SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

S E C R E T SEOUL 001631 SIPDIS FOR SECRETARY GATES FROM AMBASSADOR STEPHENS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KS SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES TO THE ROK FOR THE 41ST SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING Classified By: Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Reasons: 1.4 (b and d). -------------- SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION -------------- ¶1. (C) Mr. Secretary, all of us at Embassy Seoul warmly welcome you back to Korea for the 41st Security Consultative Meeting 21-22 October. Your visit comes at time when our bilateral relationship is the best it has been in a number of years, with a strongly pro-American president who has largely recovered from last year's debacle on the importation of American beef and is committed to working with us. The ROK has placed the DPRK nuclear issue firmly at the center of North-South relations. More broadly, President Lee's determination to build a "Global Korea" will offer opportunities to expand our strategic cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula, although we will have to be sensitive to ROK concerns that such cooperation is not a one-way relationship determined by the U.S. agenda. ¶2. (S) Issues do remain, however, particularly regarding Yongsan relocation and its accompanying budget demands, OPCON transfer, and our ambitious agenda of military transformation in the ROK. Defense Minister Kim Tae-young, your host for the 41st Security Consultative Meeting, is new to his position as of 23 September. In his previous role as Chairman of the ROK JCS he frequently made forceful public statements on North Korea and has been cast by the Korean media as a hawk on North Korea issues. While Minister Kim has been supportive of OPCON transfer, his adherence to the April 17, 2012 date has been questioned. There is also concern that he may not be able to garner support for the defense budget required to effect OPCON transfer. End Summary The Korean Political Scene -------------- ¶3. (C) Lee's rising poll numbers strengthen his ability to work with us on difficult issues. One recent poll had his approval ratings at 46 percent, up 15 points from July. Most analysts attribute the improvement to Lee's effort to move toward the political center, although the improving economy and the disarray of the opposition (which has approval ratings in the mid-20s) have also helped. Despite his growing popularity and the sizable majority that Lee's Grand National Party (GNP) holds in the National Assembly, the president has encountered difficulty in advancing legislation, due largely to the GNP's own low approval ratings and obstructionist tactics by the opposition. ¶4. (C) A recent cabinet reshuffle could help break the deadlock. On September 3, the Blue House replaced six ministers, including the prime minister and defense minister. The prime minister nominee, Chung Un-chan, was a bold choice that introduced a new, potentially influential player to the political field. An economist and former president of Seoul National University, Chung was touted as a possible candidate for president in 2007 and has been critical of Lee's economic policies. If Lee and Chung can work together, they could control the political center. The risk for Lee is that Chung could leave the administration after a brief tenure and fill the leadership void in the opposition. North Korea Policy: No Daylight with Washington -------------- -- ¶5. (C) At every level, ROK foreign policy is currently dominated by experienced America hands who believe deeply that the ROK must carefully coordinate its policies with us. Seoul has completely jettisoned the policy of the Roh Moo-hyun years that attempted to separate the nuclear issue from North-South relations, and President Lee has firmly told the DPRK that the nuclear issue is now central to relations with Pyongyang. Your interlocutors will repeat this position; in turn, they will want to be reassured that the United States is committed to multilateral talks on the nuclear issue and that we will not enter into a bilateral negotiation with the DPRK. Global Security Issues: Following Through on Afghanistan -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) The Blue House is eager to expand U.S.-ROK cooperation on global security issues. We would welcome Seoul providing more assistance and training in Afghanistan. Because of South Korea's unfortunate history in Afghanistan, however, this is a very sensitive issue here and Seoul has been moving slowly. Memories of the beef debacle linger, and President Lee does not want to risk being perceived as yielding to American pressure. Key Alliance Issues: Moving South... -------------- ¶7. (C) We are in the midst of a historic reconfiguration of our military posture in South Korea, one that will reduce the irritants that our large facilities in heavily-populated areas create for the Korean public and that will position the alliance for a generation to come, while simultaneously improving our warfighting capability. The centerpiece of this effort is the relocation of the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) to a new headquarters 30 miles south of Seoul. Progress on the move continues but unless ROKG funding and administrative obstacles are overcome soon we will not meet the agreed 2014 completion date. President Lee has voiced his support for the move but ROKG interagency fumbling and budgetary pressures continue to delay important decisions. ¶8. (C) In addition, we are working to consolidate over 100 U.S. military bases spread all across Korea into two key strategic hubs south of the Han River, replacing a Cold War-era military footprint with a modern and better-positioned force posture. We seek to complete this effort by the end of 2015, though that date may slip due to delays on the ROK side. Finally, the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces from the U.S. military to the ROK military in April 2012 is proceeding and will give the ROK a leading role in its own defense commensurate with its status as an advanced economy. Global Hawk -------------- ¶9. (S) As part of OPCON transition, DoD will phase out piloted U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions in Korea beginning in 2012. The U.S. received an official request in July 2009 from the ROKG for pricing and availability data for the acquisition of the U.S.-produced Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). However, there are some concerns regarding ROK acquisition of the Global Hawk, which is a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I item, due to repeated and continued ROK development of new missiles systems that are inconsistent with the 2001 U.S.- New Missile Guidelines (NMG) agreement constraining their missile systems to MTCR Category I limits. If the ROK decides to procure Global Hawk in mid-2010, delivery would occur no earlier than 2014. In the interim, U.S. Global Hawks based in Guam will perform ISR taskings on North Korea. According to PACAF, these Global Hawks will be responsible for the whole Pacific Ocean area of responsibility, would not be dedicated to the Korean Peninsula, and would not fully meet ISR requirements for North Korean territory and activities. The United States understands the ROK's need for enhanced ISR capabilities and is carefully reviewing the ROK's request for Global Hawk. Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement -------------- ¶10. (C) The Korea-U.S. (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement is a critical element of our effort to anchor Korea to the United States for the next generation. In addition to the substantial trade benefits, the psychological effects of the KORUS FTA would be vast, both as symbol of the American commitment to northeast Asia and in tying Korea to the United States during a time of rising Chinese influence. President Lee has faced criticism for his inability to generate momentum for the FTA in Washington. President Obama's statement at the April G20 meeting with Lee, that the United States wanted to find a way forward on the FTA, allayed some of the anxiety in Seoul and enabled Lee to push the FTA through the committee of jurisdiction in the National Assembly. A full plenary vote has not been scheduled, but the FTA is expected to pass once there is some sign of movement in Washington. USTR by the end of August had received over 500 comments (over 250 were from firms) on the FTA in response to the Federal Register notice asking for stakeholder views. USTR is reviewing the comments to ensure it understands the exact nature of the concerns and to develop recommendations for addressing them. While the ROKG waits for U.S. action on ratification, it is moving forward with FTA negotiations with a broad range of countries (including India, the European Union, Australia and New Zealand). American firms will be competitively disadvantaged if Korea's other trading partners enjoy FTAs while we do not. ¶11. (U) We look forward to seeing you in Seoul on October 21. STEPHENS