FRAUD SUMMARY - SANTO DOMINGO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 SANTO DOMINGO 001235

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP, DS/CR/OCI
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC
CARACAS FOR ELLIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC DR
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - SANTO DOMINGO

REF: A) State 057623
B) Santo Domingo 000527
C) 08 Santo Domingo 001580
D) Santo Domingo 001030
E) State 097431
F) Santo Domingo 001177
G) Santo Domingo 001062
H) Santo Domingo 000062
I) Santo Domingo 001024
J) Santo Domingo 000140
K) Santo Domingo 000155



1. (U) Santo Domingo submits its semi-annual fraud report for the
period March 2009 - August 2009 following format in ref A.


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A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS
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2. (SBU) Country conditions generally remain as reported in
previous Fraud Summaries, refs B and C. The Dominican Republic
ranks as a middle income country, but 43% of its 9 million people
live in poverty. Economic conditions world-wide, particularly in
the US, continue to have a negative impact on the Dominican economy.
The official unemployment rate hovers around 15% with reliable
sources estimating rural unemployment as high as 40%. The World
Bank estimates that remittances, an important part of the Dominican
economy, have declined by 6.9% this year. Emigration remains one of
the few means of class mobility available to a large segment of the
country's population. These economic factors, combined with crime
and insecurity, prompt many Dominicans to leave their country for
the U.S.


3. (SBU) There are approximately 1.2 million Dominicans living in
the United States and an estimated 100,000 U.S. citizens, mostly
dual nationals, live in the Dominican Republic. Dominicans
generally know someone living legally or illegally in the US.
American culture is often emulated and the dream of finding success
in America is deeply rooted. There is a huge incentive to engage in
visa fraud or even attempt the 70-mile crossing to Puerto Rico
clandestinely in a yola (small boat).


4. (SBU) The level of fraud at post is extremely high and post's
Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) currently ranks first world-wide in
number of confirmed fraud cases. Corruption is widespread and
innate respect for rules is rare. Mala fide visa applicants support
a nationwide industry of visa touts and document forgers.
Approximately 2,500 deportees were returned from the US in 2009 to
the end of this reporting period. Hundreds more Dominicans were
sent back after having reached Puerto Rico by yola. Although
improvements in U.S. documents, visa processing, biometric
collection and record systems make fraudulent travel to the U.S.
more difficult, large numbers of Dominicans continue trying to beat
the system.


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B. NIV FRAUD
--------------


5. (SBU) Fraud is omnipresent and takes many forms. NIV officers
do not depend on applicant documents and are encouraged to use
simple 214b refusals when appropriate. The NIV visa refusal rate
for the period covered by this report was approximately 36%. In
these 6 months, 2,745 NIV cases were referred to the Fraud
Prevention Unit (FPU) representing approximately 4.5% of total NIV
applications. Even though the number of NV cases referred to FPU
increased, the percentag of NIV cases referred decreased slightly
becaus the NIV unit processed more cases during this repoting
period. FPU confirmed fraud in 213 NIV cass, close to 8% of those
referred.


6. (SBU) FU continues to routinely pre-screen applications fr
visa categories C1/D, H2B, I, J, and P1 as wel as B1/B2 received as
groups. While FPU confirms fraud in less than 10% of these cases,
it provides useful notes to officers conducting interviews. FPU has
developed travel histories for various groups which help officers
distinguish between legitimate and mala fide travelers. The number
of fraudulent groups submitting applications is low and post
believes this is largely due to the deterrent effect of FPU
pre-screening. Visa classes for which FPU revealed significant
numbers of confirmed fraud cases are discussed individually below.


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7. (SBU) Almost 90% of post's NIV applications are for B1 and/or
B/2 visas and these are the majority of FPU's NIV caseload. There
were 70 cases of confirmed fraud in B1 and/or B2 applications during
this six-month period. FPU receives most cases as groups including:
little league, sports, and even dominos teams; training, convention
and other business related travel; religious based organizations;
and civic groups. FPU maintains records, including come-back
statistics, for most of these groups, and informs group organizers
of the long-term repercussions on the group's future applications
that will ensue should individuals overstay. We believe that by
employing these procedures, pre-screening and monitoring groups for
overstays, we have reduced the amount of fraud attempted.
Nevertheless fraudulent cases varying from little league teams with
mala fide travelers added to the rosters to fraudulent document
packages prepared and sold by the actual head of the Dominican
Chaplains Association were uncovered by FPU this reporting period.


