A/S CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001170 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PINR KN KS SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE LEADERS Classified By: Ambassador Stephens. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) In a July 19 meeting with EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt M. Campbell, representatives of NGOs working with North Korean refugees -- themselves all North Korean refugees -- described their work, their lives in DPRK, the North Korean leadership, and humanitarian challenges of North Korean refugees. A/S Campbell asked the refugee leaders to bring program ideas and proposals for possible USG assistance in future meetings. Our NGO interlocutors were: Kim Young-il, Executive Director of the People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE); Kim Seong-min, Free North Korea Radio; Kim Heung-kwang, North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity; Kim Seung-cheol, North Korea Reform Radio; Dr. Lee Ae-ran, Associate Research Fellow at Ewha Institute Unification Studies; and Kang Cheol-hwan, author of Aquariums in Pyongyang and staff writer at the Chosunilbo Daily. -------------- North Korean Sentiments Toward Foreigners -------------- ¶2. (C) Kim Seoung-min and Kim Seung-cheol, among the most prominent operators of radio broadcasts into North Korea, discussed how radios and cell phones continued to be a primary tool for North Koreans to gain access to the outside world. Their organizations have found that many North Koreans secretly alter their radios so that they can listen to short-wave broadcasts from stations like Free North Korea Radio and North Korea Reform Radio. A recent survey conducted by Radio Free Asia showed that some 30 percent of defectors interviewed upon arrival had either listened to or heard of their broadcasts while living in North Korea. While this did not mean that 30 percent of North Koreans were listening to foreign broadcasts, the survey did show that the numbers were quite high, according to Kim Seung-cheol. ¶3. (C) Despite these trends, NGO representatives largely agreed that North Koreans remained largely ignorant of outside developments, finding it difficult to have thoughts different from the state propaganda; most North Koreans believed the U.S. to be the cause of socio-economic problems in North Korea. This was also true of recent refugees; they did not have positive views toward Americans and Japanese. Still, several NGO representatives argued, North Koreans had an even lower view of their own authorities, because of the state's failure to provide the minimum necessities of life. Kim Young-il recounted that in 1993, the year he left North Korea, he had heard many North Koreans wishing that the regime would collapse so that American troops could enter the North. They clearly believed that a US occupation would be better than the current regime. His experience and current work has found that that anti-American sentiment has lessened since the early 1990s. -------------- Life after Defection -------------- ¶4. (C) Statistics show that the large majority of defectors from North Korea are women. Kim Young-il explained that many men also try to leave North Korea, but that the incidence of arrest -- by North Korean and Chinese border guards -- is far higher for men than women. Women are less likely to be returned by the Chinese. Women also have other alternatives such as marrying Chinese men that, albeit degrading in many circumstances, allows them to integrate more easily into outside societies. Another factor is the brokers operating in ROK, who charge approximately USD 3000 to bring out one North Korean; brokers prefer women defectors because they are more likely to keep their promise and pay these fees than men. ¶5. (C) Approximately 60 percent of defectors suffer from depression and/or other mental health disorders, according to a recent study. Alcoholism is also a serious problem, according to our NGO interlocutors. Kim Seoung-cheol stated that the difficult journey out of North Korea to China and the long assimilation period in South Korea were the top two causes for these disorders. ¶6. (C) The NGO leaders also added self-identification and assimilation as major challenges problems for the North Korean refugees living in South Korea. Most defectors continue to view themselves as North Korean after resettlement, which, combined with their unmistakable North Korean accent, nutritional deficiencies and limited vocational skill-sets, make integration into the South Korean society very difficult. Still, these psychological problems typically get better the longer the refugee stays in South Korea. On average, after four or five years, a North Korean refugee will feel quite comfortable in South Korean society and culture. -------------- North Korean Leadership -------------- ¶7. (C) Our NGO interlocutors believed that North Korean refugees in South Korea could play important roles in North Korea after the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime. While they believed that North Korea would be ruled by a collective leadership -- military and civilian -- after the death of Kim Jong-il, they doubted that such rule would be stable. Kim Heung-kwang, Representative at North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, remarked that collective leadership in North Korea consisted of older elites averaging 70 years of age. They were ideologically pro-Chinese and very opposed to any opening of North Korea to democracy or market capitalism. The collective leadership had no desire to change anything and, inevitably, with any collective system, there would be internal power struggle. The United States would do well to support refugees, especially in education, so that they could go back to North Korea and assume positions of authority, one NGO representative proposed. -------------- US Assistance for North Korean Refugees -------------- ¶8. (C) Responding to A/S Campbell's question on what the U.S. could do to help North Korean refugees, NGO representatives identified three areas: shorten the verification process for defectors seeking to enter the United States; broaden budget allocations from the State Department; and increase educational opportunities for refugees resettled in the ROK. -- In a recent visit to China, Kim Seoung-min found that a considerable amount of North Korean defectors expressed an interest in re-locating to the U.S. Many of them, however, were discouraged by the USG's 6-month verification process, which is much longer than the ROKG's 2-month process. Kim Seoung-min believed that many more North Koreans would want to resettle in the US if the process time was reduced. -- Kim Young-il proposed that the USG consider broadening the State Department budget for refugee issues in China to include NGOs operating in South Korea, provided they work with North Korean refugee issues in the PRC. Currently, 5 percent of the Department's refugee budget is allocated for South Korea and 20-30 percent is allocated to the PRC, Kim claimed. -- Several NGO representatives noted that education opportunities for North Korean refugee students would play an important role. They would like to see scholarships to study in the U.S., particularly English-language programs. ¶9. (C) Assistant Secretary Campbell closed the meeting by calling for future discussions, and asking NGO representatives to share specific programming ideas, strategies and lessons learned from their respective organizations to better inform future USG humanitarian support to North Korean defectors. ¶10. (U) A/S Campbell has cleared this message. STEPHENS