HYUNDAI GROUP SUGGESTS PATIENCE AND GENEROSITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000282 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 TAGS: PREL ECON ETRD MARR PGOV KS KN SUBJECT: HYUNDAI GROUP SUGGESTS PATIENCE AND GENEROSITY TOWARD NORTH KOREA; NOTES FROM KIM JONG-IL MEETINGS REF: SEOUL 02270 Classified By: Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun shared her views with the Ambassador on the current state of inter-Korean relations over lunch on February 13. Hyun said North Korea wanted to improve relations with South Korea, but the South's halting of fertilizer and rice deliveries while insisting on an aid "request" from the North was a stumbling block, as was the South's insistence on a public apology for the shooting of a ROK tourist last year. Hyun believed that the South should offer the first gesture to resolve the North-South standoff, which in turn would pave the way for improved inter-Korean exchanges, including reopening Kumgang Mountain tours. ¶2. (C) Hyundai Asan, an affiliate of Hyundai Group responsible for projects in North Korea, stood ready to carry out the expansion plan of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) as soon as inter-Korean relations improved, according to Hyun's senior managers who also attended the lunch. Meanwhile, however, KIC was losing money. Recalling her late husband's meetings with Kim Jong-il (KJI),as well as her own encounters, Hyun said KJI's top worry was the possibility of a coup or assassination attempt. End Summary. -------------- The Hyundai-DPRK Connection: Background -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Hyundai's official relationship with North Korea began in 1988 when Chung Ju-young, founder of Hyundai and Chairwoman Hyun's late father-in-law, delivered cattle and other emergency supplies to North Korea over the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Chung, who was born in North Korea, was welcomed with a "homecoming" celebration. Also in 1998, after Chung's lengthy one-on-one meetings with KJI, Hyundai received DPRK permission to organize tours to Mt. Kumgang. A year later, in 1999, Hyundai Asan was established. Hyundai Asan still manages South Korean tourism programs in Mt. Kumgang Resort and Kaesong City, although both are currently suspended -- Mt. Kumgang since July 2008 and Kaesong since December 2008. Hyundai-Asan also operates the joint North-South economic zone on the border, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). ¶4. (SBU) Chung started Hyundai as a small construction company in 1947, and it became South Korea's first 
construction firm to work overseas (in Thailand) in 1965. In the 1970s, Hyundai Construction built the highway between Seoul and Busan. ROK President Lee Myung-bak, as CEO of Hyundai Construction (1977-1988) and later as President of Hyundai Construction (1988-1992),was a key confidant of Chairman Chung during Hyundai's emergence as Korea's most dynamic business group. As the company grew, its construction and engineering, vehicles, electronics and heavy industry businesses separated from Hyundai Group. The following eight companies, however, still remain affiliated with Hyundai Group: Hyundai Merchant Marine, Hyundai Securities, Hyundai Elevator, Hyundai Logistics, Hyundai UNI, Hyundai Research Institute, Hyundai Investment Network, and Hyundai Asan. ¶5. (SBU) Hyun Jeong-eun took over as chairwoman of Hyundai Group after her husband, Chung Mong-hun, son of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-young, committed suicide in 2003, following his indictment in June 2003 for his role in the "cash-for-summit" scandal in which he was charged with altering the company's accounting books to hide the secret transfer of nearly USD 100 million from the Kim Dae-jung administration to North Korea. It is widely believed that the transferred fund was used to set up the historic north-South presidential summit in 2000. Chairwoman Hyun has met Kim Jong-il twice -- on Hyundai business in July 2005 and as a member of former President Roh Moo-hyun's delegation in November 2007. -------------- North-South Impasse: Seoul Holds the Key -------------- ¶6. (C) Stressing the need to improve North-South relations, Hyun stated that Pyongyang's grievances with the South centered on "unmet expectations" caused by postponed or cancelled fertilizer and rice assistance, and the ROKG's insistence that such aid required a North Korean "request." Moreover, the ROKG decision to close Mt. Kumgang resort after the July 11, 2008 shooting death of a wandering South Korean tourist at dawn had discouraged the North from initiating any reconciliatory steps, according to Hyun. ¶7. (C) Hyun believed that South Korea, as the stronger, wealthier and more confident party, should initiate gestures toward repairing inter-Korean relations. As concrete steps toward improved relations, Hyun suggested that the ROKG allow Mt. Kumgang tours to resume and then offer to discuss the October 2007 Summit Agreement. ¶8. (C) NOTE: Kim Jong-il signed the October 2007 Agreement with former President Roh Moo-hyun two months before the end of Roh's term. The Agreement was a broad outline of ways in which the two Koreas could increase cooperation, including through economic measures funded by the South. Details of potential projects, timelines and budgets -- including the expansion of the KIC and its dormitories, restoration of inter-Korean rail, and large-scale economic assistance to North Korea -- were left to a working group. Many, even within Roh's own party, opposed signing the Agreement, because there was no guarantee that the incoming ROKG administration could, or would, deliver on an agreement made only a few months before the end of Roh's term. Former Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu, who had advised then-Presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak to carefully review the October 2007 Agreement, has told us that the DPRK has no flexibility to modify the text because it was one of only two inter-Korean documents signed by Kim Jong-il himself and therefore considered "perfect in form" by the DPRK. The other document was the June 2000 Joint North-South Declaration. END NOTE. -------------- Inside North Korean Thinking: Give Quietly -------------- ¶9. (C) Hyun observed that North Korean dislike for the ROKG officials escalated in the 70s, when South Korea's economy overtook that of the North. North Koreans felt that ROK officials treated North Koreans with arrogance and disdain. The DPRK also disliked NGOs who held press events to announce assistance to North