8. (SBU) During this reporting period, post processed more J1 visas
than any other category except B1 and/or B2. While there are few
cases of confirmed fraud related to J1 applications, the category
continues to be of concern. After our 2008 analysis revealed 24% of
J1 travelers were overstays and an overstay rate for those with
previous J1 travel of 38%, NIV officers increased their scrutiny of
J1 applicants. As a result post's refusal rate rose to 63% during
2009, not unreasonable given the demographics of the applicants and
documented overstay rates. The number of J1 applications declined
to under 2,000 and some organizers may have been frustrated with
high refusal rates. Post has yet to complete its 2009 validation
study of J1 travelers.


9. (SBU) FPU confirmed fraud in over 10% of the P1 cases referred
for investigation. Most P1 applications involve either musical
groups which regularly tour the eastern U.S. or Major League
Baseball (MLB) players. FPU pre-screening of all musical groups and
the well-known consequences of including additional members solely
for visas purposes help discourage this type of fraud. Still some
legitimate musicians inevitably overstay in the U.S. Other fraud
encountered during the reporting period included a well-known
performer who previously toured in the U.S. using a B1/B2 visa as
well as multiple performers included on the same petition (to save
application fees) even though they would perform separately at
distinct venues in the U.S.


10. (SBU) Previous fraud summaries (ref B and C) have reported on
P1 visa fraud by Dominican baseball players which remains a concern
for FPU. Local media report a declining trend but still estimate
that approximately 25% of Dominican MLB players are involved in
age/identity fraud. Post has worked closely with MLB to improve
procedures related to the signing and subsequent visa application of
Dominican players. These procedures, some of which will be newly
implemented in the coming season, include: MLB (rather than
individual teams) managing investigations; pre-screening of all
investigations by MLB New York before submission with visa
applications; improved training and compensation for local MLB
investigators; and early registration with MLB of all players
participating in local academies. Two MLB teams opened new
academies during the reporting period and at least one more has
begun construction. Due to difficult conditions in Venezuela,
several MLB teams have moved or are planning to move Venezuelan
players to academies in the Dominican Republic. Post is concerned
by the possibility for fraud in this group and, in consultation with
MLB, is considering how to best process MLB related applications
from Venezuelan nationals.


11. (SBU) FPU pre-screens most H2B cases using PIMS and other
references to provide case notes related to history or associations
of companies and recruiters, viability and operations of U.S. firms,
previous rates of return and other information. Fraud was confirmed
in over 38% of H2B cases referred to FPU. Even when these
investigations do not lead to confirmed fraud, the background
information provided assists officers when interviewing applicants.
Santo Domingo's refusal rate for H2B applications remains high at
approximately 85%.


12. (SBU) FPU supplied investigative material to the U.S. Attorney
for the Western District of Missouri supporting a RICO racketeering
indictment of persons and companies abusing Dominican (and other
nationality) workers and violating laws and regulations governing
the H2B program. Dominicans anxious to get to the U.S. by any means
are willing to pay recruiters high fees even when prospects for
legitimate work are questionable. Post regularly inquires about
fees during H2B interviews, but applicants rarely admit to paying
prohibited fees. On various occasions during this reporting period,
companies in the U.S. halted applications being submitted by local
agents without authorization.

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13. (SBU) Post continues using CA/FPP (H&L) and PAS funds in
support of our "Maco" media campaign which discourages H2B visa
applicants from becoming involved with professional visa touts. The
campaign is built around slang use of the word "maco" which can mean
both a toad and a fraud. The campaign has included radio spots,
posters distributed to local "colmados" (corner store, 7-11
equivalents),beer bottle holders, large posters on the consular
section walls and various press events. This year a Mambo (popular
music) theme was developed which will shortly hit the radio waves.
The target audience is low income with particular focus in the Cibao
region; a demographic particularly susceptible to unscrupulous H2B
recruiters and regularly associated with visa fraud.


14. (SBU) There was one significant case involving F1 visa fraud
during this reporting period. NIV received a large group of
applicants claiming plans to study English at a Florida school and
referred them to FPU. FPU found that they all came through a local
H2B recruiter and were associated with an H2B company/recruiter in
the U.S. Further investigation revealed 52 related (fraudulent) F1
applications in Santo Domingo. CA/FPP also linked the U.S.
recruiter with 198 similar applications in Ukraine and Nepal.


