PRESIDENT LEE'S POPULARITY UP; SEEDS OF DISCONTENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001731 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2029 TAGS: PGOV ECON KS SUBJECT: PRESIDENT LEE'S POPULARITY UP; SEEDS OF DISCONTENT WITH U.S. EMERGING Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Lee Myung-bak's popularity has been on the rise, exceeding 40 percent for the first time since April 2008 -- primarily due to the improving economy, his focus on common people, and his success in raising Korea's status on the international stage. An emerging perception in some quarters that Lee is not effectively managing the ROK's interests in the U.S.-ROK alliance has the potential to undermine Lee's support among his conservative base and, by extension, ROK support for U.S. initiatives. To maintain high approval ratings, Lee must continue to solidify his support among moderate swing voters -- a growing force in Korean politics -- without alienating conservatives. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: President Lee's higher approval ratings will give him more flexibility on initiatives that are important to us but that lack broad public support -- like increasing contributions to Afghanistan. While leftist anti-U.S. feelings are remarkably rare in current Korean public discourse, seasoned observers note an emerging discomfort with U.S. policy among conservatives, who staunchly support the alliance. President Obama's visit next month will be a good opportunity to reassure the Korean public of Korea's strategic importance to the U.S. End Comment. -------------- Approval Ratings Up -------------- ¶3. (C) In early September, President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating reached 45.2 percent, marking the first time since his first few months in office that his support rate has exceeded 40 percent. (NOTE: One frequently cited Blue House-sponsored poll showed Lee's support rate over 50 percent, but it was an outlier. END NOTE.) Lee, plagued by anemic support rates since the spring 2008 beef protests, has seen temporary upward blips in approval before, but this is the first sustained increase of his presidency. Korean presidents often suffer from low approval ratings, but in the past the numbers have typically declined decline relentlessly over time; thus far, Lee is reversing that pattern, with exceptionally low support in the early months of his presidency, but with a sustained rally over the past couple months. ¶4. (C) The most important factor in Lee's rising approval rates is the public's approval of his handling of the economy. The Korean economy, which registered 2.9 percent growth in the third quarter, is widely heralded as one of the first economies to recover from the global financial crisis, and Lee is receiving much of the credit for this success. Indeed, his increase in popularity has roughly tracked the rise of the KOSPI, the ROK's benchmark stock index, which is also up about fifty percent this year. ¶5. (C) Second, Lee's effort to strike a more centrist pose has resonated with the public. He launched this initiative in an August 15 Liberation Address in which he pledged to adopt "moderate, pragmatic, and pro-working class" policies. His administration followed up with a proposed 2010 national budget that included $68 billion for social welfare, an increase of USD 504 million from the current fiscal year. The administration also introduced a micro-credit financing program for low-income borrowers. By widening the focus of his economic agenda to include not just big business but also the lower and middle classes, Lee has effectively broadened his appeal among moderates. ¶6. (C) Third, the public credits Lee with raising Korea's stature on the international stage. For example, Seoul's successful bid to host the November 2010 G-20 summit was a huge boost to Korean pride and is perceived here as validating the ROK's place among the world's most powerful economies. In addition, Lee's message about increasing the ROK's development assistance programs appeals to Koreans who remember that, not long ago, Korea was itself a recipient of massive development assistance. -------------- Seeds of Discontent with U.S. Emerging -------------- ¶7. (C) Part of Lee's perceived success is his management of relations with the U.S., which many Koreans believe have never been stronger. Political observers note, however, a series of incidents that, taken together, threaten to create the perception of a policy gap with the U.S.: the delay on ratifying the KORUS FTA; perceptions that Lee's "Grand Bargain" speech at the UN General Assembly was not properly coordinated with Washington and that the two capitals are out of step on the possibility of a South-North summit; the U.S. insistence on OPCON transfer; and the perceived U.S. push for Korea to send troops to Afghanistan. ¶8. (C) None of these issues alone comes close to a crisis. But together they give conservatives reason to view as suspect American policy toward North Korea and U.S. commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance. In particular, conservatives are increasingly concerned that the U.S. is content with maintaining the status quo on the DPRK, would tolerate a nuclear North Korea, and would be willing to settle for blocking roliferation. The U.S. will, the theory goes, negotiate bilaterally with North Korea with only its own interests in mind. This perception of a growing gap has the potential to erode Lee's support in his conservative base. The further Seoul gets -- or looks like it is getting ) away from Washington on DPRK policy, the more attrition Lee will face from the right. One seasoned observer said it is not the traditional anti-Americanism of the left that matters. "The U.S.," he said, "should be more worried about the conservatives." -------------- -------------- Lee Playing to a New, More Centrist Political Landscape -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) In addition to keeping the conservatives happy, Lee must consolidate his support in the political center if he is to maintain and increase his approval ratings. Political scientists see a major realignment in the Korean political landscape over the past decade, with the political center now eclipsing the left and the right. Ten years ago, political views were more polarized, based on personalities and regionalism. While those factors have not disappeared, the emergence of a larger centrist group of voters is beginning to moderate the extremes. The electorate is divided roughly into 30 percent conservatives, 30 percent liberals, and 40 percent independents in the middle. ¶10. (C) The increasing importance of the capital region -- Seoul, Incheon, and the surrounding Gyeonggi Province -- in national elections illustrates the shift. With nearly half of Korea's population living in the capital region, the old political loyalties that families had in their hometowns are breaking down as they become more focused on the economy and quality of life issues. Lee Myung-bak's election in 2007 highlighted the importance of the capital region. In past elections, the Chungcheong provinces were the key swing vote, but the concentration of the population in the capital has shifted the country's political center. In the 2012 presidential election, for which politicians are already preparing, popularity in the capital region will be the key indicator of candidates' potential for national success. STEPHENS