ELECTION PRIMER 2: AN UPDATE OF LEGISLATIVE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000002 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ES SUBJECT: ELECTION PRIMER 2: AN UPDATE OF LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICPAL RACES IN EL SALVADOR Classified By: The Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The January 18, 2009 Salvadoran legislative and municipal elections promise to have profound effects on the balance of power in the country. The (left-wing) FMLN party is likely poised to gain between three and five seats in the 84-member Legislative Assembly, positioning it to substantially increase its influence. The (center-right, pro-U.S.) ARENA party could lose seats, placing it in a position in which it can no longer form a majority through coalition only with the (right-wing) National Conciliation Party (PCN). The PCN seems set to maintain a similar number of seats in the Assembly, and is currently negotiating with the FMLN on a future alliance. The (center-right) Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is projected to gain a seat or two, possibly giving it enough seats to form a majority when allied with the FMLN, and thereby increasing the PDC's power while undermining the bargaining position of the PCN. ¶2. (C) Summary, continued: In municipal elections, the race for mayor of San Salvador is hotly contested. The FMLN incumbent and ARENA challenger are neck-and-neck. In the other larger cities, Santa Ana is a close three-way battle, while San Miguel and Santa Tecla seem set to re-elect their respective incumbents. The closer races, particularly that of San Salvador, have the potential to spark post-election violence. End Summary. ¶3. (SBU) El Salvador's legislative and municipal elections will take place on January 18, 2009. For legislative elections, political parties submit ranked lists of candidates by Department for the 84 seats in the Legislative Assembly. (Note: El Salvador has 14 Departments.) As the parties win seats in a given Department, names from those lists fill the seats in ranked order. All political parties have now released their lists of candidates. -------------- -------------- ARENA Seeks Damage Control in Legislative Elections -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) ARENA currently holds 34 seats in the Legislative Assembly and seems likely to lose some seats in January's legislative elections. If everything were to fall into place for ARENA, the party could make slight gains, but its upper limit would be 35 or 36 seats. If ARENA were to gain any seats, they would not be due to increased support, but rather from a loss of power by the smaller parties. Based on December Borges and Associates poll statistics, news daily El Diario de Hoy projected December 16 that ARENA would control 32 to 34 seats. ¶5. (C) Based on the party's submitted candidate list, 32 to 34 seats would result in 50 to 55 percent turnover. Political analyst Joaquin Samayoa told us December 16 that the ARENA list represents a slight overhaul, but that the party cannot afford to fully clean house because its presidential candidate, Rodrigo Avila, does not have enough public support. (Comment: As such, ARENA is torn between trying to shed its image as an insider's club and changing too much, thereby eroding its support base. End Comment.) -------------- -------------- FMLN Sees Ample Opportunity in Legislative Elections -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The FMLN currently holds 32 seats in the Legislative Assembly. The party is also likely to hold at least as many seats after January's elections. The FMLN has the potential to make some gains, but it seems almost impossible to reach the 43 seats that it would need to hold a simple majority. Some in the FMLN have expressed hope they can secure as many as 39 seats, though the 34 to 36 range is more probable. El Diario de Hoy projects 35 to 37 seats for the FMLN, based on the Borges polling data. ¶7. (C) According to these figures and the candidate list submitted by the FMLN, the party would have 55 to 60 percent turnover in its Legislative Assembly representation. This figure does not represent an ideological shift, however. Many of the names will change, but they will be replaced by names that have been deeply involved in the FMLN's activities and structure for many years. A key issue in the FMLN campaign has been the party's portrayal of itself as more moderate. Its main evidence of this has been the selection of Mauricio Funes as its candidate for President. However, very little else in the FMLN,s slate of candidates has indicated a shift of the party's position. For example, in the Department of San Salvador, the FMLN is projected to win twelve seats in the Legislative Assembly. Of these twelve, six of the current group of twelve would retain their positions. The remaining six would include Medardo Gonzalez, current leader of the party (and a former guerilla commander); Norma Guevara, current member of the party policy committee; Orestes Ortez, advisor of the Alba Petroleos fuel agreement with Venezuela; and Lorena Pena, current Deputy in the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). The absence of one of the more extreme left legislators, Salvador Arias, is the only indication of Funes, influence on the slate of candidates. ¶8. (C) The FMLN has no false hopes that it will reach the 43 seat majority. FMLN Deputy Hugo Martinez told us December 15 that they expect between 35 and 40. However, the FMLN also realizes that any gains made represent significant opportunity. In past elections, the PCN has held the third largest number of smaller party legislative seats. In recent years, the PCN has always aligned itself with ARENA. However, FMLN Deputy Walter Duran, to the visible displeasure of Martinez, told us December 15 that the FMLN has been negotiating an alliance with the PCN. -------------- Smaller Parties: A Potential Power Shift -------------- ¶9. (C) Classically, the balance of power among the three smaller parties, the PCN, the PDC, and the (center-left) Party for Democratic Change (CD),has been the PCN. In recent years, the PCN has held disproportionate power, as it has had enough legislative seats (10) to form a majority when allied with ARENA and approach a majority if allied with the FMLN. The party has essentially been able to hold either of the bigger parties hostage until it achieves its own goals. Joaquin Samayoa was very critical of the PCN. He told us December 16 that the PCN is the party that is most susceptible to outside influences, particularly those of organized crime, and that this makes them extremely dangerous. Based on the Borges poll data the PCN seems likely