15. (SBU) Post conducts an annual validation of referrals. In
CY2008 over 98% of 1,163 referred applicants were verified as having
returned. The Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) accounted for close
to one quarter of all referrals and the great majority of overstays
came from FCS. No other section or agency at post had more than 2
referrals who overstayed. Post tracks information regarding those
who have not returned and also informs persons/offices making the
referral.


16. (SBU) Post's recent validation study for children age 16 and
under is detailed in ref D. The study found that almost 99% of the
visa holders in this category returned to the Dominican Republic
after appropriate travel. There were only 9 confirmed overstays in
the sample; eight of them were female with one male adjusting status
for residency in the U.S. None of the overstays had traveled
related to a specific event, such as little league tournaments.


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C. IV FRAUD
--------------


17. (SBU) Post's most prevalent type of fraud remains IV fraud in
family-based categories, particularly marriage. Approximately 8% of
IV cases, in which the officer could not easily issue or refuse,
were referred to FPU. From March through September 2009, FPU
recorded 889 cases of confirmed IV fraud representing 52% of IV
cases processed by FPU. CCD statistics for the reporting period
show over one-third of all fraud confirmed cases worldwide were from
Santo Domingo.


18. (SBU) Most IV fraud results from petitioners who create sham
relationships for immigration purposes in return for payment or to
assist relatives/friends to reach the U.S. Cases referred to FPU
are often resolved on the same day by FPU investigators conducting
dual interviews with petitioners and beneficiaries. Many
petitioners admit to fraud both verbally and in signed statements
during FPU interviews. An estimated 10-20% of FPU referred cases
remain doubtful after FPU interviews and are sent for field
investigations. FPU has practically eliminated the backlog of IV
field investigations despite an increasing workload.


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D. DV FRAUD
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19. (U) Dominicans are not eligible for the Diversity Visa Lottery.
Post occasionally processes DV visas for non-Dominican applicants.


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E. ACS AND US PASSPORT FRAUD
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20. (U) The amount of fraud related to citizenship is difficult to
measure. Applicants whose cases are not clearly approvable often
abandon or withdraw the application when asked to produce additional
evidence in support of their claim. ACS continues working to close
previously abandoned cases whenever possible. Similarly PIERS
enables post to thwart imposters claiming to have lost/stolen
passports and soliciting new documentation. Other questionable

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cases are resolved through DNA testing. Even though these types of
cases may involve fraud, they are not necessarily referred to FPU.



21. (SBU) During the reporting period, ACS referred approximately
30 citizenship-related cases. FPU confirmed fraud in six of them.
FPU assisted local law enforcement authorities in another 35
citizenship cases, 20 of which were fraudulent (see para 42). Post
continues to encounter cases of Dominicans who have lived and been
documented in the U.S. after assuming the identity of a citizen,
most often from Puerto Rico. ACS and ARSO-I encourage U.S.
authorities to pursue these cases, particularly when the imposter
has petitioned for others based on a fraudulent status. FPU
regularly assists Passport Agencies and domestic USCIS offices to
investigate cases involving Dominicans applying for services in the
US. In a typical case FPU identified Dominicans who had entered the
U.S. illegally and sought status by claiming to be Cubans. A more
common scenario is for Dominicans to obtain Puerto Rican birth
certificates and attempt to document themselves as citizens using
the false identity. The FBI recently exposed a ring which had
stolen the identities of 12,000 school children and employees in
Puerto Rico and sold them in document packages to illegal
immigrants.


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F. ADOPTION FRAUD
--------------


22. (SBU) Adoptions are not a significant part of post's workload.
Issues related to adoption may arise in occasional NIV, IV and/or
ACS cases. As is true in general, susceptibility of officials to
corruption along with procedural weaknesses also leaves open the
possibility for adoption-related fraud.


