SCENESETTER FOR EUCOM ADMIRAL STAVRIDIS TRIP TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SARAJEVO 001008 NOFORN SIPDIS FROM AMBASSADOR ENGLISH FOR SACEUR/EUCOM ADMIRAL STAVRIDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PGOV OVIP BK SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUCOM ADMIRAL STAVRIDIS TRIP TO BANJA LUKA, COMBINED ENDEAVOR 2009 Classified By: AMB. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. I am delighted that you will join us in a visit to Combined Endeavor 2009 in Banja Luka, Bosnia, September 17. Your visit is a great opportunity to stress the U.S. commitment to helping Bosnia on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration. The fact that Combined Endeavor is taking place in Bosnia is viewed as a big achievement by Bosnia's defense establishment. That it is happening in Banja Luka, the capital of the ethnically-Serb Republika Srpska -- where suspicions of NATO and the international community run highest -- is even more significant. During your visit, I hope you will have the opportunity to raise the following with Bosnia's Tri-Presidency and defense leaders: -- Thank them for hosting CE 09 and tell them we are committed to maintaining a strong, visible U.S. - Bosnia bilateral military relationship in support of Bosnia's future in NATO; -- Encourage Bosnia's proposed contribution to ISAF; -- Praise Bosnia's NATO aspirations, but caution that Bosnia is only at the beginning of the road to NATO membership, a membership that must be earned by implementing fundamental political reforms necessary to prove that Bosnia can be a productive member of the alliance; -- Compliment Bosnia's leaders on the success of defense reform, but stress that the good news is now old news, and Bosnia needs to complete the defense reform agenda (including solving defense property issues) and create a state with central institutions that are strong enough to progress towards NATO integration. You should expect questions (from the Serbs) about former SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's recent comments that Bosnia must have constitutional reform to get into NATO, and (from Bosniaks) about NATO's continued presence and Chapter 7 mandate in Bosnia following the drawdown of EUFOR ALTHEA. END SUMMARY. Political Climate Has Stalled the Reform Program -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Accession to NATO and the EU are the two unifying goals of a divided Bosnia. Bosnia made institutional progress towards both last summer when it began Intensified Dialogue with NATO and signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. Despite this formal progress, Bosnia continues to move from one political crisis to another. There has been little real progress towards Bosnia's putative goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, which is the cornerstone of our strategy for ensuring that Bosnia's still-deep ethnic divides do not become a source of political instability or conflict in the region. The political climate has continued to deteriorate into a stalemate between competing levels of government bolstered by competing demands of Bosnia's separate ethnic groups. Bosnian Serbs continue to block or even roll back necessary reforms at the state level and talk openly about secession of the Republika Srpska entity from Bosnia. Bosnian Croats call for the creation of a third entity. Many Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) still argue for constitutional reforms that would abolish the Republika Srpska. As political leaders focus their time and energy on the issues that destabilize and divide the country rather than on those that could bring it together, there has been little scope to reach meaningful agreements that will advance Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Republika Srpska -------------- ¶3. (C) The greatest danger to Bosnia is Bosnian Serb efforts to delegitimize and undermine the state. Prime Minister of Republika Srpska (RS) Milorad Dodik, with whom you will have the chance to speak following the ceremony, is effectively blocking and rolling back the reforms that prompted the EU and NATO to grant Bosnia closer cooperation. His aim appears to be -- at a minimum -- to restore to the RS the level of autonomy it enjoyed at the end of the 1992-1995 war, which would greatly weaken the state and ultimately result in its SARAJEVO 00001008 002 OF 005 collapse. It is no coincidence that RS leaders have also been the loudest advocate for drawing down the international community's presence in Bosnia. They are pushing strongly for the closure of Office of the High Representative which exercises when necessary an executive governorship over Bosnia. While Dodik and other important RS politicians ostensibly support NATO accession for Bosnia and their public and private statements both reflect that support, nevertheless statements of minority politicians, articles in RS papers, statements from nationalist fringe elements and independent polling suggest that there are more doubts about Bosnia's NATO future in the RS than in Bosnia as a whole. NATO Aspirations: Substance Matters -------------- ¶4. (C) Most Bosnians believe NATO membership is necessary for their country's long-term peace and prosperity, and many believe it within reach. The government's stated objective is a Membership Action Plan (MAP) this year, and some are hoping for an invitation to join NATO within two years after that. This overly optimistic prognosis is indicative of a broad lack of understanding of the implications and requirements of NATO