CHAD: FORMIN FAKI ON CHA-SUDAN DETENTE SEQUENCING, JEM/ARMS, AND JEM/DOH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTIO 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000530


STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
DOD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAINAND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MARR PUM SU LY CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FORMIN FAKI ON CHA-SUDAN DETENTE
SEQUENCING, JEM/ARMS, AND JEM/DOH

REF: A. NIGRO-AFC EMAIL 11/06

B. NDJAMENA 520

C. NDJAMENA 503

D. NDJAMENA 498

E. NDJAMENA 485

Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro, Jr, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Ambassador met one-on-one with FORMIN Moussa Faki
Mahamat on October 6. Faki said that the next
confidence-building step in the Chad-Sudan detente scenario,
drafted by Ghazi himself in Ndjamena October 10, was Sudan's
to make. Faki said that the Qataris had found JEM's Khalil
Ibrahim stubborn and recalcitrant about going to Doha along
with other Darfuri groups and negotiating seriously, as had
the GoC in its continuing similar talks with JEM. Responding
to Ambassador's question regarding reports the USG had heard
of "possible foreign arms sales to JEM," Faki replied that
the GOC was against the sale of arms to any groups in Chad,
including JEM, and that if the USG had any information about
such sales, he would like to be the recipient of that
information, because the GOC would act on it. The Ambassador
also raised the issues of child soldiers, elections in 2010,
and the KouroKouro high-security prison.


2. (C) Faki's response to Ambassador's question on foreign
arms sales to JEM was unsurprising. We should consider
carefully what action we might want to take in this regard,
as we recommended in Ref A. END SUMMARY.

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CHAD-SUDAN
BILATERAL PROCESS
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3. (C) Chad-Sudan Detente Process: Faki re-confirmed that
the GOC was waiting for the GOS to take the next
confidence-building measure, according to the scenario
drafted by Sudan envoy Ghazi himself in Ndjamena on October
10 and agreed to by President Deby and Faki at that time.
The sequence of confidence-building measures is: (I) GOS
cantons Chad rebels in Sudan a "considerable distance from
the Chad-Sudan border." (II) Chad welcomes Sudanese
representatives to verify on the spot that there are no JEM
bases in Chad. (III) Faki leads a GOC delegation to Khartoum.
(See Refs B-E and previous.)


4. (C) Dakar Accord Contact Group: Faki said the Libyans
had been talking about reviving the Dakar Accord Contact
Group, but that had preferred the bilateral path that Ghazi
had proposed and that Chad had accepted. Faki said that Chad
would be happy to see the Contact group function as
"observers" and "verifiers" of the bilateral process, either
in Khartoum or in Eastern Chad, or both, however.


5. (C) Faki said that Ghazi had promised Sudanese action on
the next step "within a week or so" of his visit to NDjamena,
but that now that nearly a month had gone by, the GOC was
again having its old doubted about Sudanese sincerity: Was
the GOS going thorough a complicated decision process or were
they just playing for time?

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DOHA/JEM
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6. (C) Faki said that the Qatari Prime Minister had met with
Khalil Ibrahim during his recent visit to Ndjamena to try to
convince JEM to drop its pretensions of being the only ones
who count in Darfur and to come to Doha to negotiate with the
rest of the interested actors. Faki said the Qataris found
JEM stubborn and recalcitrant about both propositions. Faki
said that the GOC continued to urge Khalil and the JEM to
cooperate with international efforts to find a peaceful
solution to Darfur through negotiation, but that JEM wasn't
listening very hard.

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JEM/ARMS SALES
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7. (C) Ambassador raised the issue of "possible foreign
arms sales to JEM." Faki asked what we knew. Ambassador said
"the USG had heard things." Faki replied that the GOC was
against the sale of arms to any groups in Chad, including
JEM. Faki emphasized that if the USG had any information
about such sales, he would like to be the recipient of that
information, because the GOC would act on it.

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DOMESTIC "CONFIDENCE
BUILDING MEASURES"
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8. (SBU) Ambassador told Faki that although domestic issues
were not the FORMIN's brief, certain "high profile" internal
issues were important for Chad's image within the
international community and affected the ability of some of
Chad's international friends and partners to "accompany Chad"
on a range of geo-political, economic, and strategic issues,
including civilian and military assistance issues. The
Ambassador urged the GOC to continue to collaborate closely
with the international community on child soldier and other
children's issues and to continue to move towards credible
elections in 2010. The Ambassador also recommended that the
GOC find ways of collaborating effectively with the ICRC on
the KouroKouro high-security prison, to allow access under
international norms, if requested through appropriate
channels to do so.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Faki's response to Ambassador's question on foreign
arms sales to JEM was unsurprising. We should consider
carefully what action we might want to take in this regard,
as we recommended in Ref A.


NIGRO