WHA P/DAS KELLY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT FERNANDEZ AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTO DOMINGO 001329 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/15 TAGS: PREL DR HO SUBJECT: WHA P/DAS KELLY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT FERNANDEZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER MORALES ON HONDURAS REF: 12/12 E-MAIL FROM AMB. LLORENS CLASSIFIED BY: Alexander Margulies, Counselor for Political & Economic Affairs, State, ECOPOL; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In a 12/10 meeting with visiting WHA P/DAS Craig Kelly, President Leonel Fernandez and Foreign Minister Carlos Morales Troncoso stated that the Government of the Dominican Republic (GoDR) shares the USGbs views on resolving the Honduran crisis, is actively seeking to facilitate a meeting between President Manuel Zelaya and President-Elect Porfirio Lobo, welcomes close cooperation with the USG in achieving this goal, and was extremely frustrated by the failed Mexican initiative, which they thought derailed a Dominican attempt to bring Zelaya and Lobo together. In a 12/11 meeting with P/DAS Kelly, FM Morales said that Fernandez were trying to set up a meeting that weekend between Zelaya and Lobo in the DR. P/DAS Kelly praised the GoDRbs efforts, offered the USGbs discreet collaboration, but cautioned that, to be successful, a Zelaya-Lobo encounter in the DR would have to be carefully and privately coordinated with the Zelaya, Lobo and Micheletti camps, and regional leaders b" especially President Arias. DIscretion is important because Zelaya and Micheletti adopt extremist positions when in front of the cameras. On the evening of 12/11, however, Fernandez and Morales held a press conference to announce that the GoDR would host a 12/14 meeting between Zelaya and Lobo, apparently without previous coordination with either the Lobo or the Micheletti camps. Not surprisingly, this meeting has been postponed indefinitely, as the de facto Honduran regime continues to refuse to issue a safe conduct to Zelaya unless it is pursuant to a request for political asylum. There has been some speculation in the local media that Fernandezbs latest initiative resulted from P/DAS Kellybs visit. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) P/DAS Kelly, accompanied by Charge, Pol/Econ Counselor and Public Affairs Counselor, met on 12/10 with President Fernandez and Foreign Minister Morales Troncoso. P/DAS Kelly, accompanied by Pol/Econ Counselor, held a follow-up meeting with Morales on 12/11. 12/10 MEETING WITH FERNANDEZ AND MORALES 
 -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) USG-GoDR cooperation to resolve the Honduran crisis was the main topic of these meetings (other issues reported septel). President Fernandez made the following points at the 12/10 meeting: -- Zelaya has had enough of life in the Brazilian Embassy and is ready to recognize Lobobs legitimacy in return for safe conduct from Honduras, a dignified exit, and future immunity, which he would enjoy as a lifetime member of the Central American Parliament (an honor bestowed on former national Presidents). -- Following consultations with Zelaya and Lobo, Fernandez had set the table for a Zelaya-Lobo meeting in the DR on 12/11. -- Lobo had agreed to come to the DR on 12/10 and had assured Fernandez that he could arrange for Zelayabs safe conduct from Honduras. -- Zelaya called Fernandez on 12/9 in the evening to say he was going to Mexico with a safe conduct and as an bhonored guest,b and could not be dissuaded by Fernandezbs news that Lobo was ready to follow the DR option. -- Fernandez suspects that Zelaya went back on his prior agreement with the Dominican President and embraced the Mexican offer in response to MERCOSURbs public stance against recognizing the Honduran election results. -- The Mexican initiative, which came as a surprise to the GoDR, was poorly handled and, consequently collapsed, at least temporarily derailing Fernandezbs mediation efforts and raising tensions between the rival camps in Honduras. -- Fernandez is determined to press on with his mediation efforts and will continue contacting Zelaya and Lobo. -- Guatemalan President Colon, El Salvadorbs Funes and Panamabs Martinelli support Fernandezbs efforts. -- All agree with Fernandez that Zelayabs exit, coupled with the resignation of de facto regime leader Micheletti, will facilitate the formation of a national unity government and a truth commission. SANTO DOMI 00001329 002 OF 003 -- This will set the stage for international recognition of the election results and the future Lobo administration. -- Spain is already echoing this position privately, and will come around publicly once the Accord is implemented. -- At the recent Ibero-American Summit, there was basic agreement that the Honduran elections cannot be ignored, and that, together with political dialogue, a way can be found to implement the San Jose-Tegucigalpa Accords . -- Fernandez is talking to Chavez to reconcile him to this scenario and is trying to speak with Brazilian Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marco Aurelio and/or Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. ¶4. (S) P/DAS Kelly said that the USG praised Dominican efforts to help, adding that the U.S. is prepared to lend support behind the scenes, drawing on our many contacts with all sides in Honduras (see Septel NODIS). Fernandez welcomed this offer and emphasized that the GoDR wants to work closely with the USG in resolving the Honduran crisis. The President commented that he is taking heat from leftist elements which do not accept a practical solution involving both Zelaya and Michelettibs departure, and instead prefer permanent conflict. . 