WHA P/DAS KELLY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT FERNANDEZ AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTO DOMINGO 001329

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/15
TAGS: PREL DR HO
SUBJECT: WHA P/DAS KELLY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT FERNANDEZ AND
FOREIGN MINISTER MORALES ON HONDURAS

REF: 12/12 E-MAIL FROM AMB. LLORENS

CLASSIFIED BY: Alexander Margulies, Counselor for Political &
Economic Affairs, State, ECOPOL; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

SUMMARY
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1. (S) SUMMARY: In a 12/10 meeting with visiting WHA P/DAS Craig
Kelly, President Leonel Fernandez and Foreign Minister Carlos Morales
Troncoso stated that the Government of the Dominican Republic (GoDR)
shares the USGbs views on resolving the Honduran crisis, is actively
seeking to facilitate a meeting between President Manuel Zelaya and
President-Elect Porfirio Lobo, welcomes close cooperation with the
USG in achieving this goal, and was extremely frustrated by the
failed Mexican initiative, which they thought derailed a Dominican
attempt to bring Zelaya and Lobo together. In a 12/11 meeting with
P/DAS Kelly, FM Morales said that Fernandez were trying to set up a
meeting that weekend between Zelaya and Lobo in the DR. P/DAS Kelly
praised the GoDRbs efforts, offered the USGbs discreet collaboration,
but cautioned that, to be successful, a Zelaya-Lobo encounter in the
DR would have to be carefully and privately coordinated with the
Zelaya, Lobo and Micheletti camps, and regional leaders b" especially
President Arias. DIscretion is important because Zelaya and
Micheletti adopt extremist positions when in front of the cameras.
On the evening of 12/11, however, Fernandez and Morales held a press
conference to announce that the GoDR would host a 12/14 meeting
between Zelaya and Lobo, apparently without previous coordination
with either the Lobo or the Micheletti camps. Not surprisingly, this
meeting has been postponed indefinitely, as the de facto Honduran
regime continues to refuse to issue a safe conduct to Zelaya unless
it is pursuant to a request for political asylum. There has been
some speculation in the local media that Fernandezbs latest
initiative resulted from P/DAS Kellybs visit. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) P/DAS Kelly, accompanied by Charge, Pol/Econ Counselor and
Public Affairs Counselor, met on 12/10 with President Fernandez and
Foreign Minister Morales Troncoso. P/DAS Kelly, accompanied by
Pol/Econ Counselor, held a follow-up meeting with Morales on 12/11.

12/10 MEETING WITH FERNANDEZ AND MORALES
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3. (S) USG-GoDR cooperation to resolve the Honduran crisis was the
main topic of these meetings (other issues reported septel).
President Fernandez made the following points at the 12/10 meeting:

-- Zelaya has had enough of life in the Brazilian Embassy and is
ready to recognize Lobobs legitimacy in return for safe conduct from
Honduras, a dignified exit, and future immunity, which he would enjoy
as a lifetime member of the Central American Parliament (an honor
bestowed on former national Presidents).

-- Following consultations with Zelaya and Lobo, Fernandez had set
the table for a Zelaya-Lobo meeting in the DR on 12/11.

-- Lobo had agreed to come to the DR on 12/10 and had assured
Fernandez that he could arrange for Zelayabs safe conduct from
Honduras.

-- Zelaya called Fernandez on 12/9 in the evening to say he was
going to Mexico with a safe conduct and as an bhonored guest,b and
could not be dissuaded by Fernandezbs news that Lobo was ready to
follow the DR option.

-- Fernandez suspects that Zelaya went back on his prior agreement
with the Dominican President and embraced the Mexican offer in
response to MERCOSURbs public stance against recognizing the Honduran
election results.

-- The Mexican initiative, which came as a surprise to the GoDR, was
poorly handled and, consequently collapsed, at least temporarily
derailing Fernandezbs mediation efforts and raising tensions between
the rival camps in Honduras.

-- Fernandez is determined to press on with his mediation efforts
and will continue contacting Zelaya and Lobo.

-- Guatemalan President Colon, El Salvadorbs Funes and Panamabs
Martinelli support Fernandezbs efforts.

-- All agree with Fernandez that Zelayabs exit, coupled with the
resignation of de facto regime leader Micheletti, will facilitate the
formation of a national unity government and a truth commission.

SANTO DOMI 00001329 002 OF 003


-- This will set the stage for international recognition of the
election results and the future Lobo administration.

-- Spain is already echoing this position privately, and will come
around publicly once the Accord is implemented.

-- At the recent Ibero-American Summit, there was basic agreement
that the Honduran elections cannot be ignored, and that, together
with political dialogue, a way can be found to implement the San
Jose-Tegucigalpa Accords .

-- Fernandez is talking to Chavez to reconcile him to this scenario
and is trying to speak with Brazilian Presidential Foreign Affairs
Advisor Marco Aurelio and/or Foreign Minister Celso Amorim.


