SHOURA COUNCIL MEMBER ON SOUTHERN UNREST: SALEH'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000950

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER YM
SUBJECT: SHOURA COUNCIL MEMBER ON SOUTHERN UNREST: SALEH'S
CONCESSIONS MAY NOT SUFFICE LONG-TERM

REF: SANAA 942

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. According to a well-connected Shoura Council
member, President Saleh made some mistakes which helped
escalate southern unrest. His current efforts to stop the
situation from deteriorating will probably prevent a crisis
during this weekend's Unity Day celebrations/demonstrations,
but in the long term the President, who is under an
increasing amount of stress, may be unwilling to take the
necessary difficult steps to address southern grievances.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Over a private lunch on May 18, Shoura Council member
and former cabinet member Mohamed al-Tayeb painted a bleak
picture of developments in Yemen's southern governorates and
of the pressures building on President Saleh. (Note:
Al-Tayeb, who chews qat with President Saleh, enjoys greater
access to the President's inner circle than his title
suggests. End Note.)


3. (C) Things in the south got out of hand, said al-Tayeb,
because the President "made some mistakes." Paramount among
these mistakes was the President's behavior during an April 1
telephone call with Sheikh Tariq al-Fadhli, a former ally of
President Saleh with close extremist ties, during which the
President became so enraged with al-Fadhli's attitude that he
let loose a series of insults "like you've never heard
before," said al-Tayeb. The next morning, al-Fadhli stunned
the President (and pretty much everyone else) by announcing
his support for the Southern Movement. Had the President
better controlled his temper during the telephone call, said
al-Tayeb, al-Fadhli would likely have handled things
differently.


4. (C) Al-Tayeb also criticized the Information Minister's
"crazy, stupid" decision to shut down several independent
newspapers which had been reporting on developments in the
south. Noting that the Information Minister could not have
done so without the support and approval of the President,
al-Tayeb pointed to the move as another error in judgment by
the President, one likely to have international repercussions
if the decision is not reversed soon.


5. (C) Once the President realized the amount of support
al-Fadhli's announcement was generating, he realized that he
had to act quickly to prevent the situation in the south from
spiraling out of control, said al-Tayeb. He sent Northwest
Regional Military Commander Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (who is
married to al-Fadhli's sister) to talk to al-Fadhli;
al-Fadhli's brothers are also reportedly engaging in
behind-the-scenes dialogue with the ROYG. (Note: According
to al-Tayeb, the President has not spoken directly to
al-Fadhli since their telephone argument the night before
al-Fadhli's announcement. End Note.) The President also
sent the Prime Minister to the southern governorate of
Hadramout and the Vice President to Aden; both officials used
their visits to inaugurate development projects in an attempt
to satisfy complaints that the south does not receive its
fair share of such projects. (Note: Post is sending via
septel an overview of recent ROYG actions to address southern
grievances. End Note.)


6. (C) Unfortunately, said al-Tayeb, although the President
is (only just recently) saying all the right things about how
he wants to make amends and address southern grievances, in
reality he is not prepared to make the serious concessions
that are needed. These concessions fall into three main
categories: replacement of corrupt military commanders,
return of seized lands, and decentralization measures. The
most important of these three steps, said al-Tayeb, is the
first one, particularly with regard to Eastern Regional
Military Commander Mohamed Ali Mohsen (no relation to
Northwest Regional Military Commander/al-Fadhli's
brother-in-law) and Southern Regional Military Commander
Mahdi Maqwalla, both of whom are among the most corrupt
officials in the country. (Note: Maqwalla, for example, has
secured so much land for himself that he is now known as
"Aden's landlord." End Note.) The problem, said al-Tayeb,
is that the President trusts very few people, and he would
rather keep a corrupt commander whom he trusts than replace
him with an honest person whom he does not necessarily trust.
(Note: According to an as-yet unconfirmed press report, the
President has replaced the Southern Regional Military
Commander with a nephew, Tariq Saleh, head of the
Presidential Guard. Tariq Saleh has a reputation as an
honest and competent individual. End Note.)


7. (C) Given the above steps, said al-Tayeb, combined with

the fact that the southerners remain largely disorganized and
have not yet coalesced into a unified movement speaking with
one voice, he is not particularly worried about events this
coming weekend, when Yemen will celebrate the 19th
anniversary of Yemen's unification. He does not expect
protests and demonstrations (even those calling for
secession) to spin out of control; if they do, he does not
expect the ROYG to respond with disproportionate force. The
President has things under control, said al-Tayeb, "for the
time being." Al-Tayeb is far more concerned about the
long-term prospects for the south, especially if the
President does not take some of the hard steps outlined
above. The President is worried, too, said al-Tayeb, who
described the current set of challenges (the south, the
al-Houthi rebellion in the north, al-Qaeda, the economy,
etc.) facing Yemen as the worst the President has ever faced
and stated that the President has been drinking more each
evening and has begun taking a sleeping pill at night.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Al-Tayeb's observations track with reftel assessment
of the short- and long-term implications of southern
developments. He knows the President well, and has a good
understanding both of the President's temperament and of how
far the President is willing to go. In the case of the
south, the latter may be "not far enough." END COMMENT.
SECHE