PRESIDENT BACHELET IN CUBA -- A FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000157 STATE FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC, INR/IAA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CU CI SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BACHELET IN CUBA -- A FOREIGN POLICY FIASCO REF: SANTIAGO 44 Classified By: EPOL COUNSELOR TIM STATER FOR REASONS 1.4(B/D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Fidel Castro's statement bashing Chile following a private meeting with President Bachelet has generated unusually heated debate in Santiago. Critics -- including the Concertacion's Christian Democrats -- call the visit an "embarrassing" policy setback, some contending the sole purpose was to bid farewell to a dying revolutionary with whom the President sympathized. Most Chileans view Fidel Castro's scathing columns as a rude and gratuitous stab aimed at disparaging Chile's political system and foreign policy. Castro's actions were also viewed as intervening in Chilean affairs and bolstering Bolivia's century old ocean access claim, a sensitive bilateral irritant for Chile. Claiming success, the Bachelet administration highlighted the eight signed accords and downplayed Castro's comments as those of a retired government leader. The visit, however, will likely be remembered in Chile for Fidel's vicious attack and Bachelet's failure to visit Cuban dissidents and highlight human rights concerns on the island. End Summary. From Bad to Worse -------------- ¶2. (C) What promised to be a historic visit to Cuba by a Chilean president, the first in nearly four decades, turned into a foreign policy disaster. President Bachelet's trip to the island (February 10-13) and Fidel Castro's offensive statement following their meeting on February 12 prompted widespread commentary and harsh criticism, particularly from Alianza and Christian Democratic leaders. Since its announcement, the trip had generated extensive debate among Concertacion members about whether the President should meet with Cuban dissidents (reftel). Not wishing to upset her Cuban hosts, President Bachelet decided against meeting with the Cuban opposition and profiling human rights concerns. During the visit and at request of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, one delegation member from congress canceled a previously-scheduled meeting with the renown Cuban blogger, Yoani Sanchez. Chileans lament Bachelet compromised Chile's democratic principles and paid a heavy price, getting nothing in return. ¶3. (C) Perhaps what embarrassed Chileans most was the TV segment showing President Bachelet leaving a scheduled event at the Salvador Allende Foundation with the Chilean community living in Cuba. Chilean commentators highlighted the sudden and unpresidential exit, at one point trotting, from the event when she received unexpected word the revolutionary leader was ready to receive her. Moreover, she rode with Raul Castro in his motorcade and not in her own. ¶4. (C) Deputy Chief of Protocol Juan Luis Nilo, who advanced the Havana trip, told the DCM on February 17 that the entire delegation was taken by surprise with the sudden change in schedule to accommodate Fidel. Without consulting her team, President Bachelet got up and attempted to exit discretely, missing and disappointing the performance of Chilean Isabel Para, daughter of a leftist Chilean folklorist. Nilo said Raul Castro, who accompanied Bachelet virtually the whole time, awaited outside to escort the President to see the ailing Cuban leader. Nilo admitted they were unprepared for what transpired, even though the Chilean team had anticipated this would be their most difficult and delicate foreign visit. ¶5. (C) Former Chilean Ambassador to the United States Octavio Errazuriz told us February 17 that Bachelet's Cuba visit could have had some practical benefits but it ended in "disaster." He described Fidel Castro's "reflexiones" column as the ultimate "groseria" or insult. Neither Raul's unusual gesture to accompany President Bachelet to the airport nor Fidel's second column, claiming the remarks represented his own personal views, could ameliorate the unexpected predicament. After coordinating with the Chileans, the Cuban government did not comment or respond to Minister Foxley's stern commentary on Fidel's statement, but the damage was done without any possible recovery, the former diplomat argued. Errazuriz contended that the Bachelet team made the best of a lousy situation, and the President acted correctly waiting to express her "molestia" or displeasure immediately upon arrival in Chile. Why the "Stab in the Back" -------------- ¶6. (C) No one knows for sure why Fidel Castro issued his anti-Chilean diatribe, but several theories abound. Errazuriz speculated that the objective may have been to show his disdain for the Chilean model and his preference for the non-democratic left in the region, headed by Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Chilean author Roberto Ampuero -- who once lived in Cuba while married to a high-level Cuban official's daughter -- emphasized Fidel Castro despises the Chilean example for its successful transition from a dictatorship to a democracy with stability and prosperity. Pent up anger at Chile's other socialist leaders, such as Ricardo Lagos who never visited Cuba as President, might be another explanation. ¶7. (C) DC leader Patricio Walker said Fidel "stabbed Bachelet in the back," arguing that the "professional provocateur" and "megalomaniac" cannot stand to be out the limelight. Walker lamented, "While she called for the end to the 'blockade,' he (Fidel) countered by interfering in Chile's international affairs." Others speculated that Fidel's purpose was to sabotage Raul's foreign policy, including the recent fence mending Raul had accomplished within the hemisphere. Cuban exiles have pointed to Fidel's style, promoting division rather than cooperation. Beating Back the Bolivian Wave -------------- ¶8. (C) For Chileans, whether from the right or left, the Bolivia sea access issue is a strictly bilateral one addressed in carefully-staged meetings. Evo Morales thanked Fidel publicly and proposed that the international community get involved in Bolivia's claim following his mentor's crude advocacy for Chile to return Bolivian territory. Chile's Communist Party President Guillermo Teillier, who traveled with the official delegation, characterized Castro's remarks as those of a former head of state, and agreed with President Bachelet that the sea access issue should stay between Chile and Bolivia. Socialist Senator Carlos Ominami emphasized that Raul is Cuba's President and that Fidel's statements are those of a former leader obsessed by the issue. UDI President Juan Antonio Coloma was more direct, stating "this is part of a campaign by the international left led by Castro and Chavez, who are looking to force Chile to turn over part of its territory. ¶9. (U) The Chilean government has responded publicly to Morales' idea, emphasizing it is a bilateral matter. Meanwhile, the Chilean and Bolivian Foreign Affairs Vice Ministers met on February 19 for nearly three hours. The Bolivian afterwards noted his country reserved the right to press the issue internationally if bilateral talks are not productive. So-Called Good News -------------- ¶10. (C) Back home President Bachelet characterized the trip as "successful," notably for the broad scope of agreements signed and the important step for strengthening integration within the hemisphere. She also took special care to encourage greater business interaction between the two countries. In all, the Chileans and Cubans concluded eight accords -- cooperation agreements on forestry, cinema, sports, national monuments, international cooperation programs, neurological restoration, science and technology, and genetic engineering and biotechnology. The Communist Party leader hailed the historic occasion, praising Bachelet for being the first Chilean President to visit the island since Salvador Allende 37 years ago and joining in the call for an end to the U.S. "blockade" of Cuba. Comment: Further Fallout Likely -------------- ¶11. (C) Discussions about Cuba tends to generate high-octane emotions within Chile, similar to feelings about the September 11 coup. Fidel's references to the "rancid" UDI party may have fired up Chile's most conservative party. While Castro's actions remain a mystery, Chilean leaders undoubtedly will have second thoughts when it comes to working closely with their Cuban counterparts. Media coverage about the visit is waning, but tensions will likely resurface in March when Foreign Minister Foxley is called to testify before Congress on the outcome of the trip. Perhaps of more concern to the ruling Concertacion, the Christian Democrat's harsh Cuba critique could have the effect of imperiling coalition negotiations, notably between the Communist and Christian Democrats, on the selection of coalition candidates competing in the December national elections. SIMONS