BOSNIA - FUTURE OF THE EUFOR ALTHEA MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000211 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR EUN BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - FUTURE OF THE EUFOR ALTHEA MISSION Classified By: Amb. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In separate meetings, February 10 and 13, Per Normark, Political Military Advisor to the EUFOR Commander, and EUFOR Chief of Staff Brigadier General Wundrak previewed for us EUFOR's upcoming reports to the EU Military Committee, February 23, and to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) March 3, in preparation for a discussion on the future of EUFOR Althea at the March 16 GAERC. The report will state that EUFOR's "Dayton duties" have been accomplished, and that no military objectives remain in Bosnia. The report will also outline a Concept of Operation (CONOP) to transform EUFOR to a smaller training mission without executive competencies. EUFOR's recommendation will be not to ask for a new executive mandate in Bosnia when the current one expires in November, and instead negotiate a SOFA with Bosnia for the follow-on training presence. END SUMMARY. EUFOR: NO MILITARY OBJECTIVES REMAIN -------------- ¶2. (C) Wundrak and Normark told us that they will report that EUFOR's presence is no longer needed to ensure a safe and secure environment in Bosnia. That objective, they said, has been accomplished. Reform of the defense and intelligence sectors has been a success, Normark told us, and EUFOR considers domestic security forces capable of providing a secure environment. EUFOR has turned over to state level ministries all but one of its executive competencies, including control of military movements, airspace control, control of ammunition storage sites, and inspection of defense industry factories. The remaining competency, control over the movement of civilian weapons, has not been transferred because the parliament has failed to pass a law that would adequately regulate the competency at the state level. Passage of the law has been blocked by the Serbs who argue (wrongly) that the legislation requires a competency transfer from the entities to the state, which they oppose. Wundrak and Normark said that EUFOR has not yet decided how it will deal with this executive function should the political stalemate in parliament continue as expected. EUFOR: OUR ONLY PURPOSE IS POLITICAL -------------- ¶3. (C) The one remaining purpose of Althea, they told us, is to maintain a deterrent force to underpin support for the international community, specifically the Office of the High Representative (OHR). How long that function is necessary is a political decision that rests with the member states, Normack said. However, the lack of military objectives has weakened support among the member states for maintaining the mission. They are reluctant to keep 2,500 troops idle in Bosnia, and see little use for EUFOR's Liaison and Observation Teams dispersed across Bosnia. The French, Finns, and Spanish, Wundrak said, are planning to withdraw their troops this summer. So even if EU Member States do not reach consensus on closing EUFOR, it is unclear who would contribute troops to maintain the current level for the current mission. A EUFOR TRAINING MISSION -------------- ¶4. (C) The EUFOR Commander will recommend a transition of EUFOR to a smaller training mission without executive functions. What kind of mission is uncertain, said Wundrak and Normark. They have approached the Ministry of Defense to ask what kind of training the military would like, and the Ministry was unable to give them clear answers. They also acknowledged the need to cooperate with other missions giving training and support to the Armed Forces, including the United States which has an assistance program administered in country by MPRI. COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) While EUFOR has not had to directly intervene to restore order in Bosnia, it nevertheless has a significant impact on the perceived security environment in Bosnia. Although it is unlikely that EUFOR would be called on to bolster order in Bosnia, it is not impossible. In light of the current political stalemate in Bosnia, it is becoming all too easy to imagine scenarios where the current trends continue and lead to further destabilization of the country. Withdrawing EUFOR will send exactly the wrong political message at this time of heightened nationalist rhetoric -- that Bosnia is moving forward and that the international community can now afford to pay less attention. It will likely increase the feeling of insecurity in particular among the Bosniaks who believe the international community is making a precipitous withdrawal. For the end of EUFOR's executive mandate to come at the same time as the likely closure of OHR will reinforce the perception that EUSR will begin its mandate a weak institution, rather than with all the EU common foreign and defense policy tools at its disposal. That this decision is being taken without consulting non-EU PIC countries is also disturbing. ENGLISH