SENIOR UNIFICATION MINISTRY OFFICIAL ON DPRK FOOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001785 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR SOCI ECON KN KS CH SUBJECT: SENIOR UNIFICATION MINISTRY OFFICIAL ON DPRK FOOD SITUATION REF: SEOUL 1771 Classified By: POL EXT Chief James R. Heller. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) One of the Ministry of Unification's top DPRK experts, Yang Cheong-seok, told us that North Korea's grain harvest was down about 10 percent from 2008, a shortfall that would be "manageable" for the regime. The DPRK's food shortages would worsen next spring and summer because the ROK had not been sending fertilizer to the North. Yang attributed a sharp drop in the market price of rice to the fact that non-elite North Koreans have been occupied with busywork during the recent "Battle" campaigns; they have not been able to earn extra income to afford rice, Yang said, and are opting for cheaper corn. With freezing weather now taking many small hydropower stations off-line, and the government lacking funds to purchase coal and heavy fuel oil to run conventional power stations, ordinary North Koreans would -- as usual -- find themselves in the dark, Yang asserted. He also called our attention to the November 2 DPRK foreign ministry "Q and A" published by KCNA, which emphasized that a "resolution of U.S-DPRK hostile relations" was a precondition for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. End summary. DPRK Food Situation: "Manageable" Shortages -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ministry of Unification's Director General for Intelligence and Analysis, Yang Chang-seok, told POL M/C on November 5 that the consensus view among ROK NGOs and agricultural experts is that North Korea's grain harvest was down approximately 10 percent from 2008. Yang, a longtime North Korea-watcher, characterized that shortfall as "manageable" and "certainly not as bad" as during the famine of the late 1990s. Echoing what we have heard from other contacts (reftel),Yang said a major difference between now and then is that people have learned how to get food for themselves instead of waiting for the government to save them. Cheap Corn Preferred -------------- ¶3. (C) Yang related that the price of rice had recently stabilized at 2,000 North Korean Won per kilo, down 25 percent since August. Yang saw two reasons for the relatively sudden drop: one, China's July decision to loosen restrictions on grain exports; and, two, a significant decrease in demand for rice. Yang explained that because non-elite North Koreans have been mobilized and occupied with busywork during the 150-Day and 100-Day "Battle" campaigns, they have not been able to earn extra income to afford rice; corn was widely available and more affordable, he said, and therefore in higher demand than rice. Do-It-Yourself Hydo-Power -------------- ¶4. (C) According to Yang, DPRK Workers Party Secretary Kim Ki-nam had bragged to ROK officials during his August 21-23 visit Seoul (for the DJ funeral) that North Korea's electricity supply would increase because the DPRK could now produce its own generators. That claim, Yang said, was substantiated when Kim Jong-il visited the Aprok hydroelectric power plant and praised the workers of Daehan Heavy Industrial Engineering for their "technical accomplishments." However, Yang suggested that with freezing weather in the North taking many small hydropower stations off-line, and a lack of funds to purchase coal and heavy fuel oil to run conventional power stations, ordinary North Koreans would -- as usual -- be left in the dark. What the DPRK Wants from the United States -------------- ¶5. (C) In closing, Yang called our attention to the November 2 DPRK foreign ministry "Q and A" published by KCNA. Yang said the foreign ministry had emphasized that a "resolution of U.S-DPRK hostile relations" was a precondition for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Yang reminded us that the North Korean formula for such a resolution, dating back to 2003, has three components: -- A legally-binding non-aggression treaty between the United States and North Korea; -- Normalization of relations between the United States and the DPRK; and, -- Non-intervention by the United States in North Korea's "economic cooperation" with other countries. STEPHENS