TFHO1: ARIAS MAKES FINAL EFFORT FOR HONDURAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000622 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN AND USOAS, SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 TAGS: AEMR ASEC CASC KFLO MARR AMGT PGOV PINR PREL KDEM, CS, HO SUBJECT: TFHO1: ARIAS MAKES FINAL EFFORT FOR HONDURAS SOLUTION REF: A. SAN JOSE 608 ¶B. SAN JOSE 602 ¶C. SAN JOSE 587 Classified By: Peter M. Brennan for reason 1.4 (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On July 22, President Oscar Arias presented his final proposal, a carefully balanced mix of his original Seven Points and a Micheletti counterproposal, to end the ongoing constitutional crisis in Honduras. The "San Jose Accord (or Agreement)," as Arias called it (despite a lack of agreement on either side) laid out 12 points detailing a possible reconciliation including the return of Manuel Zelaya to the presidency and the moving forward by one month of national elections. Zelaya representative Rixi Moncada, in her statement after Arias read his proposal, said that the "accord had failed" and repeatedly referred to the interim government as a "militaristic, coupist" regime. Roberto Micheletti's representative at the press conference, Mauricio Villeda, was less antagonistic and said that "we respect the separation of powers" in government and would review Arias' proposal with the legislature and Supreme Court. However, he still rejected the re-installation of Zelaya as president. Arias ended his part by saying that unless both parties agreed to discuss the San Jose Accord, his mediation was over and further mediation could take place at the OAS. A brief review of the San Jose Agreement is in para seven. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Late in the afternoon of July 22, President Oscar Arias convened a press conference on his "San Jose Accord," flanked by both Honduran delegations. Approximately 20 ambassadors, including CDA Brennan, from the diplomatic corps also attended the event. In his opening statement, Arias reviewed the status of negotiations in San Jose up to that point and emphasized that the only way out of this stalemate was by a negotiated reconciliation. Victory, he said, will go to both sides, or none at all. ¶3. (U) Arias said that it was up to the delegations now to decide if they were going to sign the accord and that his job as mediator was to seek the peaceful re-establishment of the constitutional order and democracy in Honduras. He underlined that unless both parties committed to work on the new accord, his mediating role was complete and that there were other routes for mediation to this conflict, such as the OAS. He hoped that the Honduran delegations would now complete their part. ¶4. (U) At this point, Arias proceeded to read, word for word, the entire 12 points of the San Jose Accord. (NOTE: Actually, there are 10 substantial points, an implementation schedule, and a final declaration. END NOTE) Immediately after Arias' speech, Rixi Moncada (from Zelaya's delegation) forcefully read her statement and concluded by saying that the "agreement had failed." She repeatedly referred to the de facto government as a militaristic and "coupist" ("golpista" in Spanish) regime and would not sign this new "agreement." Moncada added that: -- From Saturday (July 18) until today nothing has happened; -- their side had accepted Arias' Seven Point proposal, but Micheletti's had not; -- we want to re-establish the constitutional order; -- at the request of U.S. Secretary (of State) Clinton, we accepted President Arias' mediation, but the de facto regime did not; -- we request that President Arias urgently cal on all SICA presidents, the OAS Permanent Councl and the UN Security Council to enforce their rsolutions based on domestic and international rights; and -- this proposal failed because of the ntransigent de facto government. ¶5. (SBU) Immdiately after Moncada spoke, Micheletti representative Mauricio Villeda said that he would take the proposal back to Honduras. He emphasized, in a pointed jab at the Zelaya delegation, that "we respect the separation of powers" of government and "democratic institutionality." His statement was far less antagonistic than Moncada's, but he firmly rejected any re-installation of Zelaya as president. Villeda added that: -- Honduras is a country that has experienced a great deal of international interference; -- the country is united and you can travel there and verify it; -- this accord presents points already proposed, its calendar insists on Zelaya's return to power and the conformation of a conciliation government; -- we are taking this proposal to our three powers and our general prosecutor; and -- our authorities will be in touch with you to continue this dialogue. ¶6. (C) After all of the statements, Costa Rican FM Bruno Stagno told us that there really was no viable option other than negotiation. He said that "armed insurrection is not the answer." He also agreed that neither side really wanted to go back to the OAS. He added that behind closed doors, the delegations were not as "sharp" with each other and that there was still room for negotiation and time to peacefully resolve the crisis. President Arias figured that it could take up to eight days for the next round of negotiations to begin. ¶7. (U) Brief review of the 12 points of the San Jose Agreement: -- Formation of a government of national unity and reconciliation comprised of representatives of the different political parties; -- Political amnesty exclusively for political crimes committed before and after June 28, 2009 and until the signing of this agreement. Likewise, signatories to the agreement would not initiate or continue legal actions on account of acts prior to July 1, 2009 arising out of this conflict for a period of six months; -- Renouncement of the convocation of a constituent national assembly to amend aspects of the constitution that cannot be amended; -- Consider moving forward national elections from November 29 to October 28, 2009; -- Command of the Honduran Armed Forces would transfer to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal one month prior to the elections; -- Return of public authorities to positions they held prior to June 28, which implies the return of Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales to the Presidency of the Republic until the end of the current governmental term on January 27, 2010; -- Establishment of a Verification Commission (to be chaired by OAS and other Honduran and international suitable figures to ensure that this agreement is carried out, and the establishment of a Truth Commission; -- Normalization of relations between Honduras and the international community (requesting immediate revocation of measures or sanctions imposed against Honduras); -- Entry into force of the Agreement of San Jose (upon signature); -- Final Provisions (disagreements on interpretation or implementation of this agreement will be submitted to the Verification Commission); -- Schedule for compliance with the Agreement (lists dates for compliance if this agreement had been signed); and -- Final Statement (commitment to implementing agreement). -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) With this proposal, Arias has left the ball firmly in the courts of Zelaya and Micheletti. Both sides, though, are clearly dug in to their primary positions and have not budged on them. With Arias' negotiations "complete," there is at this point no plan for next steps, no definite timetable, and no clear path to a resolution. Costa Rica is hosting the 11th Tuxtla summit next week (July 27) and Zelaya has confirmed his participation, so there may be further discussions on the margins of that event. BRENNAN