12/11 MEETING WITH MORALES -------------- ¶5. (S) At the 12/11 follow-up meeting with Morales, P/DAS Kelly noted that U.S. Ambassador to Honduras Hugo Llorens had spoken with President Fernandez the previous evening to update the latter on developments in Tegucigalpa. The P/DAS said that Llorens was speaking that morning with de facto supporters, and that he (Kelly) would do so as well later that day, with both stressing the need for the de factos to adopt a pragmatic approach, not an overly-legalistic one. ¶6. (S) Morales recounted that Fernandez had been up until three obclock that morning working on this issue and hoped to welcome Zelaya and Lobo to the DR on Sunday, 12/13, adding that Zelaya said he would like to arrive that day. P/DAS Kelly observed that, based on Amb. Llorenbs assessment of the situation on the ground in Tegucigalpa, that this date might be premature, as more time appears to be required to bring the de factos on board. He also cautioned that any mediation effort should be coordinated privately, as both Zelaya and Micheletti veer to extremes when addressing their conflict in public. Morales seemed to accept this, and stated that Costa Ricabs President Arias, El Salvadorbs Funes and Guatemalabs Colom remain supportive. The Foreign Minister said that he was personally very close to many National Party officials, including former Honduran President Ricardo Maduro, and that the latter would be returning to Honduras from his honeymoon on Sunday, when he would commence lobbying for adoption of the Dominican initiative. ¶7. (S) Pointing to President Fernandez excellent ties with regional leaders,, Morales said the GoDR wanted to be helpful and encouraged the USG to turn to the GoDR to help smooth out problems areas with difficult regimes. The Foreign Minister stated, for example, that Fernandez somehow manages to have a calming effect on Chavez. P/DAS Kelly responded that the USG looks to avoid counterproductive confrontation with Chavez, since that is what he feeds off of, but will will always speak up for important principles , such as freedom of speech and fair elections. Morales agreed that Chavez blivesb off protagonism, opining that he learned this from Castro. PRESS CONFERENCE LAUNCHES PREMATURE INITIATIVE -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) President Fernandez and Foreign Minister Morales held a press conference the evening of 12/11 to announce that Zelaya and Lobo would meet in the DR on 12/14, under Fernandezbs auspices. The plan, they explained, was for Zelaya to arrive on 12/12 and Lobo on 12/13. Fernandez would meet separately with each one, then host a joint meeting. It quickly became apparent, however, that this initiative had not been coordinated with the Honduran de facto authorities as the local press reported it issued a statement stating that it had not received a safe conduct request from Zelaya and reiterating its position that any such request must be pursuant to a solicitation for political asylum. It also appears that the Dominicans did not coordinate the details of its announcement with Lobo, as he told the U.S. Ambassador in Honduras that Fernandezbs latest proposal came as a surprise to him (Ref email). The DR SANTO DOMI 00001329 003 OF 003 Presidency issued a statement on 12/13 admitting that the proposed Zelaya-Lobo meeting was postponed, blaming this on the refusal of the Honduran de factos to let Zelaya leave unless it is via political asylum. SPECULATION ON USG INVOLVEMENT -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The confluence of P/DAS Kellybs visit with the Dominican initiative has led to some speculation in the media that the USG was a driving force behind Fernandezbs decision to offer himself as a mediator. This argument is being principally advanced by Alvaro Arvelo, chief commentator on the countrybs most popular political talk radio show, bThe Government of the Morning.b (COMMENT: Postbs experience has been that it is counter-productive to try to directly rebut Arvelobs commentaries, as he feeds on conflict. Ignoring his diatribes has been the best way to ensure that they fade away. END COMMENT.) COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (S) President Fernandezbs efforts to mediate the Honduran crisis, while laudable in intent, were ham-fisted in execution. Even after seeing how the insufficiently coordinated Mexican effort came asunder, the Dominicans proceeded with their initiative without incorporating any of the blessons learnedb from the Mexican experience or heeding P/DAS Kellybs cautions on dealing carefully and privately with the three political forces involved. During his 12/11 meeting with P/DAS, FM Morales encouraged the USG to turn to President Fernandez to mediate or intercede on its behalf with the more bdifficultb leaders in the region, such as Venezuelabs Chavez and Nicaraguabs Ortega. Given Fernandezbs propensity for conducting his mediation in the public spotlight (at the Ibero-American Summit, for example, he announced that Colombiabs Uribe had asked him to mediate with Chavez),however, the USG should perhaps think twice before taking the Dominicans up on this offer. END COMMENT. Lambert