PROMINENT DPRK DEFECTOR ON REPORTED CLASHES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001680 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ECON KN SUBJECT: PROMINENT DPRK DEFECTOR ON REPORTED CLASHES BETWEEN NORTH KOREAN FARMERS AND SOLDIERS REF: SEOUL 1672 Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: Prominent North Korean defector Kang Cheol-hwan asserted on 10/21 that the DPRK's latest labor mobilization campaign has damaged this year's food crop harvest. Mandatory ideological busywork has kept workers out of back alley black markets and forced farmers to neglect their private vegetable plots. In retaliation, Kang said, disgruntled peasants have "refused to work properly" on collective farms, resulting in crops being left in the fields much longer than usual. According to Kang, farmers now fear a repeat of the late 1990s famine and are aggressively stealing crops from state land. He claimed that thousands of soldiers have been deployed to guard state fields in North Hwanghae and South Hwanghae; there have been reports of large-scale fighting between soldiers and farmers in those provinces, Kang claimed. Local officials have attempted to contain the unrest by spreading false rumors that massive Chinese food aid is on the way. End summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: Kang is a longtime Embassy contact whose views on current conditions inside North Korea have been proven credible. His latest report of conditions inside the DPRK is more extreme than we have generally heard elsewhere and we note that his organization's stated objective is the immediate end of the Kim Jong-il regime. Agricultural experts we have talked to in recent weeks expect the 2009 DPRK harvest to be roughly comparable to that of 2008. End summary and comment. 150-Day Battle and Follow-On Campaign Hurts Harvest -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) "Aquariums of Pyongyang" author, DPRK gulag survivor and Chairman of the Committee for the Democratization of North Korea Kang Cheol-hwan told us on 10/21 the recent "150-Day Battle" campaign and the follow-on "100-Day Battle" campaign were exacerbating food shortages throughout the DPRK. Echoing what we have heard elsewhere (reftel),Kang asserted that authorities have attempted to restore ideological discipline both in the countryside and the cities by forcing farmers to spend more time working on the state fields, to the neglect of their own private vegetable plots, and compelling workers to participate in political busywork to physically keep them in their idled factories -- and not out trading in back alley black markets. We Won't Get Fooled Again -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Kang suggested that the campaign's effects in the countryside have been particularly toxic. Citing unidentified contacts in the north, Kang claimed that authorities have mobilized farmers to work long hours on collective farms in an effort to maximize the state harvest. Longer hours tending collective fields has meant that farmers were forced to neglect their critically important private vegetable plots and consequently were reaping a disappointing harvest, according to Kang. He said that, in retaliation, discontented farmers had "not done their work properly" on the collectives, resulting in a poor harvest there as well. ¶5. (C) Kang underscored that North Korean farmers are not idiots. Many of them survived famine in the late 1990s and are viewing the current food shortages through that dire lens; they are, as Kang put it, "determined not to die a second death." That determination is prompting peasants to steal crops from state fields. In the rice bowl provinces of North Hwanghae and South Hwanghae, thousands of Korean People's Army troops had been dispatched to guard state fields; Kang, again citing unidentified sources, said there had been several clashes between soldiers and farmers throughout Hwanghae, though he noted the incidents were not connected. ¶6. (C) Kang said that panicked local officials had attempted to short-circuit the Hwanghae unrest by spreading false rumors that large-scale PRC food assistance was "on the way." At the same time, these officials had reported to their superiors that the food situation was so severe that it could "test the limits of the system." Kang noted that KPA soldiers guarding state fields throughout Hwanghae were getting a daily ration of two potatoes; this time, Kang asserted, "even the military could revolt." (Note: Kookmin University Professor Andrei Lankov told us separately that he heard from Russian diplomats in Pyongyang that there have been isolated large-scale clashes between soldiers and farmers in several DPRK provinces, including North and South Hwanghae. End note.) STEPHENS