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G. USE OF DNA TESTING
--------------


23. (SBU) Post has found DNA testing to be a very useful tool in IV
and CRBA cases when other evidence is not sufficient to support a
relationship claim. Dominican law allows for children to be
declared late, sometimes many years after their birth, based solely
on a declarant's statement. Thus it is easy to obtain legitimate
documents in support of fraudulent cases. It is common practice for
Dominicans to take in children as "hijos de crianza", documenting
them (falsely) as biological children and never going through a
formal adoption. In other cases, Dominicans who emigrate to the
U.S., legally or otherwise, may have little contact with their
children and have difficulty establishing the relationship. In
these and similar situations, post requests a DNA exam.


24. (SBU) New DNA collection requirements detailed in ref E will
decrease vulnerability to fraud. They will also significantly
impact post's workflow. Informal statistics indicate that
approximately 400 cases per month are referred for DNA analysis.
Approximately 10% of those returned fail to establish a biological
relationship. Most often cases with no biological relationship are
abandoned without informing post, making it difficult to gather
statistics. Post regularly orients new IV and ACS officers in the
use of DNA testing and is reviewing DNA referral procedures while
planning implementation of on-site collection.


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H. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD
--------------


25. (U) Post has DHS/ICE, DHS/CBP, and DHS/CIS representation which
handle these matters.


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I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST
TRAVEL
-------------- --------------


26. (SBU) The U.S. Coast Guard regularly intercepts go-fast,
traditional "yola" and other boats attempting to cross the 70-mile
Mona Straight and enter Puerto Rico undetected. Its biometric
program identifies captains/organizers with repeated detentions and
allows for successful prosecutions in Puerto Rico. While the
majority of passengers are Dominicans, Third Country Nationals (TCN)
have also been detected, including Haitians, Chinese, Cubans and

SANTO DOMI 00001235 005 OF 009


Colombians. Unauthorized private flights also smuggle drugs and/or
humans to Puerto Rico and even the continental U.S. Dominican
authorities recognize the need to monitor officials and procedures
at Santiago, Punta Cana, Puerto Plata and smaller airports.


27. (SBU) The Dominican Republic serves as a transit route for
persons seeking illegal entry to the U.S. Several recent cases
involved Iranians arriving from Caracas, obtaining fraudulent
documents (generally Israeli and European Union passports) and
attempting travel to Canada and to other Caribbean islands. During
the reporting period nationals from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Cuba,
Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Albania have been detained using fraudulent
documents. Local authorities are supported in their ongoing
investigations by our ARSO-I as well as other agencies at post. The
porous border with Haiti has always been a local concern and Haiti's
recent elimination of visa requirements for almost all nationalities
holds implications for the Dominican Republic as well (ref F).


28. (SBU) An Interpol source reportedly identified the Dominican
Republic as a fugitive haven. In the past six months at least 15
fugitives, including Italian mafia chiefs, have been apprehended
here. The number of Colombians living illegally in the Dominican
Republic while engaging in narco trafficking is receiving increased
coverage in local media. One noteworthy case involved a Colombian
with seven false identities, supported by a national IDs or
"cedulas," who was previously deported from the U.S. after serving
time for trafficking in narcotics. Investigation of the Colombian
began after a traffic accident, and intensified when the public
prosecutor consulted with FPU. (We confirmed his record in the U.S.
and three of his false identities.)


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J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
--------------


29. (SBU) Post has an Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO-I)
assigned criminal investigative workload related to consular
activities. Post also benefits from a vetted officer from the
National Police (PN) Anti-Fraud Unit delegated full-time to the
ARSO-I. During much of the reporting period the ARSO-I was detailed
out to cover RSO staffing gaps and there was a two month gap before
the ARSO-I's replacement arrived at post.


30. (SBU) The ARSO-I has coordinated with local immigration
officials investigating Iranian and other TCNs transiting the
Dominican Republic (see para 27),participating in interviews with
subjects and passing relevant information to interested law
enforcement partners. Other ongoing ARSO-I investigations are
related to groups organizing illegal travel using fraudulent
documents.


31. (SBU) The ARSO-I is following through with other agencies in
the U.S. on several cases involving U.S. citizenship obtained
through fraudulent means. In cooperation with the U.S. Marshall
Service (USMS) and other law enforcement agencies, the ARSO-I has
helped secure the arrest of various wanted persons as they presented
themselves here for consular services. The ARSO-I also played a
critical role in the consular malfeasance case reported in ref G.
Other allegations related to inappropriate activities by consular
personnel have been investigated by the ARSO-I.


