FUNES ADVISORS SEE PERILS, OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000996

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ES
SUBJECT: FUNES ADVISORS SEE PERILS, OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Three leaders of the former Friends of
Mauricio movement, now the Citizen Movement for Change,
shared with us October 20 their concerns over the tense
relationship between President and the FMLN, ongoing turmoil
in ARENA, and the deteriorating public security situation.
They believe Funes and the FMLN still need each other,
despite diverging long-term aims. All are concerned over the
potential benefits for the FMLN from ARENA's internal strife
and agreed public security was an ongoing challenge for the
Funes Administration. End Summary.


2. (C) Luis Lagos, Gerardo Caceres, and Luis Mendez told us
October 20 of their concerns regarding Salvadoran President
Funes' relationship with the (left-wing) FMLN, public
security, and the ongoing turmoil in (conservative) ARENA.
Lagos remains the organizing head of the Citizen Movement for
Change, formerly the Friends of Mauricio movement that helped
propel Funes to power on the FMLN ticket. Caceres noted that
the FMLN miscalculated that it could put Funes at the head of
its ticket in 2009 and manage him from behind the scenes
after the election. Caceres recalled that Funes made clear
in a 2007 address that, as president, he would not be a
puppet, would run a social-democrat-style government, and
would maintain good relations with the U.S. The FMLN,
Caceres said, is working to infiltrate loyal operatives
throughout the GOES, though he said there are "many"
government officials who remain completely loyal to Funes.
The FMLN, he said, carries on an institutional conversation
with Funes through Coordinator General (and head of the
FMLN's legislative bloc) Medardo Gonzalez, but the FMLN is
disingenuous, saying one thing to Funes and doing another in
the field.


3. (C) Lagos noted that the Movement for Change maintains the
same institutional and geographic structure it built during
the campaign, with supporting groups around the country.
Caceres said the Movement planned to formalize its legal
structure within two months as a non-profit foundation, not
as a political party. (Note: Salvadoran law and the
composition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal make it
exceedingly difficult to form a new party.) Caceres said the
Movement's goals remain the same, though its approach has
changed since the transition from campaign to government.
Caceres said the FMLN was aware of the Movement's plans to
organize itself as a foundation and while he believed the
FMLN sees the Movement as a long-term threat, he does not
believe the FMLN will be an obstacle in the short-term.
Funes still needs FMLN votes in the Assembly and Funes
remains key to the FMLN's long-term goal of taking over the
country. Caceres did not rule out the possibility that the
Movement could ultimately form or join up with an existing
party to compete for Assembly seats and more, but discounted
the possibility this could happen for the 2012 elections.


4. (C) All three expressed concern over the ongoing turmoil
in ARENA, with Mendez suggesting ARENA leadership would have
to cave to the demands of dissident legislators loyal to
former President Saca, Caceres saying ARENA had to stand
firm, and Lagos suggesting a bloc of moderate ARENA
supporters could ultimately form the nucleus of a future
center-right government. All three did agree that if ARENA
self-destructs, it would strengthen the hand of the FMLN and
make President Funes's job more difficult. Caceres
speculated that current difficulties in ARENA had put the
FMLN on track to secure a majority of seats in the
Legislative Assembly in 2012 elections. (Note: Barring a
change in existing electoral law, this outcome would require
significant gains in the popular vote for the FMLN. El
Salvador's system of allocating "leftover" votes to smaller
parties makes it exceedingly difficult for one party to
garner a majority of seats.) Lagos noted that with the
passage of time, fissures in the ranks of the FMLN may appear.


5. (C) Caceres expressed concern over deteriorating public
security in El Salvador, arguing that the GOES had to take
extraordinary measures to address the problem. He said an
unfounded rumor of a gang-imposed curfew that emptied San
Salvador's streets and businesses the evening of October 19
could be seen as a reaction by Salvadoran street gangs to the
President's proposal to put the Salvadoran ARMY on the
streets to augment the National Civilian Police (PNC).
Caceres acknowledged this approach would have risks and could
tarnish the public's trust in the Armed Forces, but the
alternative of inaction is unacceptable. The PNC, he said,
should not be given command authority over the armed forces
for public security work. Caceres said the current approach
of pursuing low-level criminal operatives or mid-level
managers was doomed to fail. Only by identifying and
prosecuting senior gang leaders would the GOES make progress.


6. (C) Comment: The views expressed by some of Funes' closest
political supporters outside the government is typical of the
pragmatic approach they brought to his campaign and that has
characterized the Funes Administration thus far. Their
counterparts in the GOES are Francisco and Carlos Caceres
(both related to Gerardo),Chief of Cabinet Alex Segovia, and
Defense Minister David Munguia Payes. They are wary of the
FMLN's long-term aims in El Salvador but see the potential
power of the centrist Citizen Movement for Change. While
Funes and his supporters can directly confront some of the
threats he faces, others -- like ARENA's future -- are out of
their hands. All of the above argues for our continued
support for Funes and his approach to governing El Salvador.

BLAU