FM YU TELLS ALBRIGHT DENUCLEARIZATION IS TOP

UNCLAS SEOUL 001358 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD PINR KN KS CH SUBJECT: FM YU TELLS ALBRIGHT DENUCLEARIZATION IS TOP PRIORITY Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) At a breakfast for the U.S. Presidential Delegation to the funeral of former ROK President Kim Dae-jung, FM Yu Myung-hwan told former Secretary Albright that Seoul's message to the North Korean funeral delegation had been simple: without progress on denuclearization, improvement in North-South relations would be difficult. While hesitant to characterize UNSCR 1874 as the reason for North Korea's new willingness to engage on North-South issues, FM Yu agreed that 1874 was making it harder for Pyongyang to do business as usual. The resolution was helping put pressure on the north as it went through what Yu predicted would be a difficult three-year leadership transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim Chong-un. Noting that Chinese thinking about North Korea appeared to be evolving, Yu said the DPRK's refusal to return to the six-party process had apparently prompted the recent publication of several Chinese Communist Party-approved press articles critical of Pyongyang. FM Yu emphasized that KORUS passage was extremely important to Korea and warned that other countries would soon start benefiting from concessions won by the hard work of U.S. trade negotiators. Former Secretary Albright called on Seoul to honor Kim Dae-jung's legacy by continuing to work for human rights improvements in Burma. End summary. One Hour Breakfast with FM Yu Focuses on DPRK... -------------- --- ¶2. (SBU) ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan assured former Secretary Albright and the other members of the Presidential Delegation that Seoul's message to the North Korean delegation had been simple and consistent: without progress on denuclearization, improvement in North-South relations would be difficult. The North Koreans, Yu said, knew that they could generate domestic political pressure on the Blue House with conciliatory rhetoric and gestures. The ROKG message to the DPRK delegation was therefore clear: talks are fine, but Seoul is committed to implementing UNSCR 1874. Yu agreed with the delegation members that it would be critical to maintain solidarity between Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, Moscow, and Beijing on the importance of implementing ¶1874. ¶3. (SBU) While hesitant to characterize 1874 as the reason for North Korea's new attitude, FM Yu agreed that it was making it harder for Pyongyang to do business as usual. The resolution, combined with ROK cuts in purchases of construction materials and seafood, was putting pressure on the north as it went through what Yu predicted would be a three-year leadership transition from Kim Jong-il (KJI) to Kim Chong-un (KCU). The north's apparent goal, Yu asserted, was to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state by 2012 -- when the DPRK will mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, the 70th birthday of KJI and the 30th birthday (lunar calendar) of KCU. ...China's Evolving Role... -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Yu noted that Chinese thinking about North Korea appeared to be continuing to evolve. PRC FM Yang had assured him that Beijing wanted Pyongyang to return to the 6PT and had delivered that message via several channels, only to be rebuffed. That intransigence, Yu said, apparently prompted the publication of several articles critical of North Korea in prominent Chinese Communist Party-affiliated publications. Yu agreed with members of the delegation that while Beijing clearly feared a quick collapse of the North Korean regime and had "less influence than we think," China still supplied massive amounts of food and fuel to the north and therefore had leverage. Yu acknowledged that younger DPRK analysts in the PRC think-tank community had even begun to refer to Pyongyang as a security liability for Beijing. FM Yu said the ROKG was reaching out to these scholars to establish a Track Two dialogue about North Korea. ...Prospects for KORUS Passage... -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Turning to economic issues, FM Yu emphasized that, for Korea, the FTA was more than simply a trade deal. Passage of KORUS, he said, would signal to the ROK public a U.S. commitment to making trade a cornerstone of the ROK-U.S. alliance in the 21st century. While taking former Secretary Albright's point about the "toxic" political atmosphere for trade deals on Capitol Hill, Yu agreed with Ambassador Bosworth's observation that other countries would take advantage of the hard work done by U.S. negotiators on KORUS. The ROKG was preparing to sign an FTA with the European Union and was already in negotiations with Canada and Australia, among others; benefits won by U.S. negotiators would go to companies from other countries, Yu lamented. ...and Burma -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Noting the ROK's unique position in Asia as a country that had made the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, former Secretary Albright called on Seoul to honor Kim Dae-jung's legacy by continuing to work for human rights improvements in Burma. Calling it the "saddest country in Asia," FM Yu noted that the ROKG has been increasingly active, along with Indonesia, in calling for improvements in human rights conditions. STEPHENS