32. (SBU) In coordination with local police the ARSO-I supports an
effort to clear visa "fixers" offering services to consular clients
from the immediate vicinity of the consular section. Several
roundups by cooperating transit police (AMET),assisted by the PN
Anti-Fraud Unit, have resulted in the temporary arrest of these visa
touts and pushed back their operations; but this is an ongoing
battle. ARSO-I diligence also resulted in the arrest of a money
changer using counterfeit currency to defraud ACS and other consular
clients.


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K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY
-------------- --------------


33. (U) The Junta Central Electoral (JCE) is responsible for
issuance of "cedulas", the national identity card which is the only
generally accepted form of photo identification in the DR. Persons
age 16 or older present an application form accompanied by a birth
certificate which JCE confirms prior to cedula issuance. Cedula
numbers are unique and people generally know their number by memory.
Recognizing the possibility of persons obtaining multiple cedulas
under different identities, the GODR has made improvements to the

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cedula system to counter this vulnerability.


34. (U) The JCE cedula update began in 2008 and now has
approximately 3.3 million records that include biometric
information. Roughly 45 percent of cedula holders have voluntarily
registered their biometric information to date. Inclusion of
biometric information with automated cross-checking of the database
has already proven successful with JCE reporting 2,120 cedulas
canceled because of fraud and/or multiple issuances. The new cedula
and biometric JCE database represent a great improvement in GODR
efforts to counter pervasive identity fraud, but full implementation
remains difficult politically, and deadlines requiring registration
under the new system have been continually extended.


35. (U) The birth certificate is the basic document used to obtain
a "cedula" and subsequent passport. When registering a birth, civil
authorities request the hospital birth record and the father must be
present if his name is to be included on the document. Home births
may be documented if supported by a statement from local officials.
Births recorded within three months are considered timely or
"oportuna"; declarations are accepted "tardia" at any later date.
Annotations and/or corrections may be recorded years after the event
and are generally based solely on the statement of a parent. JCE
reports that so far this year over 86,000 late births were
registered, including those made in special registration drives.
Adults whose births were undocumented may register when accompanied
by statements from five persons supporting the claim. Local offices
issue the first birth certificate "acta" with the central office of
the JCE responsible for all subsequent copies. Post only accepts
registry documents issued through the central office of the JCE
which has more reliable issuance procedures. The document may be in
an abbreviated form, "extracto," or a more complete form,
"inextensa," providing the who, where, and when of the registration
and subsequent updates.


36. (U) The JCE is responsible for the civil registry system.
Registration of events, such as birth, adoption, marriage, divorce,
and death, occurs at local offices throughout the country with
duplicate records sent to the central office in Santo Domingo at the
end of every year. Records are handwritten into books organized
chronologically with separate books for each type of event kept at
each registry office. Changes made to any document are annotated in
the margins of the original entry. Record verification requires a
hand search of books at the central office. Efficient searches
require the place and date on which the registration (rather than
the event) occurred. More extensive searches may be done using date
ranges, but take considerable time and effort. Because of the way
records are maintained, searches based on name only have been
impractical; general queries requesting a subject's birth record or
marital status could not be answered without a location and
approximate date. JCE recognized limitations in the civil
registration system and initiated a comprehensive improvement
project.


37. (U) Progress has been steady on the JCE project, now in its
third year, to modernize the registry system. New registrations
(birth, marriage, divorce, death) are entered into a computerized,
searchable database. Whenever someone solicits a copy of a previous
registration decree, that record is also entered into the system;
including a scanned copy of the book/page where it was originally
recorded. At the same time JCE is systematically entering and
scanning records from its books working from the most recent back.
At present JCE has entered approximately 22 million registrations
into the new registry system. While the total number of
registrations to be converted is not clear, a rough estimate
suggests that the number of records contained in the database is
approaching half of those available for living persons. This
represents a great improvement to the registry system. FPU has had
cases of record searches, which would have been impossible without
the computerized system, yielding positive results.


38. (U) Dominicans may refer to their passports as biometric
because the passport office scans an index finger with the
application. A second scan and one-to-one check with the first is
made to ensure that the person picking up the passport is the
applicant. Although the passport office retains the fingerprint
scan, it is not available for use with any other GODR database.
Because passports do not contain unique biometric identifiers,
improvements in the automated cedula system (precursor identifying
document) described above are critical to counter passport and visa
fraud.