4. (S) P/DAS Kelly said that the USG praised Dominican efforts to
help, adding that the U.S. is prepared to lend support behind the
scenes, drawing on our many contacts with all sides in Honduras (see
Septel NODIS). Fernandez welcomed this offer and emphasized that the
GoDR wants to work closely with the USG in resolving the Honduran
crisis. The President commented that he is taking heat from leftist
elements which do not accept a practical solution involving both
Zelaya and Michelettibs departure, and instead prefer permanent
conflict. .

12/11 MEETING WITH MORALES
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5. (S) At the 12/11 follow-up meeting with Morales, P/DAS Kelly
noted that U.S. Ambassador to Honduras Hugo Llorens had spoken with
President Fernandez the previous evening to update the latter on
developments in Tegucigalpa. The P/DAS said that Llorens was
speaking that morning with de facto supporters, and that he (Kelly)
would do so as well later that day, with both stressing the need for
the de factos to adopt a pragmatic approach, not an overly-legalistic
one.


6. (S) Morales recounted that Fernandez had been up until three
obclock that morning working on this issue and hoped to welcome
Zelaya and Lobo to the DR on Sunday, 12/13, adding that Zelaya said
he would like to arrive that day. P/DAS Kelly observed that, based
on Amb. Llorenbs assessment of the situation on the ground in
Tegucigalpa, that this date might be premature, as more time appears
to be required to bring the de factos on board. He also cautioned
that any mediation effort should be coordinated privately, as both
Zelaya and Micheletti veer to extremes when addressing their conflict
in public. Morales seemed to accept this, and stated that Costa
Ricabs President Arias, El Salvadorbs Funes and Guatemalabs Colom
remain supportive. The Foreign Minister said that he was personally
very close to many National Party officials, including former
Honduran President Ricardo Maduro, and that the latter would be
returning to Honduras from his honeymoon on Sunday, when he would
commence lobbying for adoption of the Dominican initiative.


7. (S) Pointing to President Fernandez excellent ties with regional
leaders,, Morales said the GoDR wanted to be helpful and encouraged
the USG to turn to the GoDR to help smooth out problems areas with
difficult regimes. The Foreign Minister stated, for example, that
Fernandez somehow manages to have a calming effect on Chavez. P/DAS
Kelly responded that the USG looks to avoid counterproductive
confrontation with Chavez, since that is what he feeds off of, but
will will always speak up for important principles , such as freedom
of speech and fair elections. Morales agreed that Chavez blivesb off
protagonism, opining that he learned this from Castro.

PRESS CONFERENCE LAUNCHES PREMATURE INITIATIVE
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8. (SBU) President Fernandez and Foreign Minister Morales held a
press conference the evening of 12/11 to announce that Zelaya and
Lobo would meet in the DR on 12/14, under Fernandezbs auspices. The
plan, they explained, was for Zelaya to arrive on 12/12 and Lobo on
12/13. Fernandez would meet separately with each one, then host a
joint meeting. It quickly became apparent, however, that this
initiative had not been coordinated with the Honduran de facto
authorities as the local press reported it issued a statement
stating that it had not received a safe conduct request from Zelaya
and reiterating its position that any such request must be pursuant
to a solicitation for political asylum. It also appears that the
Dominicans did not coordinate the details of its announcement with
Lobo, as he told the U.S. Ambassador in Honduras that Fernandezbs
latest proposal came as a surprise to him (Ref email). The DR

SANTO DOMI 00001329 003 OF 003


Presidency issued a statement on 12/13 admitting that the proposed
Zelaya-Lobo meeting was postponed, blaming this on the refusal of the
Honduran de factos to let Zelaya leave unless it is via political
asylum.

SPECULATION ON USG INVOLVEMENT
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9. (SBU) The confluence of P/DAS Kellybs visit with the Dominican
initiative has led to some speculation in the media that the USG was
a driving force behind Fernandezbs decision to offer himself as a
mediator. This argument is being principally advanced by Alvaro
Arvelo, chief commentator on the countrybs most popular political
talk radio show, bThe Government of the Morning.b (COMMENT: Postbs
experience has been that it is counter-productive to try to directly
rebut Arvelobs commentaries, as he feeds on conflict. Ignoring his
diatribes has been the best way to ensure that they fade away. END
COMMENT.)

COMMENT
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10. (S) President Fernandezbs efforts to mediate the Honduran
crisis, while laudable in intent, were ham-fisted in execution. Even
after seeing how the insufficiently coordinated Mexican effort came
asunder, the Dominicans proceeded with their initiative without
incorporating any of the blessons learnedb from the Mexican
experience or heeding P/DAS Kellybs cautions on dealing carefully and
privately with the three political forces involved. During his 12/11
meeting with P/DAS, FM Morales encouraged the USG to turn to
President Fernandez to mediate or intercede on its behalf with the
more bdifficultb leaders in the region, such as Venezuelabs Chavez
and Nicaraguabs Ortega. Given Fernandezbs propensity for conducting
his mediation in the public spotlight (at the Ibero-American Summit,
for example, he announced that Colombiabs Uribe had asked him to
mediate with Chavez),however, the USG should perhaps think twice
before taking the Dominicans up on this offer. END COMMENT.
Lambert