President Funes Working Toward Honduras Solution, Fighting

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 001109

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/20
TAGS: PGOV PREL HO ES
SUBJECT: President Funes Working Toward Honduras Solution, Fighting
FMLN Demons

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Blau, Charge d Affairs; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. Summary: President Funes told visiting WHA DAS Julissa
Reynoso he is prepared to participate in an urgent regional
diplomatic initiative to resolve the Honduran political crisis.
Funes said Salvadoran recognition of President-elect Lobo depended
on the joint resignations of Micheletti and Zelaya and the granting
of amnesty for the parties involved. Funes reiterated his strong
support for the U.S.-El Salvador bilateral relationship, despite
radical public statements made by some FMLN members of his
government. Funes fumed over the seeming inability of some FMLN
members of his government to separate party positions from
positions of the State, requiring the President to "face his
internal demons" and publically rebuke senior FMLN members of
government. Funes recognizes his high public approval ratings
could provide the opportunity to form a new center/center-left
party for voters who support him and his policies, but not the FMLN
or a weakened ARENA. End Summary.



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Honduras

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2. (C) During a December 18 meeting, President Funes told WHA
DAS Julissa Reynoso he is working steadily toward a regional
solution in Honduras. Funes said that with his blessing, President
Antonio Saca traveled to Tegucigalpa to speak with President-elect
Lobo on December 17 concerning the rapid formation of a unity
government that did not include Manuel Zelaya or de facto regime
leader Roberto Micheletti. Agreeing with DAS Reynoso's strategy
of urgent and vigorous regional engagement, Funes said he and
President Colom of Guatemala would be willing to lead a public
Central American initiative to work with Lobo toward implementation
of the rest of the San Jose-Tegucigalpa Accord. DAS Reynoso
offered USG support for this approach and undertook to closely
coordinate USG policy with the GOES, to maximize the political
effect of the regional initiative.




3. (C) Funes told DAS Reynoso he was confident Lobo would be
able to achieve an "internal agreement" among the parties to
resolve the current crisis quickly. He offered to dispatch Foreign
Minister Hugo Martinez to Honduras to speak with Lobo, as part of a
joint intervention with Guatemala's Foreign Minister Heraldo Rodas.
Funes said that meeting would lay the groundwork for a joint
Funes-Colom meeting in El Salvador or Guatemala with
President-elect Lobo to press for their political redlines: a) that
Micheletti and Zelaya both step down quickly from their positions
of power, and b) granting of amnesty to allow Zelaya a way out of
the crisis without prosecution. Funes added that other regional
leaders, even including President Ortega, agree the Honduras crisis
must be resolved as soon as possible.



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Relations with the United States

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4. (C) President Funes repeated privately what he has been
saying over and over lately to the press and in public: that El
Salvador views the United states as its key strategic partner and
values the strong relationship between the two countries. Funes
assured DAS Reynoso he was clearly in charge of foreign policy, and
said that under no circumstances would he allow El Salvador to join
ALBA. Funes added that the political crisis in Honduras started
when Zelaya permitted Chavez to exert too much influence. Chavez's
having publicly insulted the Honduran public, with Zelaya's
apparent blessing was, to Funes, an ugly scene that he would never
permit in El Salvador. When asked by DAS Reynoso how the USG can
help to further solidify the bilateral relationship across the
political spectrum in El Salvador, Funes said the actions taken by
the USG that support successful development initiatives will
reinforce Funes's pragmatic policies. The Charge noted that during
a recent lunch, FMLN party leaders recognized they have no

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significant concerns over USG policies related to El Salvador, and
that their differences with the U.S. relate U.S. policies in
Honduras and Colombia.



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Internal Politics

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5. (C) Funes told DAS Reynoso he was frustrated by the FMLN's
continued radicalism and the seeming inability of senior FMLN
members of government to separate political positions of the party
and political positions of the State. Funes said recent statements
made during trips (not State visits, Funes pointed out) to Cuba and
Venezuela by Vice President and Minister of Education Salvador
Sanchez Cerin forced Funes to "once again face my internal demons"
and publically rebuke the Vice President. Funes admitted that
hard-line elements of the FMLN will never give up on joining ALBA
or pulling closer to Chavez. He noted that FM Martinez, on direct
instructions from Funes, had to step out of the FMLN party
convention on December 13 when the party voted in support of 21st
Century Socialism and joining ALBA. Funes said he had hoped that
the FMLN would moderate with its participation in government, but
recognized that this was not happening. He said the FMLN still
could exert pressure against him via votes in the legislature, or
by other means, so he had to think of creative ways to make use of
his 80-percent popularity for political gain. Pointing out that
ARENA was disintegrating, he said it was time to seriously consider
building a center or center-left party that reflected the public's
disaffection with both FMLN and ARENA.



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Comment

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6. (C) Withholding El Salvador's recognition of
President-elect Lobo provides a useful fulcrum for Funes and Colom
to exert leverage toward a comprehensive solution to the crisis in
Honduras. Funes and Martinez appreciated the USG support for their
initiatives provided by DAS Reynoso, and expressed optimism that
the crisis could be resolved with time. Funes also appeared very
confident that his popularity would keep the FMLN hard-liners in
check. There is a political vacuum available in the
center/center-left for a new party to capture what Funes called the
"silent majority" of voters who support him but who do not support
ARENA or the FMLN. Regardless, DAS Reynoso's interlocutors
expressed support and appreciation for the strong bilateral
relationship shared between the U.S. and El Salvador. End Comment.




7. DAS Reynoso cleared this message.
BLAU