BOSNIA: HIGHREP EXTENDS MANDATE OF INTERNATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001387 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, S/WCI, EUR/ACE, INL, INR DEPT OF JUSTICE FOR OPDAT (ALEXANDRE) OSD FOR BEIN NSC FOR HOVENIER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM KJUS ASEC BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: HIGHREP EXTENDS MANDATE OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS, UNLEASHES POLITICAL FIRESTORM REF: A. SARAJEVO 922 ¶B. SARAJEVO 732 ¶C. SARAJEVO 689 ¶D. SARAJEVO 679 ¶E. SARAJEVO 515 ¶F. SARAJEVO 1253 Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) HighRep Valentin Inzko, supported by the Steering Board Ambassadors of the Peace Implmentation Council (PIC), on December 14 used his Bonn Powers to extend for three years the mandate of international judges and prosecutors working on war crimes cases at the State Court and the State Prosecutor's Office. His decision generated a firestorm among Bosnia's political parties. On one hand, Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik called for a referendum on the HighRep's decision and verbally attacked state-level judicial institutions and OHR. On the other, Bosniak parties have accused the HighRep and the international community of caving in to Dodik's "blackmail" by not including an extension for those working on organized crime, corruption, and terrorism cases. End summary. Inzko to PIC: I Will Impose a Partial Extension -------------- -- ¶2. (C) During a special three-and-a-half hour December 13 session of the Peace Implementation Council's Steering Board Ambassadors, HighRep Valentin Inzko shared his plans to amend the laws on the State Court and the State Prosecutor's Office to extend for three years the mandate of the internationals working on war crimes (both first instance and appeals level),but not organized crime cases (See Refs A-E). Inzko said he would require the Bosnian government to develop a transitional plan to permit full national control of the State Court and the State Prosecutor's Office. He added he would recommend that the internationals working on organized crime cases be allowed to remain as advisors. ¶3. (C) In explaining the reasons for different treatment between war crimes and organized crime, Inzko explained that he had reached this decision given the broad consensus on war crimes, and the lack of a consensus on organized crime. He referred to the support for an extension on the war crimes �00A;side by ICTY President Patrick Robinson and Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, who advocated for an extension most recently in his December 3 address to the UN Security Council. He also said that the trans-border dimension of war crimes and Bosnia's ICTY obligations served as the basis for the extension on war crimes, but that a similar case could not be made for the organized crime side. Russia Wanted a More Limited Mandate and Turkey Objected -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Most of the PIC quickly came to a consensus. The Russian Ambassador said his government supported a one-year extension for war crimes cases, but would not object to Inzko's decision. The Turkish Ambassador stated that, based on instructions he had received just ten minutes prior to the start of the meeting, his government advocates an extension on both war crimes and organized crime and, as a result, initially objected to the consensus decision. HighRep Inzko's Press Conference Devolves Into a Circus -------------- -------------- ¶5. (U) The following day (December 14),HighRep Inzko, flanked by all of the Steering Board Ambassadors, announced his decision at a press conference. He explained that he had acted to ensure that Bosnia would be able to meet its obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Failure to extend the mandate of the internationals working on war crimes, he said, could have serious consequences for ongoing trials, would jeopardize cases, endanger ICTY's close-out strategy and require witness SARAJEVO 00001387 002 OF 004 to testify in new trials. He added that he had been assured by national officials that work on organized crime cases would not be put on a back burner. Following his remarks, Ambassador -- along with the ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden, and the head of the European Commission Delegation -- expressed support for Inzko's decision. Notably, the Russian ambassador stated that his government does not support use of the Bonn Powers but had made an exception in this case due to the importance and sensitive nature of war crimes cases, and that it had wanted a year-long extension but was outvoted by other PIC member states. ¶6. (SBU) Following these remarks, the press conference devolved into a circus. Journalists began shouting questions at HighRep Inzko, with many showing contempt and disdain for him. The types of questions journalists hurled at Inzko included: -- BNTV (Serb)" How are you going to impose this decision in light of the RSNA's rejection of all further HighRep's decisions? How do you explain the need for international judges and prosecutors in light of the Tuzlanska Kolona decision? -- RTRS (Serb): What is the message to Serbs in light of the Bradina case (in which 88 Serb civilians were killed)? What is the point of having internationals if 88 civilian deaths is not considered a crime? -- Dani (Bosniak): The Dani representative cynically "congratulated" Inzko's "courageous decision," saying that in July internationals were begging loudly for a decision to extend the internationals on both war crimes and organized crime cases but now the PIC had no courage. Now they have the courage to take decisions containing the wishes of Dodik. -- Hayat (Bosniak): How will you make wishes come true for Dodik next time? -- Federation (Bosniak): Will you be honest and admit you caved in to Dodik? Ambassadors Issue a Statement Backing HighRep Inzko -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) On the same day, the PIC Ambassadors issued a public statement in support of HighRep Inzko's use of the Bonn Powers with regard to international judges and prosecutors. The statement stressed that the decision was taken to ensure that Bosnia would meet its ICTY obligations, that the Bosnian government needed to work toward a transition to full national control of the State Court and the State Prosecutor's Office, and that the time had come for Bosnia to assume full responsibility for the prosecution of organized crime and corruption cases. The statement included (a rather benign) footnote noting that Turkey supports Inzko's decision with regard to war crimes, but would have preferred to have internationals assume an executive function on organized crimes cases as well. The full text of the statement can be found at: http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content id=44274. ¶8. (C) Inzko later confided to the Ambassador that he had spoken to Dodik immediately following the press conference to ask him to accept the extension