ROKG'S TOP PRIORITY FOR POTUS VISIT: HIGHLIGHTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001807 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MNUC KN KS JA SUBJECT: ROKG'S TOP PRIORITY FOR POTUS VISIT: HIGHLIGHTING CLOSE ROK-U.S. RELATIONS Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, the ROKG's point person on North Korea issues, told Ambassador Stephens on 11/13 that the ROKG's top priority for the POTUS visit is to highlight the strength of the ROK-U.S. relationship. Wi asked that POTUS specifically praise the excellent coordination between Washington and Seoul in dealing with the DPRK. Wi also called for POTUS to reaffirm publicly the USG's commitment to the Six-Party Talks (6PT) and North Korean denuclearization; there was real public concern, Wi asserted, about South Korea being "left behind" once direct discussions resumed between Washington and Pyongyang. He said China may be tempted to "misinterpret" the upcoming U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks and use them as an excuse to ease UNSCR 1874 sanctions. Wi said the DPRK has still not accepted the ROK's offer of 10,000 metric tons of corn; Pyongyang's silence, Wi said, was probably related to Seoul's unprecedented insistence on monitoring. Commenting on his foreign ministry consultations in Tokyo, Wi said there appeared to be more continuity in Japan's North Korea policy than in other areas. End summary. ROK's Top Priority: Showcasing Strong Relations -------------- --- ¶2. (C) During a November 12 lunch, ROK Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Wi Sung-lac told Ambassador Stephens that the ROK hoped President Obama's first visit to Seoul would showcase strong ROK-U.S. relations. Wi said that a public event demonstrating the friendship between the two presidents would reassure the Korean public of the special nature of U.S.-ROK ties, even as the importance of U.S.-China relations grows. He requested that President Obama highlight the excellent cooperation between Washington and Seoul, perhaps by endorsing President Lee's concept of a "Grand Bargain" or "il-kwal ta-gyul" with the DPRK. ¶3. (C) Wi also asked that President Obama reiterate the USG's commitment to the 6PT process and the denuclearization of North Korea. While the roll-out of the decision to send Ambassador Bosworth to Pyongyang had gone "very smoothly," this affirmation, according to Wi, would ease any ROK public concern that South Korea will be left behind once U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks begin. The fear that the USG is more concerned about proliferation than denuclearization is real, he cautioned. President Obama's reaffirmation of his full support for Lee Myung-bak's North Korea policy would demonstrate that there's no daylight between Washington and Seoul in dealing with Pyongyang. U.S.-DPRK Bilat -------------- ¶4. (C) Wi said China may be tempted to "misinterpret" the upcoming U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks and use them as an excuse to ease enforcement of UNSCR 1874 sanctions against North Korea. He suggested that President Obama remind his Chinese counterpart that it is important for the Five Parties to speak with one voice to North Korea, including about sanctions. When Ambassador Bosworth visits Pyongyang, Wi speculated that the North Koreans would probably raise their boilerplate grievances against the U.S.-ROK Alliance, again demanding, among other things, a U.S. troop withdrawal from the peninsula and abolition of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Humanitarian Assistance -------------- ¶5. (C) Wi said the ROKG has now decided to pay attention to monitoring of any humanitarian assistance to North Korea, for example by designating ports to receive shipments and by conducting multiple site visits. Wi noted that the DPRK has still not accepted the ROK's offer of 10,000 metric tons of corn; Pyongyang's silence, Wi said, was probably related to Seoul's insistence on monitoring, which stood in contrast to the previous ROKG administration's policy of providing assistance without monitoring. Wi asked about the possibilities of the U.S. resuming humanitarian assistance, and suggested that, just as the ROKG was now paying attention to the monitoring issues the U.S. had long emphasized, he hoped the U.S. would take into account the desirability of some linking of decisions on resuming assistance to progress in other areas. Continuity in Japan's North Korea Policy -------------- ¶6. (C) Wi expressed appreciation for the full set of meetings he had in Washington earlier this month, and confirmed that he had met numerous Japanese officials on his way back to Seoul from Washington, including Saiki and Yabunaka. In Tokyo, Wi shared the same broad ideas on a comprehensive approach to the DPRK that he had shared in Washington. The Japanese were receptive, he said. Wi said there appeared to be more continuity in Japan's North Korea policy than in some other areas. He related that the Hatoyama government was controlling more strictly the foreign ministry's interaction with the press; officials now need permission to appear on-camera. Japan's 6PT Representative Saiki is likely to remain until the beginning of 2010, according to Wi. STEPHENS