SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; July 6, 2009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 SEOUL 001058 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; July 6, 2009 TOP HEADLINES -------------- Chosun Ilbo ROK's Trade with China Decreasing While Taiwan's Trade with China Increasing JoongAng Ilbo North Korea Spends 420 Billion Won on Missile Launches Dong-a Ilbo Foreign Companies in ROK Surveyed: They Give ROK 6.5 Points in Terms of Business Friendliness Hankook Ilbo North Korean Missiles Become More Accurate Hankyoreh Shinmun ROKG to Serve as Mediator, Is "On Strike" for Two Months in the Face of Impending Chain of Bankruptcies Triggered by Ssangyong Segye Ilbo ROK's Foreign Currency Market Stabilized Seoul Shinmun Survey: 33.8% Companies Intend to Switch Irregular Workers to Regular Workers DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS -------------- Following North Korea's July 4 missile launches, the ROKG said that it was a provocative act that clearly violates UN Security Council Resolutions that bars all North Korean activity related to ballistic missiles. (Hankyoreh, Segye, Seoul, All TVs) INTERNATIONAL NEWS -------------- North Korea fired seven short-range missiles on July 4 as the U.S. celebrated its Independence Day. (All) An ROKG source said that five of the seven missiles landed in the same area in waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, demonstrating a higher level of precision than in previous launches. (JoongAng, Hankook). In the wake of North Korea's July 4 missile launches, the ROK, Japan and European countries condemned the launches. Russia and China expressed concern over an escalation of tension in the region. (Chosun, Hankook, Hankyoreh, Segye) ROK experts believe that North Korea spent approximately 340 million dollars on missile launches this year and spent a total of 700 million dollars when costs of its second nuclear test are included. (Dong-a, JoongAng, Seoul) According to U.S. diplomatic sources, the U.S. will call for stronger sanctions against North Korea at the ASEAN Regional Forum, which will take place in Phuket, Thailand, starting July 21. (Chosun) According to a Washington source, the U.S. government discovered some North Korean bank accounts in Malaysia, through which it suspects payments were made for the shipment of weapons. The U.S. is seeking to freeze the accounts. (Hankook,JoongAng, Chosun, Hankyoreh, Segye, MBC, KBS). According to a ROK military source, there is a possibility that North Korea's Kang Nam freighter may return home today after being SEOUL 00001058 002 OF 010 trailed by a U.S. Navy destroyer and suddenly reversing course in late June. (Dong-a, JoongAng, Hankook) Philip Goldberg, the U.S. coordinator for the implementation of a UN Security Council Resolution that punishes North Korea for its May 25 nuclear test is in Malaysia to seek help in implementing financial sanctions against North Korea. (Chosun, Hankook) MEDIA ANALYSIS -------------- -N. Korea: Missile tests -------------- Most ROK media gave wide attention to North Korea's July 4 missile launches. Conservative Chosun Ilbo noted in a front page story that North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles on July 4, U.S. Independence Day. Citing an ROK military official, the newspaper said that five of the seven missiles landed in the same area in waters 420km away from the launch site, demonstrating a higher level of precision than in previous launches. Chosun Ilbo, however, citing a military expert, commented in that same article that the missile launches, which were intended to draw U.S. attraction, failed in that regard since the North fired short range missiles, not long-range missiles which could strike the U.S. Citing experts, the newspaper said in an inside-page article that the July 4 missile launches apparently came as a result of growing hardline voices within the North Korean military, rather than from political and diplomatic considerations. Conservative Dong-a Ilbo said in an inside-page report that experts believe that North Korea did not launch Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) this time based on the judgment that its brinkmanship tactics will no longer work, and reserved an ICBM launch as the last card to play. Citing other experts, Dong-a Ilbo noted that North Korea is not yet technically capable of firing the ICBM which is presumed to have been updated from Taepodong II missiles. Moderate Hankook Ilbo, citing an expert on North Korea, reported in an inside-page story that North Korea did not fire long-range missiles this time due to strategic considerations. According to the newspaper, the expert believes that North Korea wants to keep ramping up tensions in the region while pressuring the U.S. step-by-step. Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo said in a front-page analysis that according to military experts, North Korea spent 420 billion won, or about 330 million dollars, on missile launches this year and spent a total of 700 million dollars when costs of its second nuclear test are included. The newspaper cited a Blue House official saying that 300 million dollars can feed all North Koreans for one year. Chosun Ilbo editorialized: Through a recent series of missile launches, Pyongyang showed that it has succeeded in improving its missile technology, and if Pyongyang wants, its missiles are now accurate enough to hit major facilities in the ROK. North Korea could aggravate the situation further by staging military provocations against the ROK or conducting a third nuclear test. JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: The North's recent acts of bellicosity seem to be related to its succession concerns, but the North should change its way of thinking and pay more attention to its citizens' welfare. It should turn the money it spends on missile launches into a fund to feed its people. Hankook Ilbo editorialized: It is noteworthy that the U.S. disregarded (North Korea's provocations) without any public comment. Some observers say that the U.S. took this attitude in order not to be embroiled in North Korea's attention-grabbing strategy, but it may be more accurate to say that Washington's ignorance is designed to keep the focus of its strategic game with North Korea on the nuclear issue by not responding to every short-range missile launch. SEOUL 00001058 003 OF 010 Hankyoreh Shinmun editorialized: North Korea's scud missiles can strike all ROK regions and part of Japan and therefore are apparently aimed at the ROK and Japan, which lead the hard-line moves against North Korea. North Korea timed its missile launches to coincide with the U.S. Independence Day but did not fire long-range missiles that can provoke the U.S. in order to sound out U.S. intentions. -North Korea: Goldberg Trip -------------- In a related development, Chosun Ilbo reported that Philip Goldberg, the U.S. coordinator for the implementation of a UN Security Council Resolution that punishes North Korea for its May 25 nuclear test, is in Malaysia to seek help in implementing financial sanctions against North Korea. According to the newspaper, the U.S. government discovered some North Korean bank accounts in Malaysia, through which it suspects payments were made for the shipment of weapons. The U.S. is seeking to freeze the accounts. OPINIONS/EDITORIALS -------------- CHINA SYNDROME (JoongAng Ilbo, July 3, 2009, Page 47) By Senior Columnist Kim Young-hie China must act now in alliance with the international community to thwart North Korea's nuclear ambitions before it's too late. Let's say we agree that the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council on North Korea are stern and comprehensive. Let's say that Washington's and Tokyo's independent financial sanctions effectively block North Korea's cash flow and its needs for international financial transactions. Without China's active participation, however, the sanctions on North Korea won't significantly impact North Korea's leadership or force it to change its mind and return to the Six-Party Talks. Several sets of statistics concerning economic relations between North Korea and China clearly confirm this. According to The Washington Post, North Korea gets 90 percent of its energy from China. The energy source it doesn't depend on its neighbor for is coal. North Korea turns to China each year for food aid to supplement shortfalls in its own crop production. It's thought that more than 45 percent of the food North Koreans consume comes from China. This food supply is referred to as an import but in reality it's aid. Pyongyang gives nothing in return except perhaps access to some mineral resources. The Washington Post reported that during the past year trade between North Korea and China increased by 41 percent, and North Korea's trade with China accounted for 73 percent of North Korea's entire trade volume. This means that China is throwing the country a lifeline that will keep the North at minimum survival levels despite the imposition of sanctions. When the UN Security Council discussed Resolution 1874 and the imposition of sanctions on North Korea, China changed the wording that said that the UN resolution "demands" that its member countries inspect North Korea's cargo vessels on the high seas to "calls upon." This change weakened the measure's binding power because member countries could decide whether to act or not. Most people know that China strongly opposes North Korea's nuclear armament, but North Korea will not give up its nuclear ambition just because the rest of the world, including China, opposes it. But China is not convinced that we need big sticks to force the communist country to abandon its nuclear program. China says wielding a stick is not its goal, so it takes no action to actively promote the resolution and its sanctions. Of course, others also know that getting tough with Pyongyang is not a goal in itself; it's a measure to bring North Korea back to the table. President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama have made this clear. Yet SEOUL 00001058 004 OF 010 China still makes insufficient efforts. The country simply refuses to pursue further efforts. A reliable news source reports that the United States is trying to raise China's participation in sanctions on North Korea from the current 15 percent to 75 percent. But even 75 percent will be not sufficient. If China's participation is below that level, it will be difficult to change