of the internationals but that Dodik had refused, essentially saying that all bets were off in light of the Tuzlanska Kolona decision. (Note: On December 11, the State Prosecutor's Office announced it had decided to cease its investigation against ten suspects for the attack against a Yugoslav Army convoy in Tuzla in 1992 due to a lack of evidence. The State Prosecutor's Office can re-open its investigation against the ten suspects if new evidence surfaces. It can also can investigate other suspects connected to the case. End Note.) Ambassador called the Russian Ambassador that evening to thank him for supporting the HighRep's decision and to urge him to call Dodik and to walk him back from his hard-line, emotional response to the decision. The Russian ambassador noted that he had tried to reach Dodik, without success: Dodik in fact avoided contact throughout December 14. Dodik's Public Reactions -------------- SARAJEVO 00001387 003 OF 004 ¶9. (U) Dodik held a press conference on the evening of December 14 in which he rejected Inzko's decision regarding international judges and prosecutors. He announced that the RS government would hold a special session to reject this and other decisions handed down by Inzko (including one on Mostar). He also said that he would ask the RS National Assembly to "confirm its previous decision on a referendum," so that "RS citizens can decide whether they are willing to continue to accept this legal abuse from the High Representative." Dodik called on Bosniaks and Croats to join with Serbs to eliminate "tyranny and legal violence of the Office of the High Representative and other international institutions." Dodik also questioned the legal basis by which the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) was established and said that the RS government would ask for support to be withdrawn from the HJPC (which, ironically, is run by an ethnic Serb). RS Government Releases Problematic Conclusions -------------- - ¶10. (SBU) Also on the evening of December 14, the RS Government held a session in which it adopted a 28-point position -- clearly drafted language in advance -- laying out its objections to the use of the Bonn Powers by the HighRep and more specifically, against the extension of the mandate of international judges and prosecutors. It claimed that the HighRep's decision is an attempt to negate the state-level Parliament's decision to reject the extension of the internationals' mandate and accused the internationals of selectively pursuing war crimes cases against ethnic Serbs and Croats. It also resolved to seek support from the RSNA for a referendum. Other Reactions -------------- ¶11. (U) Inzko's decision has been criticized by all other political parties to one degree or another irrespective of ethnicity. The Bosniak parties claimed that the decision gave a free reign to those engaged in organized crime. The Party for BiH (SBiH) declared that "all those involved in crime and targeted by the BiH Prosecutor's investigations and all those who plan to commit crimes can sleep peacefully." The Party for Democratic Action (SDA) accused the international community of complying with RS blackmail. The Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) 1990 struck a similar chord, saying that the IC had capitulated to the RS. Other Serb parties -- both Party for Democratic Progress (PDP) and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) -- rejected the HighRep's decision; PDP termed the decision "scandalous," while SDS said it proved that BiH is not a sovereign state and shared its expectation that Dodik would call for a referendum. The media was also divided along predictable ethnic lines. Notably, the influential newsmagazine show "60 minutes," during its December 14 broadcast, blasted the international community for not extending the mandate of the internationals working on organized crime cases. The host claimed that with the decision, "Washington, Paris, Berlin, London, Moscow, and Rome do not wish for BiH to be a...country of the rule of law; and at the same time they created certain pre-conditions for the current political mafia to rule this country." Inzko Aggravates Tensions -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) HighRep Inzko awkwardly contributed to the heightened political tensions that have ensued by commenting on the potential for an RS referendum in the Sarajevo-based daily Dnevni Avaz on December 15. Inzko was reported as saying that he was "deeply convinced that there will not be a referendum" in the RS about his decisions. If a referendum takes place, "perhaps only 50-60 percent of those who participate who would support the RS Government's position, but that it remained questionable whether there would be a good turnout." Inzko 's injudicious comments created an opening for Dodik to further heighten his rhetoric in response. Dodik Sends Mixed Signals on Referendum SARAJEVO 00001387 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶13. (U) Subsequently, Dodik has been sending out mixed signals about the possibility of a referendum. Dodik contradicted earlier assertions, saying that there is no need for a referendum since HighRep Inzko's decision has been rejected by the RS and that referendums should meet international requirements. He has also asserted that the Central Election Commission, not the RS, holds voter lists, and that a referendum law might be blocked by Croats or Bosniaks in the RS Council of Peoples. If that is the case, the issue would have to be ruled on by the RS Constitutional Court. At the same time, Dodik has reportedly said that "we need to start training people" for the possibility of a referendum, and that his party will ask for a referendum as soon as technical conditions are met. In a December 16 interview with SRNA, Dodik said that the HighRep's decision would not be published in the Official Gazette of the RS (the RS is not required to do so since the decision amends state-level and not RS legislation),nor will RS officials respect or observe the decisions. At the same time, Dodik has continued with his rhetorical attacks on the State Court, the State Prosecutor's Office, and the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC). Comment -------------- ¶14. (C/NF) Dodik's use of unfortunately-timed decision by the State Prosecutor's Office to close the investigation against suspects in the Tuzlanska Kolona case was a case of clear political opportunism. Even if the decision in the Tuzlanska Kolona case had not occurred, he would have found some excuse to react as he did. Dodik's subsequent public statements suggest that he may be walking back his initial emotional response to the extension, but the threat is still there. Even without a referendum (for now),the issue of his challenge to the HighRep's decisions and state-level judicial institutions remain. We will continue to work closely with HighRep Inzko and members of the international community to demonstrate public support for the judiciary and to bring Dodik back from this precipice. ENGLISH