Korea, because North Koreans believed such exchanges should be done "quietly," without humiliating the beneficiaries. North Koreans had always been proud and stubborn people who in order to "save face" would rather suffer and starve than ask for help, Hyun said. -------------- Consequences of Halting Inter-Korean Projects -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The other Hyundai officials at lunch, Hyundai Asan President and CEO Cho Jun-shik (who previously served as Vice Minister of Unification 2001-2003) and Hyundai Group Strategic Planning and Development Office President Ha Jong-seon, stated that Hyundai Asan was ready to move forward if and when inter-Korean relations improved. Since Mt. Kumgang tourism was halted in July 2008, Hyundai Asan had lost revenues of USD 76.4 million through January 2009. The KIC factories were still operating, but more DPRK workers' dormitories needed to be built. While Phase I of KIC (eventually to house 450 companies, employing 100,000 DPRK workers, on 3.3 sq km) would continue, barring further problems, the company's ambitious Phase II (another 8.2 sq km) and Phase III (18.1 sq km with apartments and golf courses) were on hold indefinitely. ¶11. (SBU) Commenting on KIC's female workers, who made up over 75 percent of work force, Cho said the difference in their physical appearance was remarkable once they started working at the KIC factories; they looked healthier, wore make-up, and carried handbags within a few months of their arrival. Since the Mt. Kumgang resort had been closed in July 2008, the opposite effect was taking place; employees were again showing signs of poor nutrition, much less exhibiting an interest in South Korean fashions. -------------- Kim Jong-il and the KPA -------------- ¶12. (C) Recalling her late husband's comments from his lengthy one-on-one meetings with KJI, as well as her own encounters with him in 2005 and 2007, Hyun observed that her experiences with KJI were somewhat different than the usual caricatures. He was not an unreasonable man. In his early meetings with Hyundai's founder, KJI had admitted that "people needed to eat" and asked about ways to improve North Korea's economy. KJI had also solicited ideas on how to extract more compensation from the Japanese government for World War II. ¶13. (C) According to Hyun, the DPRK's Korean People's Army became KJI's most trusted group after the 2004 train explosion on the Chinese border, an incident that was believed to be a failed assassination attempt on KJI. An explosive went off on the rail road track approximately 30 minutes before a train carrying KJI was scheduled to pass. KJI believed that cell phones had made it possible for the assassination attempt to come "so close," which might explain North Korea's particularly slow adoption of cell phones. Hyun said coup and assassination attempts were KJI's greatest worries. ¶14. (C) Hyun observed that the North Korean People's Army had originally opposed Hyundai's plans for the Mt. Kumgang project in 1988, arguing that by taking pictures of desired areas for development Hyundai would threaten the North's security. The argument that finally overcame the Army's objection was that the aerial pictures were already available by satellite, Hyun said. -------------- A Familiar Tune on Inter-Korean Relations -------------- ¶15. (C) The comments by Chairwoman Hyun and her colleagues appear to be part of an ongoing Hyundai Asan mini-campaign to win U.S. support for a more flexible approach to North Korea. In an earlier meeting with the DCM on January 20, Hyundai Asan President Cho Kun-Shik said that he was now playing the "mediator" role between the Blue House and North Korea, in an attempt to narrow the gap, but he did not foresee a breakthrough on dialogue between the two Koreas. On the unresolved Mt. Kumgang shooting, Cho shared that a high-ranking North Korean military official had visited Hyundai Asan's office in the Mt. Kumgang resort the day after the July 11 shooting to express regret, but it would not be possible for North Korea to make a public apology as the Blue House had demanded. Cho, who came into his new position as Hyundai Asan President in August 2008, also had suggested, as Chairwoman Hyun did, that the best way forward would be for the ROKG to re-open Mt. Kumgang to tourism and pursue a dialogue with the North at the same time. The Mt. Kumgang incident, as well as the October 2007 inter-Korean agreement, should be dealt with in broad, general terms when moving forward, he said, so that the two Koreas did not get entangled in details. Cho had also welcomed the announcement of the new MOU Minister, Hyun In-taek, whom he viewed as having close ties to LMB. Cho believed the new Unification Minister saw the denuclearization issue and inter-Korean issue as a "package deal" and this equipped the new Minister with better tools to improve inter-Korean relations. -------------- But Frustration with North Korea as Well -------------- ¶16. (C) Unlike Chairwoman Hyun, however, Cho had more openly expressed to the DCM his personal dissatisfaction in dealing with the North. Commenting on the KIC, Cho said that while the 93 existing companies continued to operate, border crossing restrictions had slowed construction of facilities for new companies, many of whom remained in wait-and-see mode. Cho also noted that the DPRK authorities at KIC were "embarrassed and upset" at his company's decision to reduce the number of North Korean construction workers at KIC from 3,000 to 2,700 in December and then to 2,200 in January. "They got a crash course in economics," Cho said, observing that it had never occurred to the North Korean authorities that restricting access to KIC might affect the need for workers. While he dismissed hostile North Korean rhetoric as an attention-getting ploy, he said it was unfortunate in business terms because it wasted time and discouraged investors. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) Caught between belligerent North Korean rhetoric and a calm but firm ROKG response, Hyundai Asan is on its own in trying to keep the company afloat until inter-Korean relations improve. Seeing no chance of persuading the North, Hyundai Asan has turned to lobbying the South, including trying to do so through the U.S. So far, however, President Lee, who was a major figure in Hyundai's emergence as a global company, has not accommodated their wishes. Still, nobody expects Hyundai to give up on North Korea, because its businesses, whether in Kaesong or Kumgang, will be enormous money-makers if North-South relations improve. STEPHENS