North Korea's reckless and provocative policies with financial sanctions. The source explained the differences in the points of view between South Korea, the United States and China as to why North Korea is obsessed with developing nuclear arms and long-range missiles. According to his analysis, the United States gives a lot of weight to North Korea's domestic situation; China thinks North Korea went ahead with nuclear development because the United States did not treat North Korea with enough respect; and South Korea's view lies somewhere in between. The United States' view gives the impression that it blames North Korea for the halt in the denuclearization process. If the reason why North Korea stopped implementing the agreement reached at the Six-Party Talks is due to problems inside North Korea, there is not much else that the other five member countries can do. If Kim Jong-il wants to develop nuclear weapons and missiles, display them as the great achievement of Kim Il-sung's family, pass on his power to his son Jong-un and establish succession, no carrots from the outside world will work. That is the weak point of Washington's view. China's perception is old-fashioned and cannot explain why North Korea has changed since last summer. It also wants to hold the United States accountable. Another well-informed source said the problem is that China hopes the current stalemate will continue. And South Korea's view, lying somewhere between the United States' and China's, can be said to be most realistic, because North Korea must have broken the Six-Party agreement and forged ahead with nuclear and missile development because of domestic reasons as well as outside factors. What's clear now is that North Korea's nuclear development has gained momentum. If not blocked, its stock of nuclear weapons and missiles could grow too large to cut back over the next six months or a year. We're then left with the unsavory situation of a major threat to the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and, from China's point of view, to China's national security. If China opposes North Korea's nuclear armament but does not participate in implementing measures to denuclearize it, China should be held responsible for playing the role of an onlooker. China maintains that it has no influence over North Korea, but no one believes that anymore. China's perception that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is better than its collapse goes against the progress of history. China must act to help thwart North Korea's nuclear ambitions before it is too late. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) THE DILEMMAS OF THE N. KOREAN PROBLEM (Chosun Ilbo, July 6, 2009, Page 30) By Columnist Kim Dae-joong We can assume three things about the North Korean nuclear problem. The most important one is that the regime will not abandon its nuclear weapons under any circumstances. This is all but accepted. The conditions the North has set forth for abandoning them are only for show, while the regime believes that it has survived only because of the nuclear development programs and that they are needed to ensure the hereditary rule of the Kim family. That means there is little to hope from the various approaches now under discussion such as the six-party denuclearization talks. The second assumption is that China has no intention of pressuring North Korea to the extent of threatening the survival of the regime. SEOUL 00001058 005 OF 010 Other parties, the United States in particular, have stressed China's role and expect Beijing will apply pressure on the North whenever the problem reaches an impasse. But Beijing does not want the North Korean regime to collapse. It does want Pyongyang to be more conciliatory and seek coexistence with its neighbors, but it cannot afford to abandon the North even if it fails to do so. China is naturally concerned about the enormous blow it would sustain if the North Korean regime crumbled and hundreds of thousands or millions of North Koreans escaped to its three northeastern provinces. And if the North Korean regime falls, Beijing will not tolerate a situation in which it shares borders with South Korea or the U.S. across the Apnok (or Yalu) and Duman (or Tumen) rivers. China intervened in the 1950-53 Korean War for the purpose of blocking the U.S. threat of advancing to Manchuria, and that purpose remains. The third postulation is that Washington will not permit the North to keep its nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The U.S. won't sit idle when rogue countries like North Korea have nuclear weapons but refuse to take responsibility for them. That is why it wants to discuss conditions while keeping the path to negotiations open, and that is why it is responding to Pyongyang's belligerent nuclear tests and missile launches with sanctions and diplomatic pressure. They may push Pyongyang over the brink. The question is if the U.S. is considering a military option as well. For now, the chances are nil. With the Iraq war fresh on its mind and the situation in Afghanistan becoming more difficult and costly, the U.S. cannot afford another front against the North. North Korea knows this. It keeps test-firing missiles in the wake of its second