PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE WORKSHOP IN

UNCLAS SEOUL 001306 SENSITIVE, SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL KS IR SUBJECT: PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE WORKSHOP IN SEOUL - OUTBRIEF REF: STATE 64064 ¶1. (U) This cable is sensitive, but unclassified. Please protect accordingly. ¶2. (U) This is cable is an action request. See para 19. ¶3. (U) Summary. The Government of the Republic of Korea (ROKG) on July 21-22 hosted a USG delegation at a workshop in Seoul to discuss the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Twenty-four representatives from nine ROK agencies attended the workshop, the purpose of which was to acquaint the ROK representatives with how PSI works, provide advice for building the capacity and interagency process for active PSI participation, and address ROK misperceptions that PSI focuses primarily on maritime interdictions and shipboarding. Twenty representatives from eight USG agencies attended the workshop. From USG presentations, the ROK representatives learned that maritime interdictions were one tool among many to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The U.S. representatives stressed that an effective interagency process is key to handling actions related to stopping transfers of WMD-related items and materials. The ROKG made numerous requests during the course of the workshop, of which the most significant were to join PSI's Operational Experts Group (OEG) and to receive additional training in maritime interdiction, cargo risk assessment, and proliferation-related equipment identification. End summary. -------------- Case Studies -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Director General (DG) Shin Dong-ik opened the workshop by saying that the ROK's participation in PSI was a symbol of an upgraded ROK-U.S. alliance on global issues and that the ROKG viewed PSI and UNSCR 1874 as closely linked. Shin continued by stating that the ROKG envisioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),Ministry of National Defense (MND),and the Korean Maritime Police, (the equivalent of the Coast Guard),as the primary implementers of PSI. MOFAT would have the lead coordinating role. Shin expected the ROKG to finalize its PSI implementation mechanisms in August 2009. In addition, Director Lee Jangkeun said, and it was reaffirmed throughout the workshop, that the ROKG saw itself primarily as a receiver of information. This was questioned, however, by Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (A/DAS) Foley who challenged the ROKG to find ways that they could generate information. The ROKG inquired how sensitive information was transmitted and handled, and the degree to which the information is required to meet the legal standards of evidence. Director Lee repeated throughout the workshop that significant portions of the ROKG misunderstood PSI as being primarily concerned with interdiction on the high seas, a misunderstanding that he hoped the workshop would correct. ¶5. (U) Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (A/DAS) Tony Foley opened the workshop by making two points. First, PSI attempted to counter the proliferation of WMD using a variety of tools, of which maritime operations (e.g. hail and query, boarding) were just a small part. Second, while the Department of State was the lead coordinating agency for diplomatic activity, PSI decision making relied on a national, coordinated interagency process; and that in the U.S, the process involves the National Security Council staff; the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, and Commerce; and the intelligence community. ¶6. (U) The USG delegation presented and discussed two illustrative case studies, a maritime and an air shipment scenario, in order to illustrate how PSI might work. The point of the illustrative case studies was to show that PSI was most successful when it leveraged multiple tools of national power: diplomatic, information, law enforcement, and military capabilities. The ROKG delegation asked for an actual PSI operation to be presented. The USG delegation explained that given the highly classified nature of the information shared, specific cases are not routinely discussed or made available in unclassified settings. However, as an example of a successful interdiction, the USG delegation pointed to the January 2009 incident in which the Cyprus Government recalled an Iranian-owned, Cyrus-flagged vessel after a U.S. military boarding team found arms related material in violation of UNSCR 1747 during an inspection on board the ship. During this discussion, the ROKG delegation noted that UNSCR 1874 included seizure and disposition authority for prohibited items, including North Korean arms, a provision that PSI does not allow. The U.S. side corrected this misperception by emphasizing that PSI does not obligate participating states to any particular course of action, make law, or authorize actions inconsistent with international law and national authorities. -------------- Legal Issues -------------- ¶7. (U) Chip Wedan (Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense) gave a presentation on the legal aspects of PSI. Wedan's presentation made three main points: PSI does