to win 8 or 9 seats in the Legislative Assembly in January, which would give it the ability to partner with the FMLN to create a majority. This is significant, as the party will likely no longer have a sufficient number of deputies to ally with ARENA for a majority. ¶10. (C) An interesting new wrinkle in this story is the potentially stronger showing of the PDC. If the FMLN and the PDC both reach their projected numbers of seats (37 and 6, respectively),they could have enough deputies to have an allied majority without the intervention of the PCN. This would dramatically shift the balance of power between the parties. The PCN would no longer have free reign, and the PDC would see a substantial increase in bargaining power. ¶11. (SBU) The third small party, CD, is projected to win zero Assembly seats in the 2009 elections. A fourth small party, the (center-left) Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR),has entered the fray, but is not likely to win anything beyond one or two small mayoral races. Neither the CD nor the FDR will be in any position of influence. ¶12. (C) According to the Salvadoran Constitution and Electoral Code, the PCN, PDC, and CD parties should not exist today. None has met the minimum percentage of the vote in the most recent elections to continue to function as a registered party. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, has opted to allow the parties to continue to function. (Comment: Neither ARENA nor the FMLN has protested this decision, presumably because each is terrified that the other could achieve a simple majority in the Legislative Assembly. End Comment.) -------------- Municipal Races of Note -------------- ¶13. (SBU) There are several significant municipal elections that will also be decided in January. The marquee race is that of the capital, San Salvador, in which the incumbent FMLN mayor, Violeta Menjivar, is engaged in a heated battle with ARENA challenger Norman Quijano. While the population of San Salvador slightly favors the FMLN, many are unhappy with the job that Menjivar has done over the past three years. Some poll figures (IUDOP, La Prensa Grafica) indicate that Menjivar holds a slight advantage in the race, but others (Borge and Associates) show a tight battle. Menjivar originally won her position in 2006 by a remarkable 44-vote margin. ¶14. (C) Joaquin Samayoa told us he thinks the San Salvador municipal race has the greatest chance of being the spark that sets off political violence. He said it holds explosive potential due to the close nature of the race; the FMLN is convinced that Menjivar is assured victory, and should she lose, forceful allegations of fraud are certain. He said this might be enough to ignite social unrest. TSE Advisor Luis Peralta echoed the sentiment. ¶15. (SBU) In San Salvador neighbor-city Santa Tecla, there is no race of which to speak. Incumbent FMLN mayor Oscar Ortiz holds a commanding lead in the polls over ARENA challenger Sonia de Flores. The October Borge and Associates poll showed Ortiz with 42.0 percent of the vote, with only 16.0 percent committing for Flores. Joaquin Samayoa told us that Ortiz has governed Santa Tecla well. The people think he is very open and addresses their concerns. Ortiz is a popular FMLN personality, and flirted with becoming the party's candidate for President prior to the selection of Mauricio Funes. ¶16. (SBU) Looking east, the uncertainty with the municipal race in San Miguel is not the identity of the candidate, but rather the loyalties of that candidate. The incumbent, outspoken personality Wilfredo Salgado, while very popular in San Miguel, is a polarizing figure who has regularly shifted his party alliance over his political career. Salgado has been the mayor of San Miguel since 2000, and in the years since, has switched parties three times. He began as a member of the PDC. Citing differences with party authorities, he jumped to the ARENA camp in 2002. However, he clashed with current President of El Salvador Elias Antonio "Tony" Saca, and moved to the PCN when Saca became President. This past year, Salgado considered a run for the Presidency with the PDC, after which the PCN expelled him from their ranks. ¶17. (C) Despite the constant movement, the people of San Miguel have backed Salgado as mayor for nearly a decade, suggesting they are less concerned with his loyalty to a party than his loyalty to his constituents. Despite the 2003 split, ARENA has continued to view Salgado as an ally. Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) Advisor Luis Peralta told us December 12 that ARENA recognizes that Salgado is not currently as popular as he has been in the past. Recognizing this, ARENA agreed to run a weaker candidate in San Miguel. ARENA realizes that it is in the party's interest to not detract votes from Salgado, as it would risk victory by FMLN candidate Ricardo Canales. November La Prensa Grafica poll statistics show Salgado holding 40.3 percent of likely voters, with Canales only controlling 14 percent. Canales' chances have been hurt by recent domestic violence allegations. ¶18. (C) Outside of San Salvador, Santa Ana is the closest municipal race among cities of significant size. The incumbent, the PDC's Oscar Mena, has substantial competition from challengers Francisco Polanco (FMLN) and Alfredo Lemus (ARENA). November La Prensa Grafica poll statistics give Polanco 19.3 percent, Mena 18.2 percent, and Lemus 16.8 percent. Mena, formerly of the FMLN, is currently running as a joint candidate of the PDC and FDR. His re-election efforts have been somewhat undermined by allegations of corruption. Joaquin Samayoa told us he thinks that Mena will persist and eventually win re-election. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶19. (C) The legislative and municipal elections could have two dramatic effects: a change in the course of the presidential race (Election Day: March 15) and the chance of social unrest. The concerns voiced by all sides about the potential for violence appear justified. If any significant race is not won by the party that expects to win, there will inevitably be accusations of fraud, which can quickly spiral out of control. The FMLN appears poised to make significant gains in the legislative elections. While a simple majority is out of reach, the party is a near lock for increased legislative influence. This may scare some undecided voters away from Funes in the subsequent presidential elections. Many are still afraid of giving power to the FMLN, and centrist voters may be unwilling to hand the party control of both the Legislative Assembly and the Presidency, even (or especially) if control of the Legislative Assembly depends on a third party. GLAZER