FRAUD SUMMARY - SANTIAGO (SEPTEMBER 2008 - FEBRUARY 2009)

UNCLAS SANTIAGO 000346 SIPDIS DEPT FOR CA/FPP DEPT FOR CA/VO/F/P DEPT FOR WHA/BSC DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DHS/CBP POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CI SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - SANTIAGO (SEPTEMBER 2008 - FEBRUARY 2009) REF: (A) 08 STATE 074840; (B) 09 SANTIAGO 298 Post is submitting the following fraud summary report for September 2008 through February 2009 in accordance with reftel A. -------------- COUNTRY CONDITIONS -------------- ¶1. Chile is a democratic country with a developing free-market economy. Chile is a key U.S. partner in promoting democracy, human rights, and free trade in the region and beyond. The United States and Chile have a Free Trade agreement that took effect January 1, ¶2004. There is relatively little migratory "pull" to the United States, relative to other countries in the region. Chilean civil documents are generally reliable. Formatting and security features in Chilean civil documents make falsification difficult. Chilean passports are machine readable and difficult to obtain fraudulently. Chile has an innovative system of reporting lost/stolen passports, driver's licenses and Chilean identification cards (known as RUTs). Chileans are assigned a national ID number at the time the parents register children at the Civil Registry to obtain a birth certificate. The actual RUT card is normally not issued until a person begins traveling internationally or enters university. Much like the system of reporting a lost/stolen credit card in the U.S., Chilean citizens can go online to report a lost/stolen civil document. This information is immediately available to banks, the Chilean International Police, and other Government of Chile entities. -------------- NIV FRAUD -------------- ¶2. During the reporting period, the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) conducted 601 nonimmigrant visa (NIV) fraud investigations and uncovered 60 fraudulent cases--10% of those referred--compared to 35 fraudulent cases in the previous six-month cycle. A majority of cases involved document fraud, such as the submission of altered bank, employment, or property documents. A new and troubling source of fraud this year came from the 3,000 some J-1 Summer Work and Travel NIV applicants. Many applicants brought altered or completely forged school certificates that indicated they were current university students. See Reftel (B). A small number of other cases involved visa fixers, normally posing as travel agents. As in the past, post has not been able to get cooperation from Chilean police authorities to investigate or prosecute visa fixers, even in cases where the altered documents include government tax statements. One exception was the case of a low-level employee in a local company who was posing as a human resources officer to give job references for recently laid-off workers that were applying for NIV visas. The Fraud unit worked closely with the company's management, who conducted a sting operation to catch their employee in the act, and Chilean authorities are prosecuting that employee for malfeasance. ¶3. Given its maritime industry, post receives a high number of C1/D applicants for both merchant marine and cruise ship members. Post has noticed a slight increase in fraudulent merchant marine applications, usually involving altered employment documents. Post has also increased its investigations of petition-based H1B, L1, and R1 visas, as well as the Chilean H1B1 Free Trade visa. It appears post is receiving more of these types of cases that are pushing the classification definitions but has yet to uncover any outright fraud. Post has seen a steady increase of H1B1 Free Trade visa applicants as the general public becomes more aware of their availability. ¶4. The DHS Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) has been fully integrated into all of the units, and all of the NIV officers have expressed a desire to have their own personal accounts and/or to have the DHS information more integrated with NIV+ and IVO software. ADIS has been successfully used by the NIV unit to uncover overstays, especially when renewal applicants arrive with "lost" passports that would reflect overstays. ¶5. The FPU's excellent contacts with local banks and the Chilean internal revenue service have been essential in verifying suspect documentation. Perhaps most instrumental are our contacts in the Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones (AFP),an employee retirement administration in which registration is mandatory under Chilean law. Through the AFP, the FPU is able to confirm the length of time that an employee has been employed with a particular employer and their salary. Although some companies do not follow the mandated law requiring the registration of their employees, this system is still a reliable source for employment and income