not violate international law; PSI does not infringe on a nation's sovereignty; and maritime interdiction on the high seas under PSI is permitted by principles of customary international law (e.g., master's consent, flag state consent, and Article 110 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention). Wedan emphasized PSI's call for enhanced and consistent enforcement of domestic laws as the best method for stopping WMD proliferation. ¶8. (U) Kim Byung-dae, (Director, Economic Cooperation Division, Ministry of Unification),gave a presentation on the Inter-Korean Agreement on Maritime Transportation of 2002, as supplemented by the Annex of 2003. The point of the presentation was to explain the Inter-Korean Maritime Agreement to the USG delegation. The Agreement applies to vessels owned or rented by the DPRK and ROK shipping companies, (except for fishing boats, military ships, and non-commercial government vessels),and to ships transiting between ports designated by the DPRK and the ROK, between two DPRK ports, and between DPRK and ROK ports via a third country. The Agreement establishes inter-Korean sea routes in international waters (and the Jeju Channel) and entry and exit routes into selected ports in each country. The Agreement permits the maritime authorities to stop, board, and search a vessel if it is suspected of violating any of the banned activities under the Agreement, including: refusing to respond to radio enquiries, deviating from the established routes without authorization, and flight after a violation. In practice, however, the ROK authorities simply issue warnings, requested course corrections, or escort violating vessels out of its controlled waters. -------------- PSI Implementation -------------- ¶9. (U) The USG delegation opened the discussion on implementing PSI by explaining the opportunities for capacity building under PSI, specifically: the Operational Experts Group (OEG) meetings, live and table top exercises, bilateral engagements, and workshops. In addition, the USG delegation explained how the ROK could meet its PSI commitments through participation in related initiatives and capacity-building opportunities such as the UNSCR 1540 Committee Donor Assistance, the U.S. Department of Energy's Commodity Identification Training program and its WMD and Missile Commodity Reference Manual, or through participation in the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program. The USG delegation concluded with a discussion of the upcoming regional PSI workshop in Sydney on September 15-17 and the DEEP SABRE II regional exercise on October 27-30, hosted by Singapore. The ROK asked how it could participate in DEEP SABRE II, to which the USG urged the ROKG to contact Singapore, the exercise's host, and attend the upcoming planning meeting. In addition, the United States would assist in ensuring that the ROK received an invitation to participate. ¶10. (SBU) Multiple members of the ROK delegation said at various times throughout the workshop that unique circumstances on the Korean Peninsula (specifically, tensions with North Korea) would strongly influence what contributions the ROK could make to the PSI. Still, a ROK representative said it was expected that the ROK's "geo-political environment and economic power could contribute to the enhancement of PSI activities," and that its participation would strengthen the existing non-proliferation network. The ROKG expected its participation to focus on information sharing, export/transshipment control, exercise participation, and eventual OEG participation. The ROKG expected that PSI would upgrade its own domestic counter proliferation mechanisms. DG Shin also suggested that the ROK could contribute to PSI by reaching out to other Asian nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. ¶11. (SBU) Steve Schleien (Global Strategic Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense) updated the ROKG delegation on PSI's Operational Expert Groups (OEG),which met regularly to develop operational concepts of interdiction, develop a shared understanding of relevant domestic and international law, and share best practices of interdiction. DG Shin asked how the ROK could join the OEG. Schleien and A/DAS Foley said that granting membership in the OEG was a consultative process and that they would communicate the request within USG channels in Washington and to the other OEG member nations. ¶12. (U) Sabina Kook, (Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC),Department of the Treasury),gave a presentation on how Treasury combats proliferation finance by targeting the proliferation support network (financiers, logistical support, front companies, and suppliers) and not just the WMD proliferators (individual or organization). Kook explained how UNSCRs (1737, 1747, and 1803 for Iran; and 1718 and 1874 for North Korea) provided the international framework and authorities to protect the international financial system from illicit activities, including the proliferation of WMDs. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international standard-setting body that has been recognized by the UNSC for its guidance on preventing the financing of proliferation activities. The FATF is currently in the middle of a project on examining proliferation finance and the viable policy options available to address this threat. Also explained was the recent Treasury advisory issued to financial institutions warning them of the illicit finance risk posed by North Korea. ¶13. (U) Scott Renda explained that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC),within the Treasury Department, administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. In the WMD context, the primary tool at the disposal of the USG is Executive Order 13382, an authority aimed at freezing the assets of WMD proliferators and their supporters. A designation under this authority has the practical effect of prohibiting transactions between the designees and any U.S. person and freezes the property and interests in property the designees may have within the United States or within the possession of U.S. persons. This includes those listed in the Order,s Annex; any foreign person determined to have engaged or attempted to engage in activities that materially contribute to or pose a risk of materially contributing to the proliferation of WMD; any person determined to have provided or attempted to provide support for or goods or services in support of those designated under E.O. 13382; and any person determined to be owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, any blocked party. Renda clarified the difference between the Order, the Annex, and primary (State) and derivative (Treasury) designations. Renda concluded by noting that E.O. 13382 was the legal mechanism by which the U.S. implements its obligations related to the asset freezing, financial services, and vigilance provisions in UNSCRs 1718 and 1874. In response to a ROKG question on asset forfeiture, Kook explained that Treasury used E.O. 13382 to freeze assets, but that a criminal case was necessary for forfeiture. ¶14. (SBU) Lawrence Lee, (Director, Foreign Exchange Policy Division, Ministry of Strategy and Finance),asked for USG help with obtaining ROK membership on FATF. In addition, he asked for a FATF document that described what actions FATF members has taken against Iran in response to the FATF statement calling for counter-measures. Lee also asked for specific cases on proliferation finance and Kook referred him to the FATF Typology Report which includes case studies. ¶15. (SBU) Although the ROKG supports multilateral, counter proliferation efforts against Iran as embodied in the UNSCRs and in multilateral export control regimes, Director Lee explained that dealing with Iran was a delicate issue for the ROKG because Iran was the fourth largest petroleum supplier to the ROK, and because Iran was the ROK's largest export market in the Middle East. Since Iranian oil accounted for roughly ten percent of the ROK oil supply, relations with Iran were a matter of energy security. Director Lee Jangkeun said that the ROK did not have legal mechanisms (domestic or otherwise) to implement unilateral sanction regimes. ¶16. (U) Ms. Lou Green (Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security) gave a presentation on the customs-related aspects of PSI, specifically, CBP's strong role in the detention and/or seizure of export/import goods. The ROKG asked many questions about the legality of detention (in which the owner retains title to the property) and seizure (a legal process through which the CBP attempts to acquire title to the property, which implies a pending criminal investigation). Green explained that CBP had legal authority to detain all goods transiting across the national border, even goods destined for transit to another country via the U.S. Furthermore, CBP may request departed vessels to off-load suspicious cargo at another port or order the redelivery of the suspicious goods back to the U.S. -------------- Korean Maritime Police (Coast Guard) -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The USG delegation visited the Korean Maritime Police (Coast Guard) located in Inchon, a port city 24 miles west of Seoul. Superintendent General (SG) Kim Suk-kyoon greeted the delegation and was the main presenter and guide for the visit. Kim's presentation confirmed Director Kim Jangkeun's statement that the Korean Coast Guard did not see itself as a security agency, but rather as an economic agency. For SG Kim, "trade and cooperation between the two Koreas were a domestic matter." SG Kim said that the maritime police were responsible for surveillance of DPRK vessels, and in fact, had monitored the Kang Nam I for two days. (Note: The Kang Nam I was a DPRK vessel suspected of carrying weapons contraband in violation of UNSCR 1874. The vessel ultimately turned around mid-voyage and returned to North Korea. End note.) SG Kim said that although the Inter-Korean Agreement on Maritime Transportation gave the ROKG the right to board North Korean merchant ships, the maritime police had yet to do so because the ROKG believed that not only would such a move raise tensions between the two Koreas, but also because the crews on DPRK vessels were likely to be armed with light weapons. SG Kim said that the maritime police would carry out any interdictions on the high seas jointly with the Navy. -------------- Courtesy Call on Deputy Minister Oh Joon -------------- ¶18. (SBU) A/DAS