SEVERE FOOD SHORTAGES WON'T COLLAPSE DPRK, SAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001771

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10 YEARS AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MNUC SOCI ECON KN KS CH
SUBJECT: SEVERE FOOD SHORTAGES WON'T COLLAPSE DPRK, SAYS
PROMINENT NORTH KOREAN DEFECTOR

Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) During a November 2 meeting with poloffs, prominent
North Korean defector Cho Myung-cheol emphasized that the
DPRK's poor harvest and severe food shortages are "nothing
new." The major difference between now and the famine of the
late 1990s, said Cho, is that non-elite North Koreans have
taken charge of getting their own food via unofficial
markets; in the 1990s, many ordinary North Koreans "sat
around waiting for the government to save them and died of
starvation." Cho acknowledged that the recent increase in
black market activity throughout the DPRK could be read as a
sign of particularly tough, but not unprecedented, times in
the North. Downplaying reports of growing dissatisfaction
with the Kim Jong-il regime among the North Korean populace,
Cho asserted that non-elites don't have the "luxury" of
thinking about politics; their focus, he stressed, was on the
daily need to "put the food on the table." End Summary.

Old Problem: Grain Shortage
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2. (C) During a November 2 meeting with poloffs, Korea
Institute for International Economic Policy Senior Research
Fellow Cho Myung-cheol characterized the current food
situation in North Korea as "not significantly worse" than in
previous years. According to Cho's research, the DPRK
harvested approximately 4.2 million metric tons (MMT) of
grain in 2008; the 2009 harvest would be about 3.8 MMT, a
shortfall of some 400,000 MMT. A gap of that size was
"nothing new," Cho claimed.

New Solution: Markets
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3. (C) What was new, however, was the people's initiative to
participate in black market activities to "take care of
themselves," according to Cho. North Koreans who survived
the famine of the late 1990s learned that "if you wait to be
rescued by the authorities, you'll starve to death."
Motivated by memories of the famine, Cho explained,
non-elites have found creative ways to get their own food --
primarily via unofficial markets.

Black Market A-B-C
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4. (C) "Just about everyone" in North Korea now buys and/or
sells things in black markets, Cho said, including government
officials and urban workers. People go to their work units
for the morning roll call and then head off to the nearest
market to "earn real income." The system is sustainable, Cho
argued, because even work unit supervisors and security force
officers earn income at the markets -- though often in the
form of bribes. At a typical market, Cho said, approximately
85 percent of the goods come from China; the balance, he
claimed, were generally goods stolen from factories,
government offices and/or people's homes.

No Time for Politics
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5. (C) Cho acknowledged that there was growing
dissatisfaction with the Kim regime among ordinary North
Koreans but dismissed the possibility of an organized, East
European-style uprising for two primary reasons: fear and
hunger. Cho emphasized that, though weakened and corrupt,
the DPRK security apparatus was still capable of inflicting
fearsome punishment on those caught doing something viewed as
anti-regime. Moreover, the authorities still punished not
only the wrongdoer, but his or her extended family (and
sometimes friends) as well. While medieval, this collective
punishment kept a "tight and effective lid" on regime
opposition. Second, Cho stressed that the average non-elite
North Korean does not have the "luxury" of thinking about
politics. Instead, he/she has to "worry about putting food
on the table for the next meal."

Please Flood the Markets with Food and Clothing
-------------- --


6. (SBU) Cho closed by calling for the ROKG and USG to flood
North Korea with donated clothing and food aid -- items not
restricted by UN sanctions. The clothes and food would find
their way into the black markets and drive down prices.

This, he argued, would have two positive effects: it would
improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans and undercut
unscrupulous Chinese merchants who were, in Cho's view,
exploiting the misery of the North Korean people.

Bio Note
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7. (SBU) Cho is a former member of the North Korean elite.
As the son of a Minister of Construction father and economics
professor mother, Cho attended special schools from
kindergarten through university. Cho majored in economics at
Kim Il-sung University and spent three years in China as an
exchange professor; he defected to South Korea in the 1990s.
Cho is an in-demand interlocutor for diplomats and
journalists here, respected for his insights on all things
North Korea-related. He travels frequently to the PRC-DPRK
border area, Japan, Europe, and Southeast Asia.
STEPHENS