption of new labor into government and corporate sector) -- ask ILO and OECD to draw a set of guidelines from these practices -- review stimulus packages designed to increase growth potential and quality of life (e.g., green growth) International Trade: -- reaffirm commitment and provide leadership for concluding the Doha Round -- reaffirm standstill commitment -- review stimulus packages vis-a-vis standstill commitment -- facilitate and strengthen WTO (Trade Policy Review Body) monitoring to ensure effective standstill -- leaders should charge Finance Ministers to take steps to mitigate financial protectionism Trade Finance: -- emphasize need for G-20 governments, export credit agencies and IFIs to work together to address lack of trade finance Next Step: -- agree on date and venue for the third G-20 summit. Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis -------------- ¶E. (SBU) The crisis first hit Korea as an acute imbalance between supply and demand for U.S. dollars and a rapid tightening of credit. The ROKG's first response was to provide liquidity. The ROKG has offered foreign loan guarantees (not used),provided dollar (and won) liquidity to the banking system through a variety of instruments including direct auctions (and has used the U.S. Federal Reserve USD 30 billion bilateral currency swap mechanism for this purpose). The ROKG has reinforced policy banks and credit guarantee agencies to ensure liquidity for struggling sectors, particularly SMEs. The ROKG is still working to ensure that liquidity measures move through the banking system and into the broader economy. A first direct capital injection totaling USD 8 billion into key banks is likely to occur in March. The ROKG is also strongly encouraging creditors to move insolvent firms into bankruptcy and to conduct debt restructuring for stronger firms experiencing temporary liquidity problems. The Bank of Korea has slashed interest rates from 5.25 percent to just 2 percent since October. As the crisis has spread from the financial sector into the broader economy, the ROKG has adopted fiscal stimulus measures totaling approximately USD 10.5 billion -- tax cuts in 2008-09 and an increase in the 2009 budget (roughly 1.7 percent of GDP). The ROKG is also preparing a second stimulus package widely expected to be in the range of USD 20-33 billion (up to as much as 5 percent of GDP). The ROKG has also undertaken steps to guarantee deposits, increase trade financing availability, support the bond market, and reduce regulatory burdens (especially in construction/housing). ¶F. (SBU) The primary impact of the crisis on the financial sector has been to tighten the supply of dollars and reduce the value of the won by more than 40 percent over the past six months. No major banks have failed and the government has taken steps to ensure that relatively limited problems in a handful of mutual savings banks are contained and controlled. However, the ROKG is still working to free the flow of credit to industry. Some analyses have pointed to Korea's ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves as a factor that renders the economy vulnerable to instability. The ROKG points out that the the ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves stood at 0.75 at the end of 2008 and actually declined during the first months of the financial turmoil. Similar analyses have identified the ratio of banks' loans to deposits as an indicator of banking sector vulnerability to financial contagion. The ROKG rebuttle is that the loan-to-deposit ratio figures have also been falling steadily through the crisis and do not represent a systemic threat, particularly if savings in the form of certificates of deposit are included. ¶G. (U) See E. The Broader Economic Crisis -------------- ¶H. (SBU) South Korea's currency has fallen by more than 40 percent and the benchmark KOSPI stock index is down by approximately 30 percent over the last six months. Korean GDP fell by 5.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 dragging annual growth down to 2.5 percent from 5.1 percent in 2007. Industrial production in December was 18.6 percent lower and in January 26 percent lower than a year earlier. Exports in January dropped by 32.8 percent from a year earlier and January imports fell by 32.1 percent. Preliminary figures for goods exports in February show a 17 percent decline, but a swing to a current account surplus is expected as the weak won cut imports by even more. When considering trade volume, it is useful to bear in mind that trade accounts for approximately three quarters of Korea's GDP. Loan delinquency rates for SMEs have risen from one percent at the end of 2007 to 1.7 percent at the end of 2008, to 2.36 percent one month later at the end of January 2009. Despite Korea's aversion to layoffs, formal