DPRK NOT STARVING BUT CONTROLS ERODING, SAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001468 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MNUC SOCI ECON KN KS CH SUBJECT: DPRK NOT STARVING BUT CONTROLS ERODING, SAYS PROMINENT ACADEMIC REF: SEOUL 1387 Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a recent meeting with poloffs, Kookmin University professor and longtime DPRK-watcher Andrei Lankov ridiculed NGO assertions that North Korea is facing another major famine but did say the regime's internal political controls are weakening. Lankov asserted that up to 80 percent of non-elite North Korean household income is now derived from trading in the country's unofficial markets. While the DPRK could "stagger on for 20 more years," Lankov cautioned that a sudden change like the death of Kim Jong-il or a botched attempt to implement major reforms could collapse the regime very quickly. Lankov asserted that Kim Jong-il's illness had focused the PRC on the issue of what to do in the event of a major crisis in the DPRK. He called for the United States to secure DPRK approval for the establishment of a U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang that could use public diplomacy programs, the Fulbright Program in particular, to dramatically open up North Korean society to the outside world. End summary. Food Situation: Don't Believe the NGO Hype -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During a recent meeting with poloffs, Kookmin University Professor and noted North Korea-watcher Andrei Lankov blasted a recently-released WFP report suggesting the North could be as much as 1.8 million metric tons (MMT) short of grain and could again experience widespread famine. According to Lankov, the North's 2009 harvest should be in the range of 4.2 to 4.3 MMT; the regime could survive with 4 MMT but would head off potential unrest as long it had 5 MMT to distribute. Pyongyang would therefore be seeking approximately 800,000 metric tons from a variety of sources, Lankov asserted, including China and the international NGO community. Emotional statements by left-leaning ROK NGOs about the North being on the verge of starvation are not true, he stressed. Internal Controls: Regime-Threateningly Weak -------------- ¶3. (SBU) What is true, Lankov said, is that the DPRK's internal political controls are continuing to weaken. Echoing what we have heard elsewhere (reftel),Lankov asserted that the North's unofficial markets are now so widespread and so effective at supplying food that ordinary people view the state as a parasite rather than a provider of basic necessities. According to Lankov, a common joke in DPRK villages is that there are now only two types of North Koreans: those who are traders and those who are dead. ¶4. (C) Citing unpublished research done by a Seoul National University economist, Lankov asserted that up to 80 percent of non-elite North Korean household income is now derived from trading. The political effect of this is significant: with money in their pockets and official corruption at epidemic levels, Lankov argued, people now routinely use bribes to shield the family members of "political criminals" and to win the quick release of those caught crossing illegally to/from China. Moreover, the DPRK's propaganda shift characterizing the ROK as "corrupt" and not "hell" is the ideological equivalent of a white flag, Lankov said, tacit recognition by regime propagandists that they have been beaten by a steady flow of illicit cell phones, DVDs, magazines and thumb-drives coming in from China. The Wildcard: A Sudden Change -------------- ¶5. (C) On the prospect of major unrest in the DPRK, Lankov ridiculed those in the Seoul-based defector community who predict that the proverbial end is near. The DPRK regime, he argued, could "stagger on for 20 more years." Lankov cautioned, though, that a sudden change like the death of Kim Jong-il or a botched attempt to implement major reforms could collapse the regime very quickly. Citing unidentified PRC official and academic contacts, Lankov asserted that Kim Jong-il's stroke had focused Beijing on the issue of what to do in the event of a crisis/collapse scenario in the DPRK. Lankov claimed there is an intense debate underway within the PRC government, reflected in official publications, about the risks and merits of intervening in a domestic DPRK crisis; allegedly, a key discussion point is assessing the risk of enriched DPRK plutonium ending up in the hands of Uighur militants. U.S.-DPRK: "Drown Them in a Barrel of Syrup" -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Giving us a preview of his upcoming "Foreign Affairs" article, Lankov said the focus of U.S. bilateral talks with the North Koreans should not be denuclearization, because Pyongyang would not agree to give up its nuclear weapons. Lankov argued the talks should instead focus on normalizing relations between Washington and Pyongyang. Part of that normalization process, he argued, should include the disablement/dismantlement of the Yongbyon complex and a pledge by Kim Jong-il not to engage in nuclear proliferation; these modest goals, Lankov claimed, could be achieved in talks with the North. ¶7. (SBU) The real focus of bilateral talks, according to Lankov, should be to "drown the North Koreans in a barrel of syrup." He urged the United States to secure North Korean approval for the establishment of a U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang that could use well-established U.S. public diplomacy programs, the Fulbright Program in particular, to dramatically open up North Korean society to the outside world. Lankov noted that two of the four participants in the first Fulbright cohort from the Soviet Union were Aleksandr Yakovlev, the architect of Glasnost, and Oleg Kalugin, the KGB general who played a critical role in trying to turn the KGB into a professional security service "instead of the political police." Lankov closed by asserting that there are North Korean versions of Yakovlev and Kalugin "just waiting for the opportunity to go to Columbia" on the Fulbright Program. TOKOLA