Foley on July 22 had a courtesy call meeting with Deputy Minister Oh Joon, Deputy Minister for Multilateral, Global, and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. DM Oh said that he was glad to hear that the PSI workshop went well, especially considering that PSI and the interagency cooperation it entailed were new for the ROKG. DM Oh asked if the ROKG should approach any other countries regarding their models for PSI coordination, to which A/DAS Foley suggested that New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada all had effective models of PSI interagency coordination. Oh said that MOFAT was the central point (or "channel") for PSI activity because most other ministries lacked foreign experience and therefore looked to MOFAT for guidance. In addition, Oh said that the "negative attitudes" about PSI were based on misperceptions that MOFAT tried to correct by publishing a small booklet about PSI. Regarding PSI and the media, Oh agreed with Foley that much of the information used in PSI interdictions would be difficult to declassify; instead, Oh continued, he thought that what the public should know about PSI was that it followed and used domestic laws to accomplish its aims. Like DG Shin, Oh also said that perhaps the ROKG could contribute to PSI by reaching out to other Asian nations, specifically, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. Oh concluded the meeting by stating that the ROKG would like to be in the OEG, to which Foley responded that Steve Schleien would look into the matter. Foley reminded Oh that membership in the OEG required consultation with other OEG members and would require a commitment of ROK resources. -------------- Action Items -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Below is a summary of ROK inquiries: --Membership in the OEG --Sharing of information --Participation in DEEP SABRE II exercise in Singapore --Practical interdiction training for the maritime police and navy (which can be done in the U.S.) --CBP training in customs operations/interdiction --CBP training in synchronizing cargo risk management with the Secure Freight Initiative's (SFI) 100% screening mandate --National Nuclear Security Administration (Department of Energy) training in material identification --Bilateral consultations/workshops in Seoul or Washington --Membership in FATF --Receipt of the FATF Topology Report --Summary of major "take-away" points of the workshop -------------- Workshop Participants -------------- ¶20. (U) USG Delegation (20 persons): Tony Foley (A/DAS Counterproliferation - State) Joseph Yun (A/DCM - Embassy Seoul) Steve Schleien (Global Strategic Affairs - OSD) Beth Flores (Global Strategic Affairs - OSD) LTC Steve Park (Asian & Pacific Affairs - OSD) Chip Wedan (Office of the General Counsel - DOD) CDR Tony Crego (Joint Staff J5 - DOD) Lou Green (Customs and Border Protection - DHS) Bennett Courey (Customs and Border Protection Legal - DHS) John Kroft (National Counterproliferation Center - DNI) Lance Stubblefield (National Nuclear Security Administration - DOE) Sabina Kook Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes - Treasury) Scott Renda (Office of Foreign Assets Control - Treasury) LCDR Mel Naidas (USPACOM) Markus Garlauskas (USFK) David Jeffrey (Embassy Seoul) Tyler Carson (Embassy Seoul) LCDR Patricia Springer (U.S. Coast Guard - Embassy Seoul) John Yu (FBI - Embassy Seoul) Erik Hunt (Foreign Commercial Service - Embassy Seoul) ¶21. (U) ROK Delegation (24 persons) Shin Dong-ik (Director General, International Organization Bureau - MOFAT) Lee Jang-keun (Director, Disarmament and Nonproliferation - MOFAT) Koo Hyun-mo (Director designate, Disarmament and Nonproliferation - MOFAT) Kim Jae-woo (Disarmament and Nonproliferation - MOFAT) Koh Young-kul (Disarmament and Nonproliferation - MOFAT) Park Eun-jin (Disarmament and Nonproliferation - MOFAT) Jin Gi-hoon (Director, Inter-Korean Policy - MOFAT) Kang Myong-il (International Legal Affairs - MOFAT) Song Si-jin (North American Division I - MOFAT) Hong Jee-pio (ROK Embassy Washington) Lim Sang-beom (Office of Secretary to the President for National Security Strategy - Blue House) Col Kim Mu-kyum (Director, WMD Policy Division - Ministry of National Defense) LtCol Kang Kyu-tai (WMD Policy Division - Ministry of National Defense) Kim Byung-dae (Director, Economic Cooperation Division - Ministry of Unification) Lee Lawrence (Director, Foreign Exchange Policy - Ministry of Strategy and Finance) Park Chan-ho (Foreign Exchange Policy - Ministry of Strategy and Finance) Kim Myung-hoon (Port Management - Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs) Kweon Si-hong (International Air Transport - Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs) Park Joon-soo (Air Traffic Management - Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs) Kim Suk-kyoon (Superintendent General - Korean Maritime Police) Kim Un-ho (Superintendent - Korean Maritime Police) Seo Sang-wook (Korean Maritime Police) Im Joong-cheol (Director, Surveillance Division - Korean Customs Service) Han Yoo-lim (Senior Researcher - Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security) ¶22. (U) This cable has been cleared by ISN A/DAS Tony Foley and the USG delegation. STEPHENS