unemployment is starting to rise, from 3.3 percent at the end 2008 to 3.6 percent. ¶I. (SBU) At the outset of the crisis, trade financing was an issue. The ROKG moved quickly to reinforce the Korean Export-Import Bank's capital base and the bank is now able to supply trade financing for those firms that need it. ¶J. (C) The ROKG sees trade and investment as essential and an effective G-20 standstill on protectionist measures is a major goal. The government has undertaken some measures to support industry but has not resorted to subsidization of exports. The ROKG has taken no actions to restrict imports. Even during the crisis, the ROKG has undertaken steps to provide additional incentives for foreign direct investment and to reduce regulatory burdens for foreign firms investing in Korea. The ROKG is not currently contemplating any type of capital controls and, as demonstrated by the February 4 entry into force of the Capital Markets Consolidation Act, which contains a range of liberalization measures, remains dedicated to an open capital markets regime. ¶K. (C) ROKG crisis measures taken thus far have not raised any national treatment issues. Post does not believe that the ROKG is intentionally lowering the value of its currency. On the contrary, the government is working to stabilize and gradually increase the value of the won. Many of Korea's leading exports (steel, autos, electronics) contain significant imported content, so Korean exporters derive less benefit than one might expect from a weak won. Near-term Outlook and Political/Foreign Policy Ramifications -------------- -------------- ¶L. (SBU) The majority of forecasts for ROK GDP in 2009 are now negative. Most fall within the range of a 2-3 percent GDP decline. The Finance Minister himself projected a 2 percent decline on his first day on the job in early February. The IMF predicted a sharp ROK GDP decline of 4 percent in 2009 in its late January update to the World Economic Outlook, but with a strong rebound in 2010. The rapid depreciation of the won in February notwithstanding, current evidence indicates that the ROKG is likely using direct intervention to prevent the currency from moving weaker than 1600 per dollar. Many analysts suggest that the won will eventually settle in the range of 1100-1200 per dollar once the crisis begins to subside. The ROKG is directly encouraging the practice of job sharing -- wage cuts to current employees in order to allow firms and government agencies to continue to bring new workers (and interns) into the workforce. Together with a significant informal workforce that does not appear in unemployment statistics, this makes tracking unemployment difficult. Even so, the unemployment rate is expected to rise from its current 3.6 percent as the crisis continues. ¶M. (C) Koreans believe that their previous experiences with economic crises are beneficial under current circumstances and they claim they draw together in the face of adversity (e.g., Korean banks have generally seen their deposits increase during this financial crisis -- the reverse of the usual global pattern). President Lee Myung-bak had fallen into the 20 percent approval range prior to the outset of the economic crisis and his poll numbers are currently in the 30 percent approval range. Nonetheless, sharp conflict between the ruling Grand National Party and the opposition in the National Assembly has sometimes manifested itself around the ROKG's economic reform measures, although this tends to be viewed as symptomatic of a larger domestic political battle between conservative forces, who won the Presidency and legislative majority last year, and liberal forces, who are out of power for the first time in many years. ¶N. (C) The ROKG has not blamed the United States for the crisis and expressed effusive gratitude for the extension of the Federal Reserve USD 30 billion bilateral currency swap. When the measure was announced in late October, Korean equity indices and the value of the won rose by more than ten percent in a single trading session. Some concern was expressed with respect to "Buy America" provisions but this generally subsided once the actual text of the language was known. ¶O. (C) The crisis does not appear to have had any direct negative impact on U.S. security interests in South Korea at this stage. ¶P. (SBU) The ROKG has committed itself to increasing its ODA levels -- tripling them as a percentage of GDP by 2015. When viewed in won terms, the ODA budget is still increasing in ¶2009. The depreciation of the won, however, has reduced the 2009 ODA budget when viewed in dollar terms. From either perspective, the ROKG would need a substantial increase in resources to meet the goal it has set for itself for 2015. ¶Q. (C) The ROKG remains committed to being a global partner for the United States. STEPHENS