BOSNIA -- THE COMING END OF EUFOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000385 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019 TAGS: MARR PREL BK EUN SUBJECT: BOSNIA -- THE COMING END OF EUFOR REF: SARAJEVO 211 Classified By: Amb. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 5. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. We understand that the administration is planning a review of the U.S. and international profile in Bosnia. The Embassy would like to call Washington's attention to decision processes underway which will impact our ability to influence that profile. The civilian presence, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), reviewed by the just-concluded Peace Implementation Council (PIC) determined that OHR cannot close until predetermined conditions (the so-called 5 2 agenda) are met. The PIC meets again in June to again consider the renewal of OHR's mandate. As a PIC member, the United States can influence OHR's profile and tenure, including vetoing closure if we are convinced that it is premature. However, the international military presence -- the two-thousand-man EUFOR ALTHEA mission -- reports that it has concluded its military objectives in Bosnia, and believes that the need for its further contributions here are minimal. While a final decision on EUFOR's closure has been delayed because of recent EU high-level concerns about Bosnia's stability, there are practical movements on the ground that seem to presuppose, and perhaps predetermine, the decision to close sooner rather than later. If EUFOR closes, our automatic ability to intervene under its Chapter 7 authority will also end, OHR's effectiveness will be greatly undercut, and our options will significantly narrow. Post recommends that we raise concerns over EUFOR's stealth departure from Bosnia in contacts with senior EU officials on the margins of the Strasbourg and Prague summits. END SUMMARY. RUSH FOR THE EXIT -------------- ¶3. (C) There are increasing indications that EUFOR's ALTHEA mission will soon transform to a smaller, non-executive training mission, despite the fact that a political decision to that effect has not been made. EUFOR's Commander has determined that no military objectives remain in Bosnia. The one remaining aspect of Althea's mandate is to maintain a deterrent force to underpin support for the international community, specifically the Office of the High Representative (OHR). How long that function is necessary is a political decision that rests with the member states. However, the lack of military objectives has weakened support among the member states for maintaining the mission, and the decision to reduce EUFOR's size may ultimately be determined by unilateral withdrawals of contributing nations. Military leaders in EUFOR point to the desire of European nations, notably France, Spain and Finland, to draw down deployed forces in Bosnia and reduce the EU military footprint. (NOTE: In parallel, USAREUR is taking practical steps to dismantle key U.S. facilities collocated with EUFOR/NATO HQ on Camp Butmir. While this is understandable, it may increase the Bosnian perception of an imminent withdrawal by the international military presence. END NOTE.) GIVING UP EUFOR'S EXECUTIVE MANDATE -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite its limited operational capacity, EUFOR plays a vital role as the military deterrence against the prospect of destabilizing action. It also has over-the-horizon forces it can call upon in a crisis. EUFOR has prepared a Concept of Operation (CONOP) to transform to a non-executive 200 person force dedicated to training, capacity building and performing selected Joint Military Affairs (JMA) tasks currently under EUFOR's executive mandate. EUFOR's existing UN Chapter 7 mandate expires November 21, 2009. D/SACEUR McColl briefed the PIC Steering Board March 26 that the EU likely would not seek a new Chapter 7 mandate for the downsized training mission. This means, absent bilateral Bosnian authorization, the EU would have no legal basis to intervene militarily in response to renewed violence. Given that the likely reason for intervention would be ethnic strife, obtaining consensus for such an authorization within Bosnia's three-member Presidency which represents Bosnia's three ethnic groups would be virtually impossible. If EUFOR no longer has its executive mandate after November 2009, a question arises whether NATO still retains the right to militarily intervene in Bosnia based on its Dayton Annex 1b authorities. SARAJEVO 00000385 002 OF 002 COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶5. (C) While EUFOR has not had to directly intervene to restore order in Bosnia, its presence is understood as the military backing behind OHR's executive mandate, and plays an important deterrent role against possible destabilizing acts. In light of the current political stalemate in Bosnia, a scenario where Bosnia's domestic forces are unable or unwilling to keep the peace is not beyond the realm of possibility. Withdrawing EUFOR will send exactly the wrong political message at this time of heightened ethnic tension -- that despite its rhetoric of enhanced EU engagement in Bosnia, it is in fact disengaging. That this decision is being taken without consulting non-EU PIC countries is also disturbing. ACTION REQUEST: Embassy recommends that Washington principals raise in upcoming meetings with EUofficials U.S. concerns over the unilateral draw don of EU troops and to discourage any possible deision to relinquish EUFOR's chapter 7 mandate. e also ask that Washington instruct US NATO to snsitize allies to the potential implications forNATO of EUFOR's drawdown and transition to a non-executive mandate. END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST. ENGLISH