SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO EL SALVADOR FOR THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000164 SIPDIS CJCS FOR GENERAL CARTWRIGHT; OSD FOR A/S BENKERT; SOUTHCOM FOR LTG SPEARS; CENTCOM FOR LTG ALLEN; U.S. ARMY SOUTH FOR MG HUBER; SOCSOUTH FOR BG PAGAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019 TAGS: ES PM PREL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO EL SALVADOR FOR THE OIF SERVICE RECOGNITION CEREMONY Classified By: Charge Blau for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) The U.S. Embassy warmly welcomes your visit to El Salvador. Your presence here will demonstrate U.S. gratitude for Salvadoran support of OIF, as well as reinforce the importance the U.S. places on maintaining a close, cooperative bilateral relationship with El Salvador. -------------- Political Overview -------------- ¶2. (C) El Salvador's current political landscape is largely the result of the 1992 Peace Accords that ended the nation's twelve-year civil war. Under the agreement, the communist guerrillas, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN),laid down their weapons and became a legitimate political party. The government (GOES) in return agreed to disband elements of the military and security services notorious for human rights violations, to allow the FMLN to participate in the political process, to reform the judiciary, and to form a new National Civilian Police force (PNC) drawn from the ranks of demobilized guerrillas and former members of the armed forces. In the ensuing years, the conservative, pro-U.S. National Republican Alliance Party (ARENA) has won every Presidential election. Current Salvadoran President Elias Antonio "Tony" Saca, of the governing ARENA party, assumed office on June 1, 2004, after winning a hard-fought presidential race with 57.7 percent of votes cast. President Saca,s term expires May 31. ¶3. (C) You will be visiting El Salvador during a crucial period in the electoral calendar. The country held legislative and municipal elections on January 18, with the leftist FMLN winning a slim plurality of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. More importantly, El Salvador will hold Presidential elections on March 15, with conservative, pro-U.S. ARENA party candidate Rodrigo Avila facing off against leftist FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes. According to local polls, Funes holds a slight lead over Avila. (Note: Avila twice served as director of the Salvadoran National Civilian Police, and was Deputy Minister of Public Security and Justice. He is respected and well-known in U.S. law enforcement circles. End note). Funes, a former journalist who hosted one of El Salvador's most popular television news programs, is the first FMLN Presidential candidate who is not a former guerrilla leader. Funes' candidacy, fueled by name recognition, voter discontent over high crime, and the perceived lack of shared economic benefits under ARENA stewardship, offers the FMLN its strongest opportunity yet to win the Salvadoran presidency. ¶4. (C) Funes and company have indicated publicly that they will continue to cooperate with the U.S. on counter-narcotics and transnational crime, and to support ongoing public security endeavors such as the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) and the Comalapa Cooperative Security Location (CSL). At the same time, however, the FMLN senior leadership has strong links to Hugo Chavez and the rest of the Bolivarian bloc, and appears not to have significantly deviated from the Marxist world-view that motivated their guerrilla insurgency in the 1980,s. FMLN Vice Presidential candidate Sanchez Ceren is himself a former guerrilla commander. -------------- Economic Overview -------------- ¶5. (C) After growing by over four percent each of the last two years, the Salvadoran economy now appears to be slowing and may head into recession, depending on the extent of the financial contagion from the United States. El Salvador was the first Central American country to implement CAFTA-DR, and exports, which have continued to increase through September 2008, remain the bright spot of the economy. Populist policies in the run-up to 2009 elections, including costly subsidies for electricity, propane gas, and transportation, have led to increasing fiscal indiscipline, and the government has recently experienced problems in placing its short-term debt. A number of international businesses have recently scaled back or shut down operations in El Salvador because of worldwide economic conditions. The security situation continues to impose a considerable operational cost on businesses and remains a detriment to foreign direct investment. -------------- Civilian-Military Relations -------------- ¶6. (C) The Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) are capable, professional, and subordinate to civilian authority. The military consistently receives high approval ratings in public opinion polls, due largely to its response to national disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, and outbreaks of infectious diseases such as dengue. Salvadoran soldiers also support police in counter-narcotics efforts, anti-gang patrols, rural patrols, customs inspections, and reform-school training for juvenile convicts. On January 1, 2009 the Minister of Defense, MG Jorge Molina as well as Vice MOD, VADM Marco Palacios, retired from active duty, although President Saca has retained both in their positions. Also on January 1, the former Army Chief of Staff, BG Oswaldo Rubio, was promoted to MG and became the Chief of Defense, replacing MG Mendoza, who was retired. Newly promoted BG Joaquin Galvez assumed the Vice Chief of Defense position on January 1st as well. ¶7. (C) The ESAF continues to focus on force modernization in a constrained budget environment. The ESAF currently has approximately 12,000 total service members and 2,500 administrative personnel. The ESAF's funding level of USD 115 million has changed very little for several years, representing a slightly declining percentage of the national budget. Small increases for the ESAF in recent yearly budgets have been obligated to a pay raise, so there is no net increase in funds available for operations, training, maintenance, and modernization. While El Salvador currently receives modest FMF allocations, (2nd highest in AOR most years and one of only two allocations in FY08),military officials have expressed their desire for considerable increases to help address pressing modernization needs. The focus of our FMF expenditures is on developing host nation capabilities in disaster relief, peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and to counter illicit trafficking. -------------- OIF Service -------------- ¶8. (U) The GOES initially deployed forces to Iraq in August ¶2003. Since then, El Salvador has deployed eleven contingents to Iraq in support of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction missions. The Salvadorans suffered five KIA and over 50 wounded during their participation in coalition operations. One Salvadoran soldier, CPL Platero, has been at Brook Army Medical Center in Texas recovering from a severe leg injury since October 2006 and is expected to return to El Salvador in August 2009. ¶9. (U) The eleven Salvadoran "Cuscatlan" battalions have overseen more than 362 humanitarian assistance projects valued at more than USD 23 million, including the construction of roads, schools, and medical clinics, as well as installation of power generators and transformers. Salvadoran troops performed admirably during their five and a half years in Iraq. Their performance has been recognized at various levels, to include six soldiers being awarded the Bronze Star by former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for saving the life of Najaf's Coalition Provisional Authority Provincial Coordinator and five other American Government Officials. In May 2007, President Saca made an unannounced visit to Iraq and personally expressed his gratitude and pride for their tremendous contributions to the reconstruction of Iraq. Salvadoran soldiers were intimately involved in the training and equipping of the Iraqi Civil Defense Forces in Najaf, Al Hillah, and Al Kut. The national press has positively portrayed the real impact of ESAF efforts and the gratitude of Iraqi provincial leaders. Although public opposition to Salvadoran involvement in Iraq at times ran as high as 70 percent, the Saca administration and the Legislative Assembly nonetheless found a way to extend the Salvadoran military presence in Iraq through early ¶2009. Unfortunately, their departure was a product of misunderstandings -- they might otherwise have stayed through June, 2009. -------------- Peacekeeping and International Agreements -------------- ¶10. (C) The GOES is interested in peacekeeping opportunities, although current ESAF budget constraints make large-scale deployments of troops unlikely without significant external support. In August 2008, the ESAF deployed 51 soldiers as part of a Spanish-led contingent in support of the UN mission in Lebanon. In February 2009 they deployed another 50-man platoon to relieve the original unit. The ESAF is also coordinating with the Spanish armed forces to deploy troops to the UN mission in Bosnia. ¶11. (SBU) The UN has certified the ESAF as competent for full participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Since 2005 the USG has released funding for equipment and training for the ESAF to take part in the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI). This would support a long-term desire of the Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC) to deploy a combined peacekeeping unit from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. El Salvador is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court, but signed and ratified Article 98 provisions to the Rome Statute with the U.S. in 2004. In late 2006 the legislature approved a 505 Agreement for U.S.