nuclear test to achieve recognition as a nuclear power at home and abroad, taking advantage of the U.S. dilemma. The North is also aware that Beijing, though it outwardly backs the UN sanctions, will not finally abandon the North, because it does not want a Northeast Asia without the buffer of North Korea. That is another reason why Pyongyang continues the nuclear game. It believes that both Washington and Beijing have their hands tied. But what is it the South can assume about the North? For one thing, the South lives with the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons over its head. In a situation where the North will not give up its nuclear weapons and the global powers are unable to force it, South Korea can do almost nothing on its own. If we are to escape being hit by the North's nuclear weapons, we have to do whatever the North wants. Living a life of humiliation, giving the North Korean regime money, food and whatever else it wants, regarding them as a "peace insurance," as a former president said. Buying peace with a lump sum may be tolerable, but being held hostage indefinitely would be unbearable. Another assumption is that escape from such captivity would mean paying a high military price. This is the most dangerous assumption. If sanctions from Washington and Beijing really bite, the North may well seek a way out in military retaliation against the South. In that case, the South will have to confront the North's military provocations head-on. But there is a variable, namely a change inside the North Korean regime, and a subsequent shift in the perception of North Koreans. An abrupt change in the North Korean leadership linked to Kim Jong-il's health, undercover political struggles within the leadership and new perceptions of the population will no doubt shake the North's system enormously. This is the most interesting factor. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) ARMS ARE NOT THE ANSWER (JoongAng Ilbo, July 6, 2009, Page 42) SEOUL 00001058 006 OF 010 North Korea is persisting with its brinkmanship strategy, but the effective value of that strategy ends here. It believes that it will get what it wants through its nuclear tests and missile launches or the use of provocative language. Its launch of seven Scud-type missiles on July 4 is a prime example of that. Meanwhile, the international community, including Korea and the United States, has differed in the approach to North Korea, as the North appears poised to apply its past success to present strategy. The recent missile launch, conducted on America's Independence Day, was aimed at attracting the attention of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama. However, the U.S. flatly ignored it. There was not even a comment from the White House or the Department of State. Although President Obama mentioned the Iranian nuclear issue at his Independence Day speech, he did not say a word about the North Korean issue. Instead, the Obama administration is tightening the reins by taking steps to enforce the sanctions against North Korea. Obama has even emphasized that tougher action on North Korea may be taken. Meanwhile, the State Department said the tests were "not helpful" and that North Korea should "fulfill its international obligations and commitments." A special task force that traveled to China to enlist its help in applying the sanctions is known to have investigated suspicious North Korean bank accounts in Malaysia. Of course, North Korea will withstand the hardships the sanctions impose, because it has maintained an independent economy while becoming increasingly isolated from the international community for more than six decades. And because China, which is worried about American influence on the Korean Peninsula, is not likely to be willing to cut back on the assistance it provides to North Korea, North Korea is likely to escape the worst effects of its isolation. The question is whether the leaders in Pyongyang will get what they want, despite the hardships they must endure, by resorting to arms. The answer is no. As long as North Korea is a nuclear weapons state, normalizing its relationship with the U.S. is nearly unthinkable. We are at a loss to explain how they can continue to endure international isolation and substandard economic conditions. Will North Korea leave the matter of protecting its citizens' welfare unresolved for years to come? The North's recent acts of bellicosity seem to be related to its succession concerns, but the North should change its way of thinking and pay more attention to its citizens' welfare. It should turn the money it spends on missile launches into a fund to feed its people. (We have compared the English version on the website with the Korean version and added some sentences to make them identical.) ¶N. KOREA'S MISSILE LAUNCHES REQUIRE A CALM RESPONSE (Chosun Ilbo, July 6, 2009, Page 31) North Korea on Saturday fired seven missiles into the East Sea from a launch site near Wonsan, Kangwon Province. They are said to be of the Scud C variety with a maximum range of 500 km, new Scuds with a range of 1,000 km, and a Rodong missile that can hit targets 1,300 km away. Last Thursday, North Korea fired four KN short-range missiles at a launch site