ARENA PARTY PREPARES FOR OPPOSITION AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000472 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019 TAGS: ES PGOV PREL SUBJECT: ARENA PARTY PREPARES FOR OPPOSITION AND REJUVINATION Classified By: Charge Blau for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Center-right, pro-U.S. ARENA party on May 23 announced the composition of the new political commission (COENA in Spanish) that will direct the party as it transitions from governing to opposition. The shakeup was precipitated by the left-wing FMLN's defeat of ARENA Party candidate Rodrigo Avila in the March 15 Presidential election. It is intended to inject new faces and younger leadership into the party, enabling ARENA to both mount an effective legislative opposition to President-elect Mauricio Funes and the FMLN, as well as to reverse its declining electoral appeal. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) ARENA publicly unveiled its new political commission on May 23. Former President of El Salvador Alfredo Cristiani (1989-94) takes over the leadership of a revised COENA largely staffed by younger, lesser-known business executives and technocrats. The composition of the new COENA is also notable for the absence of any sitting mayors or Legislative Assembly members. Other than former President Cristiani, the best-known COENA members are economist Julio Rank, whose father served as Director of Communications for President Saca, and former Admiral Marco Antonio Palacios, who was Vice Minister of Defense from 2004-2009. Newly-named COENA members include the President of the Salvadoran Automobile Vehicle Distributor's Association, a former port authority director, a former Vice Minister of Education, a medical doctor, and several business entrepreneurs. ¶3. (SBU) The bias towards business and commerce amongst the newly-named COENA members would seem to indicate that this political commission can be expected to focus on economic and financial issues. The presence of Cristiani provides high-level political gravitas and experience that is likely intended to balance the relative youth and political inexperience of the new COENA rank-and-file. ¶4. (C) Comment: The obvious intention here is to signal to voters that ARENA is prepared to roll up its sleeves and do what is necessary to regain the economic high-ground that it seemingly lost to the FMLN during the Saca administration, and, more recently, Rodrigo Avila's unsuccessful Presidential campaign. Voter discontent with the direction of the Salvadoran economy likely had as much or more to do with Maurico Funes' electoral victory than any other single factor in play. By placing young business executives and technocrats in charge of the political commission, ARENA is attempting to reconnect with the commercially-minded middle-class and aspiring working class voters who long formed the backbone of their constituency. ARENA also appears intent upon shedding the image it gained during the Saca administration of serving as the vanguard for a privileged elite which benefited from self-serving maneuvers and outright corruption. ¶5. (C) Comment continued: Cristiani, one of the founders of the ARENA party, is about as old school as ARENA could possibly get. His leadership, endorsed by fellow ex-Presidents Calderon Sol and Flores, returns the party to economic and fiscal fundamentals. Cristiani's detractors, abroad and at home, have sought to link him to the 1989 murders of the Central American University (UCA) Jesuit priests by security forces. Salvadorans largely view him as the President who signed the Peace Accords ending the civil war, leaving him with considerable prestige. End comment. BLAU