39. (SBU) There is always a concern that genuine documents may be
obtained by fraudulent means or through corrupt local officials.
Although significant improvements are being implemented, there

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remain systematic vulnerabilities. The ease with which
registrations can be altered or even declared years after the event
makes the documentation process susceptible to manipulation.
Officials who are not well paid and receive little oversight are
vulnerable to corruption and may issue documents even in
questionable cases.


40. (SBU) Progress continues on the biometric initiative sponsored
by Embassy's Force Protection Detail (FPD-DR) which is described in
ref H. This project aims to establish an automated data base with
biometric capability and integrate various local law enforcement
systems. It will significantly improve GODR capabilities in
combating terrorism, drug and human trafficking, and other criminal
activity. FPD-DR plans to greatly expand the number of biometric
capture stations and to provide servers enabling the integration of
various GODR law enforcement agencies. A fully implemented
initiative would provide for FPD-DR to receive biometric data from
the GODR system which, once passed through US Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM),would be available to various USG watch lists and
data bases.


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L. COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRY AUTHORITIES
--------------


41. (SBU) The FPU benefits from a high level of cooperation with
GODR authorities. Dominican officials continue to respond to record
verification and other inquiries both informal and official. The
ARSO-I supervises a vetted officer from the National Police (PN)
Anti-Fraud Unit who is delegated full-time to duty at the consular
section. The officer regularly assists in investigations and
provides local jurisdiction in cases where detention and/or arrest
may not have been otherwise possible. Ref I details one of several
cases in which the PN officer's ability to detain and arrest was
critical to the successful prosecution of a ring supplying
fraudulent NIV document packages. FPU also benefits from direct
access to records in the police database.


42. (SBU) GODR immigration officials regularly send suspect
documents and/or travelers to FPU for verification. During this six
month period, 35 cases involving citizenship were referred; 20 were
confirmed fraudulent involving imposters, photo substitute and
counterfeit documents. Fraudulent visas were confirmed in another
12 out of 19 cases received from GODR officials. A final case
involved a fraudulent LPR card. Cooperation allowing FPU to see the
documents seized and to interview the persons detained has improved
somewhat in these cases. Typically such cases result in a fine and
conditional release if they are prosecuted.


43. (SBU) The FPU and ARSO-I worked in cooperation with GODR
immigration and national police on several operations against
document rings during the reporting period. In one operation a tip
helped FPU identify travelers planning to use washed and reprinted
visas (most on foils originally issued in Peru) to board a cruise
ship from the Casa de Campo facility near La Romana. Immigration
officers who traveled from Santo Domingo along with FPU personnel
and the vetted PN officer were able to arrest two of the organizers.



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M. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
--------------


44. (SBU) In the past six months corruption amongst GODR officials
received increased media coverage and recent surveys show that the
majority of Dominicans see corruption increasing. There have long
been charges of corruption and involvement of law enforcement
personnel in criminal activity in the Dominican Republic. Local
media reported the National Police (PN) Chief's estimate that 3,000
officers have been dismissed in the past two years. Large scale
police transfers are common. In one recent incident, the entire PN
force in Azua was transferred and 194 officers identified for
investigation. Extradition requests involving active and former
members of the armed forces further highlight the problem. Low
salaries must compete with high pay offs, making the fight against
corruption difficult amongst all levels and types of Dominican
officials. NIV and FPU actively pursue visa revocations, in
coordination with Mission-wide efforts to combat corrupt officials
engaged in or supporting criminal activities. During the reporting
period 23 visas were revoked, and more were physically cancelled.


45. (SBU) FPU receives a variety of reports from USG and GODR law
enforcement agencies and we also review local media accounts to make

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CLASS entries for persons implicated in criminal activities who do
not currently hold visas. Informal statistics kept during the
reporting period recorded approximately 500 CLASS entries in a four
month period. In spite of FPU diligence, post remains concerned
that applicants with undocumented/unrecorded ineligibilities may
still slip through.