near Hamhung. It has launched 18 missiles so far this year, including the long-range rocket launched on April ¶5. Seoul estimates North Korea spent US$700-800 million on these provocations this year, with $300-400 million spent on the nuclear test, $300 million on the long-range rocket launch, $4 million to fire each Scud missile and $10 million to fire each Rodong missile. The South Korean government and the World Food Programme estimate that North Korea suffers from a shortage of a little under 1 million tons of food each year. By last summer's prices on the international markets, it costs around $300 million to buy 1 million tons of food. The money North Korea spent on its nuclear test and missile launches in the first half of this year is enough to cover two years worth of food shortages. The North was attempting to show off its military might by firing SEOUL 00001058 007 OF 010 seven missiles on July 4, America's Independence Day. It also fired seven missiles, including a long-range missile, on July 4 2006. Just after being inaugurated early this year, U.S. President Barack Obama proposed dialogue with North Korea, but he recently said he wants to break the previous pattern of rewarding North Korea's provocations, shifting direction in favor of sanctions and pressure. In response, North Korea has embarked on a series of missile tests that demonstrate its ability to hit South Korea and Japan. Obama warned recently that Washington could implement further sanctions, in addition to those provided in a UN Security Council resolution, while appointing Philip Goldberg as a special envoy handling the U.S. sanctions. Goldberg traveled to China to seek Beijing's support for the UN sanctions and to Malaysia to negotiate the freezing of suspected North Korean accounts there. The standoff between Washington and Pyongyang is expected to continue. Through a recent series of missile launches, Pyongyang showed that it has succeeded in improving its missile technology, and if Pyongyang wants, its missiles are now accurate enough to hit major facilities in the ROK. North Korea could aggravate the situation further by staging military provocations against the ROK or conducting a third nuclear test. There are rumors that North Korea is in the midst of a power transfer from Kim Jong-il to his third son Jong-un after the North Korean leader fell ill last summer, highlighting mounting uncertainties within the regime. Some rumors say military hawks have surrounded the North Korean leader. The South Korean government has no choice for now but to focus on international cooperation to stop the North. At the same time, Seoul must be meticulous in gathering intelligence about North Korea, while preparing detailed responses to specific provocations by the communist country. The key is to make accurate predictions and handle the situation calmly. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) ¶N. KOREA'S MISSILE LAUNCHES ONLY WORSENS CHANCES FOR DIALOGUE (Hankyoreh Shinmun, July 6, 2009, Page 27) North Korea launched a group of seven short-range missiles Saturday. It was a continuation of Tuesday's show of military force when it fired four missiles that flew short ranges of less than 100km. Defense officials are presuming the latest missiles to be either Scud or Rodong-type missiles whose firing range has been reduced to 400 kilometers and 500 kilometers. Up until now, North Korea has occasionally fired surface-to-air or surface-to-ship missiles, but this launch of surface-to-surface missiles is the first since July 2006. Then, as now, the atmosphere of confrontation between North Korea and the U.S. was at its height, and North Korea launched seven Rodong and Scud-class missiles, including one long-range Taepodong-2, during the U.S. Independence Day holiday. Unlike then, however, North Korea did not fire a long-range missile this time. This latest launch is being interpreted as an attempt by North Korea to strengthen its military deterrence ability amid a situation of confrontation, while demonstrating the political determination of not bowing to the pressure of sanctions by the international community. In addition, North Korea's scud missiles can strike all ROK regions and part of Japan and therefore are apparently aimed at the ROK and Japan, which lead the hard-line moves against North Korea. North Korea timed its missile launches to coincide with the U.S. Independence Day but did not fire long-range missiles that can provoke the U.S. in order to sound out U.S. intentions. However, if pressure against North Korea grows more severe, there is also a possibility that North Korea might escalate tensions to levels it has previously warned of with the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile or with an additional nuclear test. Whenever SEOUL 00001058 008 OF 010 pressure against it has strengthened, North Korea's response has been to resolve the problem through a show of force. These missile launches, however, are an act of provocation in contravention to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1817 and 1874, which demand that North Korea cease all activity related to ballistic missiles. Even China and Russia, nations that have friendly relations with North Korea, have said that the country must stop engaging in any measures that might harm stability in Northeast Asia. This can be read as an indirect expression of dissatisfaction with North Korea's recent short-range missile launch activities. North Korea must stop engaging in activities that worsen the situation and bring about its own isolation. Also, the nations participating in the six-party talks, including South Korea and the U.S., and the international community must leave behind their ineffective hardline policy focused entirely on sanctions and seek out a plan to resolve the issue substantially through dialogue as soon as possible. With the U.S. government not yet having presented a picture of its North Korea policy, the role the South Korean government plays is particularly important. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) NUCLEAR REPROCESSING FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES (Dong-a Ilbo, July 3, 2009, Page 31) Foreign Minister Yoo Myung-hwan said yesterday, "There is a need to revise the nuclear agreement between (South) Korea and the United States for a short period of time." He was trying to say that Seoul will negotiate with Washington to allow reprocessing of leftover material at nuclear power plants at a time when South Korea needs more nuclear power to cope with climate change and high oil prices. South Korea abandoned nuclear reprocessing in 1974 under a nuclear agreement with the United States, but some have continued to press for a revision of the bilateral accord. Now seems like the right time to revise the agreement in a way that brings economic and industrial benefits under the basic principle of "peaceful use." The revision process is expected to start in 2012, two years before the agreement expires. More than 10,000 tons of nuclear fuel have been produced in South Korea from 20 nuclear power plants. The country will run out of storage room for such material by 2016. The plants use 4,000 tons of uranium per year and produce 700 tons of fuel. If reprocessed, 94.4 percent of the spent fuel can be recycled as an energy source, which is both economically and environmentally helpful. To achieve "peaceful nuclear sovereignty," Seoul needs recognition from the international community about nuclear reprocessing. Washington is said to be opposed to the revision. U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Rep. Ellen Tauscher, said in a paper submitted to Congress that the U.S. cannot allow South Korea and Taiwan to conduct nuclear reprocessing, a right which the U.S. has given to the European Union, India and Japan. The 1992 inter-Korean declaration on denuclearization, however, was an inevitable measure to stop North Korea's nuclear development. It is a declaration that has lost its effectiveness in the wake of Pyongyang's second nuclear test and declaration as a nuclear country. Of course, South Korea is suspected of wanting to arm itself at a time when North Korea is showing its nuclear ambition. So Seoul must persuade the international community that it has no plan to use nuclear power as a weapon, only for peaceful purposes. South Korea, which has 20 nuclear power plants, is the world's fifth-largest producer of nuclear energy and ranks sixth in terms of safe management of nuclear material. . Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, all member nations must guarantee the use of nuclear power SEOUL 00001058 009 OF 010 for peaceful purposes. Even Japan, which bans the manufacturing, retention and import of nuclear weapons under its "peace" constitution, has reprocessing facilities for nuclear waste. Japan was one of the villains of World War II, so it is unfair for South Korea to be continually banned from reprocessing nuclear fuel. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) TREAD CAREFULLY ON NUCLEAR PACT (JoongAng Ilbo, July 4, 2009, Page 34) Speaking to international and local press, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said that South Korea should revise its nuclear power accord with the United States in the near future to incorporate its commercial needs for supplying and reprocessing nuclear fuel. In sum, the country is looking to get back its rights to complete the nuclear fuel cycle through the self-enrichment of uranium and the recycling or reprocessing of used nuclear fuel. The basic direction is right; however, a more prudent approach seems necessary in handling this type of matter. Economically speaking, completion of the nuclear fuel cycle makes sense for the Republic of Korea, which is the fifth-largest commercial nuclear energy producer in the world. After all, 40 percent of the nation's electricity comes from nuclear reactors. According to the pact with the United States in 1974, South Korea cannot domestically enrich uranium and reprocess used nuclear fuel without the consent of Washington. The pact was meant to ease concerns over the potential military use of nuclear power. Korea has the technology and know-how to design nuclear plants and make nuclear fuel, but it must import nuclear fuel, which costs a huge amount of money. The country also must dump waste from 700 tons of nuclear fuel - generated from 20 reactors - in water tanks due to the ban on recycling. Waste levels have already