membership. As a result, we are confronted with the delicate task of keeping the Bosnians motivated, while simultaneously injecting reality into the discussions. There has been little public discussion about what the path forward entails, particularly the necessity of reform across the board, including in civilian institutions. You will want to underscore to your interlocutors that NATO membership is earned, not gifted, and that this requires a sustained commitment to reforms across the board. SYG Comments on Constitutional Reform -------------- ¶5. (C) Former SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer caused a stir, especially among Bosnian Serb politicians, during his July visit by saying that constitutional reform would be necessary for Bosnia to join NATO. Your interlocutors may look to you to comment on this position. There is consensus within the international community and some local political actors that near-term constitutional reform is necessary, but there is no agreement on how best to accomplish it or how far it needs to go. You may remind them that Bosnia's NATO Partnership Action Plan (IPAP),adopted by their Council of Ministers, calls for constitutional reform as a part of their progress towards NATO. The failure of their decision-making structure under the current constitutional arrangement has had obvious consequences, including the embarrassing failure to stand up a mission to NATO and SHAPE until last year because of arguments over the ethnic make-up of the office. Anything that you can say about the need for constitutional reform to make Bosnia a credible candidate for NATO membership may add leverage to our efforts to begin the reform process. DEFENSE REFORM -------------- ¶6. (C) Defense reform remains one of the few success stories in Bosnia since Dayton -- but this good news is old news now. Since abolishing the two entity-level militaries and ministries of defense and creating a single state institution in their place in 2005, Bosnia has taken the first steps to create a unified, effective military. The government has developed a clear and direct ethnically-integrated command structure, and a legally consistent and transparent way to manage the transition of the Chief of Defense. All this required robust U.S. and NATO engagement, however, and the reform agenda has since stalled and remains incomplete. Infantry battalions remain mono-ethnic, which means the daily life has not changed for most soldiers since the unification of the armies. A Bosnian Serb infantry soldier, for example, will live in the RS, report for duty in the RS (probably guarding property the RS claims it owns),and report to and work with colleagues of his ethnicity. Property Issues Remain Critical -------------- ¶7. (C) The resolution of defense property issues is the most SARAJEVO 00001008 003 OF 005 important outstanding objective in completing the first stage of Bosnia's defense reforms and tying up the loose-ends of bringing the two armies together. It took robust U.S. engagement to ensure state-level ownership and control of Bosnia's excess wartime weapons and ammunition. Now they must overcome a politicized dispute between Serb and other officials over how to dispose of it. Most excess munitions remain where they had been as property of the former entity armies. Many, especially RS officials, seem to want to keep it there. An agreement on immovable property is also necessary to allow the Armed Forces to sell excess real estate and free its forces from the taxing burden of guarding excess sites. These two issues are, at U.S. insistence, one of the five objectives set by the Peace Implementation Council as a pre-condition for transitioning the executive-empowered Office of the High Representative to an advisory/hortatory European Special Representative. The Importance of NATO HQ -------------- ¶8. (C/NOFORN) The cooperative action of the United States and NATO HQ Sarajevo has been critical to the success of Bosnia's defense reform so far, and is equally critical to the future of our defense reform agenda. NATO's role in ending the war, and NATO HQ's success in forging a unified armed forces in Bosnia give it a credibility that EUFOR and European leadership in general lack in Bosnia. The EU is associated with their record during the 1992-1995 war, UNPROFOR, the failure of police reform, and the fact that EUFOR is openly pulling up stakes as the political situation in Bosnia deteriorates. Bosnians remember that it was NATO under U.S. command, and vigorous bilateral U.S. diplomacy, that ended the war in 1995. Keeping U.S. leadership at NATO HQ will maintain our ability to leverage NATO's influence in Bosnia and reduce the growing perception that the international community, including the United States, is heading for the back door. It is the staff at NATO HQ who wrote the Defense Law that integrated Bosnia's Armed Forces, the agreements that transferred weapons, ammunition and equipment from entity armies to a new Bosnian one, and who drafted important outstanding agreements that we must still push through Bosnia's government. It was the American NATO HQ Commander who went with me to successfully lobby for their adoption. The success of NATO HQ has largely been due to its American face. ¶9. (C/NOFORN) That is why I worked hard to bring back U.S. leadership of NATO HQ. I believe that if we want BiH to progress towards eventual NATO membership, NATO HQ must continue to provide hands-on support to the NATO accession process. I hope that we can count on your support for maintaining the presence of NATO HQ in Sarajevo, and under U.S. leadership. The creation of a single, multi-ethnic Armed Forces has always been a U.S.