-provided assistance; the Assembly has also approved an agreement for the protection of classified military information and the DOD/DOS preferred global format Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). ¶12. (C) Comment: Depending on the outcome of the March 15 Presidential election, as well as the level and nature of USG engagement, there is a reasonably strong possibility of the ESAF agreeing to commit troops to OEF (Afghanistan) within the next year. While the political situation will not solidify until after the March 15 elections, it could be a worthwhile exercise to plant the seeds for an OEF commitment during your visit. End comment. -------------- Counternarcotics and Transnational Crime -------------- ¶13. (C) El Salvador is a transit country for narcotics, mainly cocaine and heroin. The country's geographic position makes it vulnerable to those trafficking drugs, drug proceeds (in the form of bulk currency shipments),people, and guns to or from the United States. U.S.-funded training and equipment have contributed significantly to improvements in the National Civilian Police (PNC) Counternarcotics Division. JIATF-South, with its ability to provide Salvadoran authorities with real-time intelligence, is also a great asset; however, the ESAF need additional operational capabilities to help us take full advantage of JIATF's contributions. Some of these Salvadoran operational shortcomings will hopefully be addressed via Merida Initiative funds earmarked for communications gear and high-speed open ocean interceptors. ¶14. (SBU) The Salvadoran government is a valuable partner in the war on drugs, and has assumed an important leadership role in regional initiatives to improve public security in Central America. The GOES hosts the FBI-led Transnational Anti-gang Unit (TAG),the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA),and the Comalapa Cooperative Security Location (CSL). The GOES is an ally is efforts to curtail transnational street gang activity, to disrupt maritime narcotics trafficking routes, and to strengthen the rule of law throughout the hemisphere. The current government of El Salvador enthusiastically supports the Merida Initiative, and continues to aggressively push the Central American Integration System (SICA in Spanish) to implement a comprehensive regional plan for improving public security. ¶15. (SBU) Despite their cooperative attitude, the Salvadorans are not winning the battle against organized crime. Illegal immigration to the U.S., coupled with deportation of illegal aliens back to El Salvador, feeds the explosive regional growth of transnational street gangs. Salvadoran officials frequently infer that the country's spiraling violent crime rates are largely the result of the U.S. deporting illegal alien gang members back to El Salvador. But they could do more themselves, for example pass wire tap legislation. Additionally, enactment of a civil asset forfeiture statue would also help to offset the significant budget shortfalls faced by the National Civilian Police and the judicial sector. Finally, moving forward on extradition would help to ensure that neither the hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans residing in the U.S. (legally and otherwise),nor fugitive American criminals, find safe haven in El Salvador and avoid punishment for crimes they commit. -------------- CSL Extension -------------- ¶16. (C) In July 2008, Embassy San Salvador delivered to the GOES the U.S. request for an early five-year renewal of the current CSL agreement, which expires in August 2010. On December 17, 2008, El Salvador delivered a counterproposal to expand the list of allowable activities to include humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism operations, and training and military exercises as well as authorization for U.S. military access to additional Salvadoran bases beyond Comalapa; in return, the U.S. would improve the capabilities of the Salvadoran military. This proposal would provide a new ten-year agreement. Such an agreement would have to be approved by the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly. The GOES is confident that it has the necessary votes. President Saca has publicly stated his desire to ensure future operations at Comalapa before he leaves office May 31. The USG has not yet formally responded to the GOES counterproposal. -------------- Suggested Take Aways -------------- ¶17. (C) In addition to expressing U.S. gratitude for Salvadoran sacrifices in support of OIF, and strengthening institutional ties with the ESAF, your visit could also serve as a valuable opportunity to move forward on the CSL, both in Washington and here in El Salvador. We suggest that you use interactions with high-level GOES officials to seek closure on a CSL extension. You could also raise the potential ESAF commitment to OEF, should the political calculus fall into place. ¶18. (SBU) At the same time, we must be careful to avoid any politicization of your visit, and not impart the impression that your attendance at the OIF commemoration ceremony is in any way related to the upcoming Presidential elections. BLAU