reached 10,000 tons and will overwhelm storage capacity by 2016. Thus, recovering our peaceful nuclear sovereignty makes sense when viewed only from the economic side. Furthermore, renegotiating the terms of the pact is necessary anyhow, as the current agreement with the United States expires in 2014. Still, it is not desirable for the government to publicly declare the need for Korea to be able to reprocess nuclear fuel. North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests, nullifying the 1992 inter-Korean agreement to keep the peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless South Korea's call for completing the nuclear cycle leaves a lot of room for misunderstanding. It could trigger a diplomatic collision with Washington, as the U.S. State Department has already publicly voiced opposition to changes to the existing pact. So the argument to opposing the United States might lead to conflict. To attain sovereignty in the commercial use of nuclear power, we need to gain trust from the international community first, as Japan did. The government should not join the populist cry for nuclear deterrence out of impulse. Discretion is most desired in perilous times. (This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is identical to the Korean version.) NORTH KOREA GOING ON ITS OWN ROAD (Hankook Ilbo, July 6, 2009, Page 35) North Korea reaffirmed its intention to go its own way by launching seven short-range missiles off its eastern coast on July 4. The modified Scud missiles and Rodong missiles that the North test-fired are weapons targeting the ROK and U.S. forces in Japan. The North flaunted its "self-defense striking power against any possible invasion" once again. Pyongyang also seems to have intended to improve its missile accuracy. We should calmly figure out North Korea's true intention and cope with it appropriately. SEOUL 00001058 010 OF 010 The ROK military and government were right to closely track the missiles and analyze their performance. Observers say that as shown by the fact that five of the seven missiles landed in the designated no-sail zone after travelling about 450 kilometers, missile accuracy has improved. In addition, observers speculate that considering the speed of three missiles, they are variants of Rodong missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers. This can be interpreted as meaning that, despite its saber-rattling, North Korea has no intention of ratcheting up tensions by firing a missile toward Japan. North Korea's missile launches, of course, constitute a blatant defiance of the UN Security Council Resolution. This is why Japan, China, Russia, the U.K., and France strongly condemned the North for its provocations. However, it is noteworthy that the U.S. disregarded (North Korea's provocations) without any public comment. Some observers say that the U.S. took this attitude in order not to be embroiled in North Korea's attention-grabbing strategy, but it may be more accurate to say that Washington's ignorance is designed to keep the focus of its strategic game with North Korea on the nuclear issue by not responding to every short-range missile launch. The U.S. is pressuring the North more strongly than expected. The key is to choke off revenue to North Korea by banning its arms export and blocking its overseas financial transactions. In the past, too, when dealing with a nuclear-possessing state like the North, the U.S. focused its efforts on implementing economic sanctions and preventing nuclear proliferation. The Obama Administration is taking the same line. In light of this, it is not desirable for us to put too much emphasis on a security crisis and military readiness. On the other hand, it is also reckless to worry about the possibility of the ROK being alienated from any future U.S.-North Korea talks and only criticize the ROKG. For quite a while, the North will go its own way, and the U.S. will continue to apply pressure on the North. Therefore, we need to wait for any further developments in a resolute and calm manner. ROK-EU FTA SHOULD SERVE AS BENCHMARK FOR KORUS FTA (JoongAng Ilbo, July 6, 2009, Page 42; Excerpts) There is a growing possibility that the ROK and the EU will soon strike a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The successful conclusion of the ROK-EU FTA talks is expected to serve as a lever to make progress in the ROK-U.S. FTA, which is awaiting ratification after the conclusion of the negotiations between the two governments. If the benefits of the ROK-EU FTA become visible while no progress is made in the ROK-U.S. FTA, it will be difficult for the U.S. to drag its feet on the ratification of the deal any longer. The U.S. will also feel burdened by the fact that the ROK and the EU reached an agreement on the auto sector while the U.S. has been making an issue of it. If the ROK-EU FTA is reached and then quickly ratified, it will give the ROK some breathing room before the ROK-U.S. FTA is ratified. This is because the ROK, while benefiting from trade expansion with the EU through the FTA, can sit and watch the U.S.'s response. The ROK-EU FTA will also have a positive impact on the ROK's trade negotiations with China and Japan, which are currently at a standstill. STEPHENS