-led and resourced project and has laid the foundation for Bosnia's invitation to join Partnership for Peace, begin Intensified Dialogue, participate in the Multinational Force in Iraq, and contribute a deployment, we hope in the coming year, to ISAF. Finishing defense reform is critical to locking Bosnia on its Euro-Atlantic path, and American leadership, within NATO HQ's mandate, of defense reform is crucial. It is also in our overall interest to scotch any perception that the U.S. is reducing its military commitment to supporting the development of a strong and unified Bosnian military. Strong bilateral defense engagement, such as Combined Endeavor, helps dispel the image of the U.S. handing an incomplete Bosnia project to (ineffective) European leadership. Other high visibility exercises that require U.S. boots on the ground are crucial to maintaining the perception of U.S. commitment to stability in Bosnia. The Coming End of EUFOR -------------- ¶10. (C) Your visit comes as EUFOR's ALTHEA mission in Bosnia is drawing down. Although there has been no decision to change EUFOR's mission at the political level, many EU member states are withdrawing unilaterally, and EUFOR's leadership has prepared a Concept of Operation (CONOP) to transform to a 200 person force dedicated to training, capacity building and SARAJEVO 00001008 004 OF 005 performing selected Joint Military Affairs (JMA) tasks currently under EUFOR's executive mandate. The original CONOP called for EUFOR abandoning its UN Chapter 7 mandate when it expires November 21, 2009, although we understand this is being reconsidered. In any case, it seems there is little intention to keep the executive mandate after the closure of OHR. This would mean that EUFOR's presence here would be subject to a negotiated SOFA approved by all three Presidents. That would certianly exclude two important deterrent aspects EUFOR contributes now: the ability to intervene unilaterally in response to renewed violence in Bosnia, and the ability to call on over-the-horizon forces. Implications for NATO's Chapter 7 Status -------------- ¶11. (C) Bosniak Presidency member Haris Silajdzic will ask you what this means for NATO's Chapter 7 mandate, a question which remains unaddressed. His staff has lobbied for NATO to assert a legal basis under Dayton Annex 1b to retain NATO's original mandate after EUFOR abandons its derivative one. Silajdzic will argue that the fact that NATO could, in the case of renewed conflict, retake responsibility for a safe and secure environment and keep the ability to bring in over the horizon forces without another UN Security Council Resolution plays an important deterrent effect in Bosnia. Silajdzic may point out that decisions taken by NATO HQ in the near term will affect this. If NATO HQ staff stays here under Chapter 7, it will be assumed NATO HQ has kept it. If they negotiate diplomatic or other status for their presence here, it will be clear NATO has abandoned it. Bosnia and Afghanistan -------------- ¶12. (C) Bosnia's Defense Ministry is actively working to send a deployment to ISAF. The Minister of Defense, Selmo Cikotic, has just returned from Afghanistan where he was considering possible deployments with Turkey or Germany as a sponsor. I believe there will be sufficient political support in Parliament and the Presidency to approve a deployment, but it always helps to remind them why contributing to collective security operations is important to their NATO ambitions. Bosnia deployed small units nine times to Iraq. Based on our request, all overseas deployments were multi-ethnic, and thus served as a positive model for the future of the Armed Forces -- a small, NATO inter-operable and completely integrated force focused on providing support for international missions. If Bosnia deploys with another ally, we will have less say over the ethnic integration of the deployment than we have had in the past. They may, for example, rotate through different ethnic units, rather than mix the units. I strongly support Bosnia's effort to deploy a truly multi-ethnic company to Afghanistan, which, because of the need to train a reserve and a follow-up company, would effectively create an integrated battalion in the Armed Forces. I encourage you to make this point both to Bosnia's leaders and to our NATO allies. Conclusion -------------- ¶13. (C) Over the past 14 years, the U.S. has made a substantial investment in Bosnia. These investments have been critical to securing our interests here, in the Balkan region, and more broadly, in building a Europe whole, free and at peace. The deteriorating political situation over the past three years has showed that our accomplishments remain fragile. A drawdown in the international presence or the failure of international institutions to provide effective leadership of the reform agenda can lead to a roll back of the reform process and an upswing in interethnic tensions. Given Bosnia's current political trajectory and the European Union's inability to drive reform, it is imperative for the U.S. to maintain a high profile as a cooperating partner with Bosnia, keep leadership of the defense reform process and to finish what we started. A robust and visible military relationship, combined with U.S. leadership of NATO HQ Sarajevo is necessary to Bosnia's reform process and to assure the Bosnians of our commitment to Bosnia's progress on SARAJEVO 00001008 005 OF 005 its Euro-Atlantic path as its only option. ENGLISH