verification. ¶6. Post is in the process of conducting validation studies on J-1 SWT applicants from the 2007-2008 season, and the 2008-2009 season that is just ending. Results will be reported in the next Fraud Summary. -------------- IV FRAUD -------------- ¶7. The IV Unit referred 87 cases to the FPU, and uncovered one caseof fraud where an applicant was concealing a 9B2 ineligibility. The IV Unit has also successfully incorporated ADIS information to confirm 9B1 and 9B2 ineligibilities, as well as to confirm eligibility for transportation letters for Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) who have been outside the U.S. less than one year. -------------- DV FRAUD -------------- ¶8. DV applications remain relatively low, and no DV fraud was detected during the reporting period. -------------- ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD -------------- ¶9. No cases of fraud were detected during the reporting period in the ACS Unit. -------------- ADOPTION FRAUD -------------- ¶10. Post processed two adoption cases and encountered no fraud. Foreign adoptions are relatively rare in Chile. The Chilean Central Authority, SENAME, is working with post and the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) to implement the Hague convention on adoption. Chile has relatively high bureaucratic barriers on the adoption of children by foreigners, and required U.S. adoptions agencies to be accredited in Chile. In the reporting cycle, two U.S. adoption agencies applied for accreditation and were denied by SENAME. -------------- DNA TESTING -------------- ¶11. During the reporting period, two IV applicant but no ACS applicants have opted for DNA tests to prove relationships. The two DNA tests confirmed the relationship, and no fraud was found. -------------- ASYLUM AND DHS BENEFIT FRAUD -------------- ¶12. No cases of fraud were identified during the reporting period. -------------- -------------- ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIMES, AND TERRORIST TRAVEL -------------- -------------- ¶13. FPU contacts with airline officials have been important in detecting visa impostors. Airline officials have encountered at least two cases of impostors and fraudulent visas bound for the U.S. Imposter travel was not only detected for travel to the U.S., but also to Canada and Mexico. During the reporting period post did not encounter cases dealing with organized crime or terrorist travel. -------------- DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS -------------- ¶14. There were no cases of DS criminal fraud investigations during the reporting period. FPU has a good working relationship with the RSO office, which is always available to the consular section with little advance notice when if a complex cases arises. -------------- HOST COUNTRY DOCUMENTATION -------------- ¶15. There were no cases of host country documentation fraud during the reporting period. -------------- COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES -------------- ¶16. FPU continues to enjoy a high level of cooperation from host government authorities on issues including immigration, tax, and civil registration. However, as noted, it is often difficult to get the host government to assist in prosecuting perpetrators of fraud. It is not a crime, under Chilean law, to provide a fraudulent document to the U.S. Embassy in pursuit of a visa. -------------- AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN -------------- ¶17. Post greatly appreciates information from CA/FPP regarding fraudulent U.S. visas being used in transit through Chile. Post believes that a regional fraud conference would be an effective way to alert neighboring embassies and consulates to similar fraud trends that surpass borders and provide a venue to discuss potential mechanisms to improve fraud prevention processes in the region. -------------- STAFFING AND TRAINING -------------- ¶18. The FPU consists of the Visa Unit Chief and Fraud Prevention Manager, William Whitaker; one Locally Engaged Staff fraud investigator, Ilse Schacker; and one Vice Consul on a six-month rotation, Nathan Tidwell, who also serves as the immigrant visa and non-immigrant visa officer and also back-up ACS officer. All consular staff has been encouraged to take on-line courses that focus on fraud detection relative to their particular units, and seek to enroll in relevant fraud prevention training offered at FSI. ¶19. On Consular Leadership Day, post hosted a Chilean tax attorney and an immigration manager in the Department of Interior to train all Consular staff to identify legitimate Chilean tax documents and understand Chilean immigration procedures. Post plans to request the use of FPU funding to travel to meet with Chilean University representatives to combat fraudulent applications during J-visa season, and post has requested training by the DHS Carrier Liaison Program (CLP) to provide training to airline and immigration officials. . SIMONS