ROK DETAILED RESPONSE TO NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000295 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/MNSA GENEVA PASS TO CD UNVIE PASS TO IAEA USUN PASS TO POL USNATO PASS TO POL USEU PASS TO POL E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL IAEA NPT KS SUBJECT: ROK DETAILED RESPONSE TO NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) DEMARCHE REF: A. STATE 6970 ¶B. SEOUL 212 Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (U) Lee Jangkeun, Director of the Disarmament & Nonproliferation Division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade on February 24 provided detailed responses to reftel A and an expansion of reftel B. Won Jong-mun, the ROKG point of contact on NPT issues, also attended the meeting. ¶2. (C) The following is Lee's detailed responses to the questions posed in reftel A, para 8. The questions are reproduced to facilitate comprehension of the responses. The responses are in quotation marks. ¶A. What are the host government's objectives for the NPT in general, and for the current review process in particular? "The ROKG gave equal weight to nonproliferation, peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. Regarding nonproliferation, a determination on North Korea's (DPRK) withdrawal from the NPT must be made (reftel B). If the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT was recognized, then other ways to get the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) involved with the DPRK must be found. In addition, the NPT system had to strengthen and clarify the withdrawal and non-compliance clauses. The ROKG wanted to promote peaceful utilization of nuclear energy because of its current and increasing reliance on nuclear energy for its electricity generation needs. Consequently, a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle and assurance was needed. The NPT should provide answers on how to manage nuclear terrorism risks in the light of the technological renaissance of nuclear energy technology. Finally, universality of the NPT was important to achieve." ¶B. What policies or actions regarding the NPT does the host government hope to see from the United States? "The ROKG would like to hear specific, detailed plans given the new administration. Lee believed there was a high expectation from the international community. Lee said that early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be a positive sign to the international community. The ROKG believed the USG policy on sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology should be more 'problem oriented' versus its current 'control oriented' approach. A problem oriented approach provided incentives for responsible behavior and focused on developing proliferation resistant nuclear technology." ¶C. What does the host government believe would represent a successful outcome to the current NPT cycle ending with the 2010 Review Conference? How important is it for Parties to reach consensus on substantive matters? "The ROKG thought it was important to maintain the consensus mechanism. Lee believed that the lack of a consensus agreement would have a negative impact on the NPT because a final document was a prerequisite for a successful Review Conference (RevCon) in April-May 2010." ¶D. Does the host government believe that NPT parties should take action to address the NPT issues described below? If so, what actions would it support? -- Noncompliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and North Korea. "A mechanism was needed to prevent the withdrawal of parties, such as the DPRK. If Iran withdrew, then it was too late, (meaning, the NPT was of limited use and effectiveness). Consequently, the ROKG wanted the DPRK to return to the NPT regime. Lee said that not only should Iran's right to peaceful utilization of nuclear energy be affirmed, but also that Iran be given a firm warning that if it continued on its current path, UN Security Council resolutions would follow. Lee admitted that China and Russia would have to be on board for this approach to work." -- The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing from the Treaty. (No ROKG response given.) -- The lack of NPT universality. "Lee said that India, Pakistan, and Israel should participate in the NPT. If the USG ratified the CTBT, perhaps it could positively impact these countries." -- The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol. "The ROKG believed that the universality of NPT safeguards and the Additional Protocol was important. Lee said that offering additional incentives, such as enhanced technical cooperation, may encourage additional countries to adopt the NPT safeguards and additional protocol." -- The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to additional countries. "The ROKG believed that enrichment and reprocessing capabilities could be discussed under a multilateral mechanism regime. Lee said that the ROKG was planning to actively participate in this discussion. Lee said that the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle was not problematic for the ROK, but the back-end was very problematic, specifically, in dealing with spent fuel. For the ROKG, the solution to its spent fuel (storage) issues was urgent. The ROKG believed that proliferation resistant, spent fuel technology programs needed to be re-engaged, and it was on this issue that multilateralism held much promise." -- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligation for the fullest possible international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations. "The ROKG believed that it was a model case for peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with NPT obligations. The ROKG hoped that its experience would set an example that others could follow." -- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations to pursue negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. "Lee said that this was an obligation of nuclear weapon states." -- Transparency on the part of nuclear weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons forces and policies. "Lee said that it was obvious that all nuclear weapon states should have transparent policies. The ROKG hoped that the USG would continue to make such efforts and hoped that other nuclear weapon states would do the same. Lee said that the USG ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol was a good step in this direction." ¶3. (C) Lee said that the ROKG was inclined to cooperate with the USG. Besides sharing many of the USG's objectives in the upcoming Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting, Lee suggested that perhaps the USG and the ROKG could present a joint paper either on peaceful utilization of nuclear energy or on strengthening the withdrawal clause. ¶4. (U) Lee also extended an invitation to the NPT Special Representative, if the USG appointed one, to visit the ROK before the PrepCom or RevCon. ¶5. (SBU) The ROKG point of contact for NPT issues is Won Jong-mun, the First Secretary of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division. His email address is jmwon95@mofat.go.kr. His telephone number is 011-822-2100-7248. His fax number is 011-822-2100-7933. STEPHENS