46. (SBU) Post had five new cases involving altered fingerprints
during the last six months. This trend was reported in ref J as
well as the previous Fraud Summary. Some of these new cases were
unique. Post's first NIV case involving fingerprint alterations was
also our first female who later admitted to multiple attempts at
illegal entry to the U.S. In another case "C" and "Z" shaped scar
patterns were observed, rather than the usual horizontal or vertical
cuts. After EFMs were unable to obtain acceptable prints from
another applicant, FPU discovered that he had placed glue over all
ten prints. When the glue was removed, he was reprinted revealing
his previous use of a false identity. The interception in May of a
Dominican finger slasher (denied a visa in February) who was
apprehended in Lima, en route to Toronto using fraudulent documents,
demonstrates the determination of some to reach the US by any means.
FPU and/or ARSO-I regularly alert local law enforcement contacts
and support GODR prosecution of persons who have acquired cedulas
and passports in fraudulent identities. Some of these cases also
involve altered fingerprints, not a crime in itself according to
Dominican law.


47. (SBU) Post continues to be concerned by GODR diplomatic
appointments supporting a large patronage system, whereby dozens of
non-accredited "vice-consuls" are appointed and paid by Presidential
decree, but act independently of the Foreign Ministry. For years,
the USG has pressed the GODR to bring its diplomatic and consular
operations in the USA in line with U.S. laws and regulations,
Department practices, and the Vienna Convention on Consular and
Diplomatic Relations. In June 2007, we requested via diplomatic
note a full account of all persons working in the USA for the GODR;
the GODR has not yet responded adequately. This problem has grown
significantly under President Fernandez and has been raised in
conversations with him (see ref K). In some cases appointees'
status as Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) or U.S. citizens renders
these persons ineligible for accreditation for positions that are
widely assumed to be sinecures with no official functions. Other
politically appointed persons gain accreditation and then abuse
their diplomatic privileges, often with little supervisory
oversight. In one recent case, FPU obtained a signed statement from
the "spouse" of a diplomat declaring that they had no marital
relationship but had gotten a marriage decree in order to make her
eligible for an A2 visa.


48. (SBU) Even though Consular support has helped local authorities
detect and deter mala fide travelers using the Santo Domingo - San
Juan ferry, its history of smuggling, corrupt immigration officials
and reputation as a means of passport-free entry into the U.S. make
it a continuing concern. Changes in the ferry schedule combined
with continued workload demands have forced post to reduce our
presence during departure of the Santo Domingo - San Juan ferry.
Boarding for Tuesday and Thursday departures now occurs during
regular work hours and may be monitored through spot checks by FPU
personnel. Consular personnel continue to offer assistance/consults
during Sunday departures. Implementation of the WHTI travel
document requirement for land and sea ports of entry has facilitated
document inspection by eliminating travel using only a birth
certificate. However post has seen that acceptance of Enhanced
Driver's Licenses (EDLs) makes document inspection by GODR
officials, now confronted with EDLs from several states, more
difficult.


--------------

N. STAFFING AND TRAINING
--------------


49. (U) Post's FPU is staffed by: a Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM),
a Senior LES Investigator, four LES Investigators, one LES
Investigative Assistant, and one LES Clerk. An ELO serves as
back-up FPM and works five or more hours per week in the FPU. The
FPU works in close cooperation with an ARSO-I and a local police
officer assigned to the ARSO-I.


50. (U) FPU staff actively engages in FSI distance training and
completed 2 online courses during the reporting period. A listing
of all training received, with the number of FPU LES who have
completed the course in parenthesis, follows: PC102 Immigration Law
and Visa Operations (7),PC103 Nationality Law and Consular
Procedures (2),PC110 Passport Examiners (1),PC120 Consular Task

SANTO DOMI 00001235 009 OF 009


Force Basics (7),PC128 Detecting Imposters (4),PC545 Examining
U.S. Passports (2),COMM0013 Business Writing (1),PY210 FSN Online
Writing Lab (1),PY212 FSN online Writing Adv (1),PC143 Customer
Service (1),PC542 FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (4),OT501 FSN
Investigator Course (3),PC104 Overseas Citizen Services.


51. (U) FPU continues to provide anti-fraud training for all newly
arrived officers. In addition FPU encourages IV officers to
participate in field investigations and NIV officers are offered
windshield fraud tours of Santo Domingo. Consular personnel who
volunteer for work at the ferry terminal receive further FPU
training. Additional training, advising and coaching occurs
regularly in staff meetings, during monthly Consular Development
Days, and in consultation with individual consular personnel.
During the reporting period, approximately 60 GODR officials, mostly
from immigration or the passport office, attended FPU organized
document detection training.

LAMBERT